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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
"... given the near universality of market failures in poor 
countries, it should be possible, with a combination of 
careful research and good thinking, to identify 
opportunities for redirecting resources to poorer people 
who are in aposition to make very good use of them. 
World Development Report 2006 
1. Sri Lanka's accomplishments in the area o f  social policy surpass most developing countries. 
Sri Lanka has made stellar progress on the millennium development goals: the country has already 
attained universal primary education and completion and has achieved gender parity at primary and 
secondary education levels. Sri Lanka's child and infant mortality rates are unusually low relative to other 
developing countries, and also compare favorably with some middle income countries. While challenges 
remain-particularly in improving the quality of  education services, tackling persistent child malnutrition, 
and addressing regional disparities in social outcomes -Sri Lanka's accomplishments are remarkable for 
a developing country, particularly one that has endured a 20 year civil conflict (World Bank 2005a). 
2. Sri  Lanka's performance on poverty reduction has been more modest. Almost a quarter o f  
Sri Lankan population i s  poor, with poverty concentrated in rural areas. Despite average annual economic 
growth of  4.5 percent in the last decade (1994-2003), the decline in poverty has been modest, dampened 
by growing inequality.' I f inequality had not increased, poverty reduction would have been more than 5 
fold higher. That said, given its much higher level o f  income, poverty rates in Sri Lanka are s t i l l  much 
lower than for most South Asian countries (World Bank 2005a) and while inequality i s  much higher than 
most countries in the region, it i s  far lower than for many Latin American countries (World Bank 2006). 
3. Aside from poverty (low income), Sri Lankans also face considerable vulnerability to 
income shocks. The poor, with few assets and limited access to markets, are often the hardest hit, but 
income shocks can also drive many non-poor into poverty. Results from a recent survey, consistent with 
results from other South Asian countries, show that the major individual risks faced by Sri Lankan 
households are sickness, disability and death o f  a family member and unemployment, and the main 
comnzunity-wide (aggregate) shocks include drought, crop failure, and other natural disasters (the most 
recent and disastrous being the tsunami).2 Moreover, Sr i  Lanka has one o f  the most rapidly aging 
populations in South Asia. Over the next 25 years, the share o f  the population over 60 wil l  double from 
about 10 to 20 percent and this demographic trend will have an aggregate impact on the economy, 
' Gini Index o f  per capita consumption expenditures, a measure of inequality, increased from 0.32 to 0.40 over the period 
1990/9 1 to 2000. 
The microfinance survey found that over a twelve month period, over a half o f  households experienced significant income 
shocks, with 2 1 percent o f  households being exposed to sickness, injury and death, 16 percent to unemployment, 23 percent to 
natural calamities, and 18 percent to crop failures n Sri Lanka i s  amongst the highest in the region, it i s  lower than found in many 
countries o f  Latin America. 
2 
1 
potentially changing patterns o f  labor force participation and the composition o f  health care, and 
imposing a strain on traditional and formal income support  system^.^ 
4. There are several poor and vulnerable groups deserving attention. Among children, these 
groups include those l iv ing in large families (the poverty incidence o f  households with 3 children i s  57 
percent above the national average and o f  households with 4 or more children i s  more than double the 
national average), disabled children and child workerdstreet children, children affected by the conflict 
(child soldiers), children who drop out from school (though their numbers are very small relative to other 
South Asian countries), and malnourished children. Among working age adults, the most poor and 
vulnerable are informal sector workers l iv ing i n  remote and infrastructure poor areas (particularly 
uneducated, casual and own-account workers), unemployed youth f rom low  income families, displaced 
due to the c iv i l  conflict or natural disasters, and the disabled. Among the elderly, only the oldest face 
above-average poverty rates (the incidence o f  poverty among households with member over 80 years old 
i s  I O  percent above the national average), but rapid aging o f  the population may lead to strains in the 
traditional and formal income support systems and contribute to future vulnerability among the elderly. 
5 .  Sri Lanka i s  committed to promoting equitable growth and has instituted several social 
protection programs. A fairly extensive social protection system comprises three main components: (i) 
e/iip/oy/iient yrorecrion and promotion: labor legislation, unions, collective bargaining and related 
i n s t i t 11 ti on s, and t ra i n i n g/re t rai n i n g o f  workers; ( i i) social security/insurance programs : pensions, 
disability, survivor insurance (coupled with universal health coverage); and (iii) safely nets, or protection 
o f  last resort: mainly cash transfers and social welfare and care services. Informal networks, including 
those relying on migration and remittances, continue to have an important role in helping people weather 
chronic poverty and income shocks, but the viability o f  such networks given urbanization and aging i s  in 
question; and evidence suggests that informal arrangements are not able to provide protection against 
community wide  shock^.^ 
6. This report reviews Sr i  Lanka’s social protection programs and proposes strategic options 
for enhancing their role in promoting growth with equity. Wel l  designed social protection (SP) 
systems can help address poverty and inequality through redistribution, and mitigate risks and facilitate 
employment opportunities, thus contributing to both growth and equity goals.5 The report first identifies 
the poor and vulnerable (chapter I) and then reviews and evaluates employment protection and promotion 
policies and programs (chapter 2), social security/insurance schemes (chapter 3), and safety net programs 
(chapter 4) and proposes policy options The concluding chapter summarizes key analytical findings and 
presents a unified policy framework to improve social protection. The report relies mainly on extensive 
existing literature f rom Sri Lankan and international researchers. The remaining part o f  this section 
-’ While more evidence on income shocks i s  merited, risks facing Sri  Lankan households are not dissimilar to those 
affecting other households in South Asian region. Recent evidence on income risks in such diverse countries as 
Afghanistan, India (Andhra Pradesh) and Maldives suggest that health and disability shocks are amongst the most 
important income shocks (in terms o f  frequency and lost income) faced by households in these countries (World 
Bank 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). And South Asian countries are highly prone to natural disasters, as the most recent 
earthquake in Pakistan bears witness. 
See Townsend (1994), Morduch (1995, 2002), Ravallion and Chauduri (1997), and Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2005) for evidence on informal support networks in promoting consumption smoothing. 
See World Bank (2001) for a description of  how social protection issues are addressed by the social risk 
management framework, and World Bank (2005e) for a discussion o f  how equity contributes to growth. Note that 
social risk management approach categorizes mechanisms into three categories: (i) those that reduce social risks (for 
example, reduce the probability o f  becoming unemployed or sick); (ii) those that mitigate social risk (for example, 
reduce the impact o f  unemployment or sickness); and (iii) those applied in response to the undesirable event- 
coping mechanisms (for example, social assistance). 
5 
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summarizes the main issues and policy options. (The main results o f  the poverty and vulnerability chapter 
have been detailed i n  paragraphs 2-4 above.) 
I. Sri Lanka’s Social Protection System 
7. As in most countries, Sri Lanka’s social protection system has three main elements: employment 
protection and promotion; social security/insurance, and safety nets. I t s  coverage i s  much more extensive 
than in other South Asian countries, with up to a third o f  the workforce covered in case o f  employment 
protection and social security, and about 40 percent o f  households covered in the case o f  the largest safety 
net (cash benefit) program. Social protection expenditures amounted to approximately 3 percent o f  GDP 
in 2004 (2 percent for pensions and 1 percent for safety netsebut the large impl ic i t  debt o f  the pension 
system (estimated at 60 percent o f  GDP) means that the above costs underestimate the full fiscal costs o f  
the social protection system. 
1. Employment Protection and Promotion 
8. Sri Lanka i s  to be commended for providing basic protection of  core labor standards- 
albeit to formal sector workers. Sri Lanka has ratified eight ILO conventions on core labor standards, 
including the right to collective bargaining and freedom o f  association. Tripartite mechanisms for social 
dialogue have been in  place for a long time and trade unions, employers and the government interact 
collectively to resolve critical issues in industrial relations, e.g., wages and other disputes. While the 
problem o f  child labor (street children and child soldiers) remains, strong chi ld focused policies (e.g., 
inclusive education system and employment protection) have led to one o f  the lowest rates o f  out o f  
school children (and incidence o f  child labor) in all o f  South Asia. Gender discrimination in wages i s  
present-women earn less than men, as a result o f  productivity differences, but also because o f  other non- 
economic factors-but there i s  no evidence o f  ethnicity-based differences in earnings. 
Key Issues 
9. However, Sr i  Lanka’s labor market institutions provide excessive job protection for formal 
sector workers. Sri Lanka’s severance pay (TEWA) system i s  one o f  the most restrictive severance pay 
systems in the world (for example, a Sri Lankan worker with 20 years o f  experience i s  awarded by a 
severance pay o f  39 monthly wages vs. average o f  16 in other Asian countries and 6 in OECD countries), 
and the process o f  separation requires prior approval by the Labor Commissioner and i s  thus non- 
transparent and arbitrary. Wage setting institutions have also considerably raised the returns o f  public 
sector workers and ‘protected’ private sector workers (covered under the TEWA) relative to informal 
sector workers. Adding to perverse labor market incentives (and contributing to government over- 
staffing) are patronage-based appointments to the c iv i l  service. 
10. Excessive job security leads to lower productivity and exclusion of  vulnerable workers from 
formal sector jobs. Labor market institutions that encourage worker voice can help reduce 
discriminatory practices, enhance work place health, safety, and training-improving equity and 
productivity o f  covered workers. However, international evidence suggests that excessive protection to 
incumbent workers (’or insiders’) can reduce the reallocation o f  labor required to enhance economic 
productivity. I t  i s  perhaps not surprising, then, that j ob  f low rates in Sri Lanka are far lower than those 
found in developed, transition and other developing countries (in early 2000s, Sri Lanka’s j o b  creation 
rate was 8 percent and j o b  destruction rate was 4 percent, vastly lagging behind the average job  creation 
For an extensive survey on the literature o f  the economic and employment impact o f  unions and collective 
bargaining see Aidt and Tzannatos (2000), based on OECD experience, and World Bank (2005) and Nickell and 
Layard (1997), based on experience o f  other countries. 
6 
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rate of  14 percent and job destruction rate o f  11 percent in selected 17 developed, transition and 
developing countries, see chapter 2). Moreover, international evidence shows that restrictive employment 
protection legislation, like the TEWA, reduces job prospects of  vulnerable groups (or ‘outsiders’) e.g., 
women, youth, and informal workers, as observed in Sr i  LankaS7 Thus excessive protection o f  workers 
has not only efficiency costs, but also results in exclusion of  vulnerable groups from the labor market. 
1 1 .  Wage setting institutions increase wages of  formal sector workers relative to informal sector 
workers. There i s  compelling evidence that wage setting institutions (unions and collective bargaining, 
tripartite pay commissions) have created an art i f ic ial gap between better-paying jobs in the public and the 
“protected” private sector, and low-paying jobs in the “unprotected” private sector. Empirical analysis 
shows that public and formal private sector jobs command an important wage premium which cannot be 
explained by the productive characteristics of the workers. Other things equal, returns of  public sector 
workers are 14 percent more, and returns of  the ‘protected’ private sector workers (covered under the 
TEWA) are 11-12 percent more than returns of  informal sector workers. I n  addition, public sector 
workers enjoy other benefits such as tax exemption, job security and non-contributory pensions. Unions 
are also more likely to be active in this sector, compelling greater compliance with protective labor 
legislation and engaging in collective bargaining. However, women earn less than men, as a result o f  
productivity differences but also because o f  other factors, such as discrimination. On the positive side, 
there i s  no evidence o f  ethnicity-based differences in earnings (with few exceptions, studies show 
statistically insignificant differences in earnings, once differences in observable characteristics of  
individuals are accounted for). 
12. Recent evidence supports that high unemployment is  linked to the queuing and institutional 
hypotheses for labor market rigidities.’ The civil service wage premium attracts job-seekers to queue 
and thus generates unemployment. Similarly, the wage premium of  TEWA-covered jobs increases costs 
and reduces labor demand. Note that TEWA-covered jobs also carry non-wage costs-the expected costs 
of  layoffs ( i f  explicitly acknowledged at the time of  the contract, the expected costs o f  layoff should 
reduce wages, and so the amount o f  the wage premium of  the TEWA jobs underestimates the additional 
costs borne by employers). Adding to perverse labor market incentives (and contributing to government 
over-staffing) are patronage-based appointments to the civil service as a way o f  obtaining political 
support or fulfill promises, with insufficient private job creation often used as a rationale (in the 2005 
Budget announcement, for example, 30,000 graduates were recruited and 40,000 temporary staff were 
made permanent). 
13. Informal sector workers have lower education levels which reduce their labor market 
prospects-a result, in part, o f  high dropouts among children from poor families. Many school 
dropouts can only qualify for unskilled occupations, the occupations which are paid the lowest and which 
are associated with the highest poverty incidence. In 1999/2000, 7 percent o f  5-14 year olds did not 
attend school. Dropouts occur both because poor families cannot afford schooling costs and because the 
expected benefits o f  schooling for childreii from poor families are low. Direct and opportunity costs of  
schooling of  poor families are relatively higher because by sending children to school, the sacrifice in 
terms of  foregone work at home and direct costs of  schooling are higher than the sacrifice of  non-poor 
families. Expected returns of  schooling for poor children are lower because their schooling i s  o f  lower 
quality and because they lack the social networks which would enable them accessing higher paying jobs. 
14. Sri  Lanka has few passive o r  active labor market programs, with scope for piloting new 
approaches. Publicly administered and provided active labor market programs (job counseling, 
See, for example, OECD (1999) and Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1999) for the impact o f  strict limitations on 
We are referring to the findings o f  Raina (2003), World Bank (1999), and Heltberg and Vodopivec (2004). 
7 
terminations o f  employees. 
iv  
information, training, wage subsidies) exist on a very small scale in Sri Lanka, and their effectiveness i s  
not known. Indeed, this i s  quite positive as Sri Lanka can design and develop programs based on an 
evaluation o f  both domestic interventions and international experience. Evidence from OECD countries 
suggests that publicly provided programs are often very costly and ineffective, with j o b  counseling/search 
and job  information being the exception. Wel l  targeted programs to vulnerable groups can also be 
effective, but their cost needs to be carefully controlled. Evidence from developing countries suggests that 
privately provided, but publicly regulated training programs work best to link j o b  seekers to jobs. The 
Government i s  considering the introduction o f  a passive labor market program: a formal unemployment 
insurance (UI) system, modeled largely on an OECD model. However, international evidence suggests 
that unemployment benefits need to be much more simply designed if implemented in low income 
countries (World Bank 2003). Sri Lanka i s  also addressing unemployment among youth by preparing a 
national action youth plan for implementation in the coming year. 
Policy Options 
1 5 .  Strong economic growth, a sound investment climate, and high quality education systems are 
critical for improving employment, productivity and wages for al l  workers. However, wel l  functioning 
labor market institutions that balance j o b  and worker protection also importantly contribute to favorable 
labor market outcomes. 
16. Reducing excessive j o b  security for formal sector workers wil l  not only enhance 
productivity, but also improve job prospects for vulnerable groups. The costly protection o f  formal 
sector j obs  via excessive termination benefits could be gradually reduced to international norms. In 
particular, it would be important for policy makers to reconsider maintaining the exceedingly high costs 
o f  separation and the discretionary power o f  the Labor Commissioner for granting permission for layoffs. 
Avoiding direct government interference in wage setting (apart f rom setting o f  minimum wages) would 
also reduce labor costs. Ad-hoc recruitment o f  unemployed graduates should also be reconsidered, as i t  
reduces incentives for youth to take non-government jobs. Reducing excessive protection for ‘insiders’ 
could, in tandem wi th  other economic reforms, promote j o b  flows, and hence higher economic 
productivity. Increasing access to formal sector jobs (with greater access to basic workers rights and 
social security-see next section) for  ‘outsiders’ or less educated and marginalized workers would also 
promote equity and contribute to a reduction in labor market duality. 
I 7. Replacing ‘ job’  protection with ‘worker’ social protection programs can promote market 
efficiency and helps allay the political costs o f  reform. Reducing j o b  protection for formal sector 
workers is  politically difficult, to say the least, and often meets with s t i f f  resistance from ‘insiders’ 
because it increases the prospects o f  layoffs and dismissals from previously protected jobs. Yet, many 
countries have taken th i s  diff icult step. Promoting social dialogue and negotiating solutions acceptable to 
all stakeholders have been critically important for fostering change. Ensuring protection o f  basic workers 
rights i s  also essential. Moreover, the introduction o f  well designed, cost-effective active and passive 
labor market programs that provide more efficient protection to workers in the long run (in lieu o f  
protection o f  jobs) and that help allaying the short term political costs o f  reforms has proved instrumental 
in achieving this policy shift (for example, in Eastern European c o ~ n t r i e s ) . ~  Once in place, active and 
During the early transition o f  Eastern European countries, reductions in job protection were accompanied by the 
active and passive programs to ease restructuringilayoffs. W h i l e  the programs were initially generous and increased 
fiscal costs, their generosity was significantly reduced over time, as the goals o f  the restructuring agenda were met, 
though reducing entitlements was difficult (see Vodopivec, Worgotter and Raju 2005). That said, it should be noted 
that too generous worker protection programs can also impede effective functioning o f  the labor market, and these 
programs also need to be cost effective in design (World Bank 2000). 
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passive programs also facilitate restructuring efforts and thus promote dynamic efficiency. Sri Lanka i s  
already taking steps to create a more explicit ‘worker’ protection system to support less stringent 
protection of jobs, but a key challenge will be to adapt these programs to the f iscal and administrative 
capacity o f  the country. I n  this respect: 
The unemployment insurance program will need to be adapted to Sr i  Lankan context. This 
program could potentially lay the foundation for a more efficient protection o f  formal workers 
and ease the political costs o f  reducing job protection, but i t s  design, costs, and administration 
will need to be modified from a standard OECD model and adapted to the Sri Lankan context 
(see social insurance section below). 
Active measures to enhance skills/employability o f  lower income workers should be piloted, 
prior to scaling up. Strengthening cost-effective programs (e.g. job counseling/information) and 
providing informal sector workers better access to well designed and affordable training through 
demand driven, private sector based approaches could bring greater equity and productivity gains. 
Programs specifically targeted to women, youth, disabled, and the poor living in remote rural 
areas could also be piloted (for youth and disabled these pilots should be based on the 
recoin in end at i o n s o f  n at i o na I action p I ans) . 
2. Social insurance 
18. Sri Lanka provides the most extensive social security (pensions, disability, survivor and 
health) coverage in South Asia. The provision of  social security i s  largely tied to participation in the 
formal sector, although since tlie 1990s, a new public sponsored scheme reaches a significant number of  
farmers and fishermen, despite its voluntary nature. Together, these programs cover a third o f  the 
population, much more than any other South Asian country. Aside from pensions, these workers are 
offered disability and survivor insurance as part o f  their benefit package. Coverage for medical 
expenseddrugs to cope against catastrophic health shocks i s  provided through a universal health 
insurance scheme that i s  not tied to scheme membership, although formal sector workers have added 
be ne fi t s . 
Key Issues 
19. Nevertheless, the coverage o f  current schemes i s  limited and their administration and 
financial sustainability could be considerably strengthened. First, there are large gaps in coverage, 
with tlie vast majority of  informal sector workers lacking coverage and considerable evasion among those 
in the formal sector. Two thirds o f  the labor force remains without insurance for life’s major risks in the 
face o f  dramatic demographic ageing trends. Second, pensions provide some consumption smoothing over 
the l i f e  cycle only for civil servants, but not for workers participating in other retirement schemes. The 
Employees’ Provident Fund provides insufficient benefits due to low investment returns, a low 
pensionable age, and the lump sum payout that does not offer longevity insurance (for outliving one’s 
savings). Third, the fiscal sustainability of  these schemes i s  questionable. At 2 percent o f  GDP, Sri Lanka 
has the highest pension spending on civil service pensions in the region, and preliminary estimates 
indicate that the pension system faces an unfunded liability on the order 60 percent o f  GDP. Although the 
EPF i s  a defined contribution scheme which i s  self-financing by definition, it, too, depends on 
government financial capacity because practically the entire EPF portfolio consists o f  government 
v i  
paper.” And fourth, pension programs have weak administration and regulation, and limited portability o f  
benefits (pension rights that are not transferable across jobs) constrains labor mobil ity. 
20. Two publicly sponsored programs offer social security for informal sector workers, but face 
similar and even more complex challenges. Farmers, fishermen and self-employed are the main groups 
served by these programs. Because these workers do not earn regular wages, their contributions and 
benefits are set in flat nominal terms and both are steadily eroded by inflation. Minimum pensions have 
been increased by fiat. 111 the long run, the relationship between the assets and the liabilities i n  these two 
schemes may lead to broken promises, a massive bailout, or both. Administrative costs are high, eating 
into members’ contributions, and investments are once again concentrated in government paper. 
2 1. Informal sector workers also participate in quasi-formal group arrangements for death 
benefits. There exist a large number o f  self-help associations that have traditionally provided funeral 
assistance or death benevolence benefits, and they have recently been joined by a few non-governmental 
organizations. However, the benefit levels o f  these schemes are set ad hoc and are not indexed to 
inflation, the financial sustainability o f  schemes i s  not known, and their regulation and administration are 
l ikely to be weak. 
22. As noted above, a formal unemployment insurance (UI) system i s  being considered and 
workfare programs-a safety net cum unemployment insurance program for informal sector 
workers-are largely ad hoc. The government has formulated several OECD type proposals for 
unemployment insurance programs, but t h i s  scheme wil l  be geared to formal sector workers. To provide 
income support for the workers in the informal sector, workfare schemes exist on an ad-hoc basis, but Sri 
Lanka does not have a permanent workfare scheme (offering l ow  wages to target the most vulnerable able 
bodied workers) that can be scaled up to help informal sector workers earn benefits in times o f  
unemployment caused by layoffs or natural disasters, and scaled down when these emergencies are 
passed (a well-known example o f  such a scheme i s  provided in Argentina). 
Policy Options 
23. 
their coverage and scope, and financial solvency. In the short run, important gradual reforms include: 
Social insurance institutions could substantially improve their services, as well as expand 
Improvements in the functioning o f  old age income support schemes, and consideration of 
possibilities to expand coverage to the informal sector. In the case o f  the c iv i l  service scheme, 
these measures include gradually reducing target replacement rates (pension benefits as a share o f  
individual’s wages) and introducing employees’ contributions, increasing retirement ages in 
Employees’ Provident Fund and approved retirement schemes, and improving the linkage o f  
benefits to contributions (or introducing fully contributory schemes) rather than specifying 
nominal benefits and contributions in schemes covering informal sector workers. Moreover, wi th 
regard to death and disability insurance, public policy objectives should be clarified with a view 
to reducing arbitrary differences and inequities between workers. Once again, political economy 
considerations will be important, especially in case when benefits are affected. However, many 
countries have addressed this issue by introduced changes very gradually, with several options, 
including grandfathering, available to workers impacted by the change (e.g., India, Russia). 
Adaptation of the proposed unemployment insurance scheme and a consideration of 
workfare to address unemployment shocks. The proposed UI system wil l need to be adapted to 
0 
In the defined contribution scheme, the stream o f  contributions and the returns on ensuing investments determine 
pension benefits; in a defined benefit scheme, pension benefits are determined by a specific, predetermined formula 
(and thus benefits are usually only loosely linked to contributions). 
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Sri Lanka’s fiscal and administrative capacity. For example, the elimination o f  personalized 
monitoring o f  continuing eligibil i ty conditions and a much simplified benefit and administration 
structure would render i t  more appropriate for a low income country. For informal sector workers, 
particularly the poor, a workfare program might be considered which can be self-targeted to the 
able bodied poor. However, i t s  costs will need to be assessed and administrative arrangements 
developed to ensure self-targeting and the program piloted, prior to scaling up. 
For all schemes, information systems (record keeping, forecasting) need to be upgraded and 
supervision improved. Funded schemes also need to strengthen fund management and 
regulation, and coiisider diversification o f  their investment options. 
24. A longer-term strategy i s  to create a seamless, unified framework for formal and informal 
sector workers, covering old age, disability, survivor and unemployment risks. Social security (old 
age, death, disability) should be based on a defined contribution scheme (or with contributions strongly 
linked to benefits) with parameters set so as to produce a target replacement rate. This would allow for 
complete portability o f  benefits (individuals would not lose accumulated benefit when they move jobs, 
easing labor mobil ity) and increase economies o f  scale in administration (e.g., record keeping) and avoid 
the creation o f  new liabilities. Death and disability insurance, fairly priced based on actuarial results, 
could be purchased for members o f  this scheme. Annuitization o f  benefit (the conversion o f  a lump-sum 
benefit into a stream o f  benefits paid in regular intervals) after retirement could also be made possible. 
Similarly, a funded severance portion o f  the system could be added and integrated into the unemployment 
insurance (UI) program, wi th  UI benefits being funded by withdrawals f rom both individual saving 
accounts as well as from the solidarity fund, the latter being financed by pooled contributions o f  workers 
and their employers. This approach offers advantages not only in terms extension o f  coverage, but also 
greater labor mobil ity and financial solvency. A unlJied system would need to be designed carefully, and 
would only be implemented gradually once improvements in regulation and administration of current 
programs are achieved. Increased formalization of the economy would complement expansion in 
coverage. 
3. Social Safety Nets 
25. Sri Lanka has put in place an extensive social safety net system to address chronic poverty. 
The safety net system comprises Sainurdhi, the main program cash transfer program to address chronic 
poverty, and disability payments. I n  addition, the system provides l imited social welfare and care 
services; and disaster re l ie f  to all affected persons on the basis o f  the impact and injuries suffered. Relief 
programs are also in place to assist families cope with income loss associated with drought. The 
Government and private response to the recent Tsunami was exceptional, with special cash transfer and 
other programs implemented to help affected families cope with the disaster. 
26. 
safety net system could be strengthened include: 
The safety system could be better designed to serve its objectives. Specific areas where the 
The targeting, the level o f  benefit and work incentives of the Samurdhi program could be 
improved. The program i s  poorly targeted, wi th a low level o f  benefits, and limited exit 
provisions. Since i t s  introduction in 1995, the income transfer component o f  the program utilizes 
the bulk o f  resources and has the widest outreach. At the end o f  2002, a total o f  1.9 mi l l ion 
families or 41 percent o f  the population received the income transfer (Central Bank o f  Sri Lanka 
2003). While the allocation o f  funds at the central level i s  relatively equitable, much o f  the 
mistargeting occurs due to the lack o f  explicit targeting criteria at the local level. Moreover, 
reflecting a decrease o f  beneficiaries and an erosion o f  nominally f ixed benefit levels, program 
expenditures declined from 0.9 percent o f  GDP in 2001 to 0.4 percent o f  GDP in 2004. I t s  
... 
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welfare impact is  minimal-for example, in 2000 on average it amounted to less than 15 percent 
of total household food expenditure. Thus, as currently designed, the program provides 
inadequate assistance to the poor. I t  also does not adequately help the poor escape poverty (e.g. 
through in vest in en t in their h 11 man capital), 
The disability program does not reach all poor disabled people. The second largest income 
transfer program, cash conipensation for disability, i s  primarily focused on the disabled soldiers 
injured in the conflict, leaving other disabled groups under-covered (survey data show that only 
4 1 percent o f  the disabled receive any sort o f  income transfer, including the disability allowance, 
from the government). Program expenditures have increased steadily over the years, reaching 
approximately 0.2 percent of  GDP in 2004. The combined spending on the two main cash transfer 
programs i s  thus about 0.6 percent of  GDP-generally consistent, or even higher than countries in 
the region. I t  has to be stressed that disability payments are a limited way o f  supporting the 
disabled poor, and that a more comprehensive approach to disability i s  needed that addresses 
prevention and enables the disabled to integrate better into society. 
Social welfare and care services exist, but provide limited coverage. Social welfare and care 
services are an essential complement to cash programs, addressing social risks (e.g. alcohol and 
drug abuse, orphan hood, protection o f  legal rights), particularly for the poor. Currently services 
are provided publicly and through non-governmental organizations, but the coverage i s  small and 
their impact i s  not well known. 
Relief programs could be strengthened in their ability to support affected populations. 
Displaced persons are also eligible for rehabilitation assistance for permanent settlement but 
fiscal constraints limit program coverage. The relief for the displaced (in the form of food 
assistance) during drought conditions i s  insufficient to meet basic nutrition needs. 
Po [icy 011 tio t is 
27. 
benefit by focusing on alleviating vulnerabilities and promoting growth. Policy options include: 
The equity objectives of the safety net should be strengthened, but the program could also 
Revamping existing social assistancekash transfer programs to target the poor. The ongoing 
reform-aiming to increase the amount o f  support within existing budget through better 
targeting-is a an important initiative, and similar reforms have been successfully introduced in 
many countries around the world (e.g., Armenia, Mexico). Introducing a proxy means testing 
targeting formula wil l  improve objectivity and transparency. Eligibility could also be validated 
via community participation. Because inflation has strongly eroded the real value o f  benefits, 
current benefits should at least be maintained in real terms and continually adjusted for 
inflation." But higher benefits may create work disincentives (poverty traps), so suitable 
exit/incentive clauses from the program need to be designed (e.g., workfare to improve 
community infrastructure, which can act as a work test for able bodied poor), and continual 
eligibility frequently monitored. Once disability i s  included as a criterion for receiving Samurdhi 
benefits, it would be possible to consider the option of  folding disability transfers into Samurdhi, 
or at least ensure consistency across the two main cash transfer programs as a first step. Similar 
coordination on benefit and eligibility could be developed for other cash transfer programs, so 
that over time a consolidated cash transfer system could be developed, allowing an increase in 
benefits (within f iscal envelope and with attention to work incentives) and enhancing 
ad in in i s  trat ive and targeting efficiency . 
Perhaps the original 1996 values could be restored, which would roughly double 2004 benefit levels. I I  
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Strengthening incentives to help the poor escape poverty. The safety net program could be 
designed to help the poor participate in human development and income earning programs, and 
improve their access to skill development. The Samurdhi reform could be strengthened by using 
cash transfers providing incentives to improve school enrollment and reduce dropouts, and also to 
help the poorest participate in nutrition based programs, thus confronting child malnutrition. 
Helping the poor access micro-finance and training wil l  also assist poor people to exit the safety 
net (successful examples include Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey). 
Upgrading programs to address individual vulnerabilities. Strengthening existing social 
welfare and care services for vulnerable groups are critical for addressing individual 
vulnerabilities. While these services can be outsourced to private providers/NGOs, the 
government agencies need to shape policy, set standards of  care, license providers, and regulate 
the provision o f  services. Strengthening and mainstreaming disability i s  also important to address 
the special needs o f  this vulnerable group. The implementation o f  the national disability action 
plan will require considerable coordinated efforts across a number of  agencies, both public and 
private, to raise awarenessireduce stigma o f  disability, strengthen prevention o f  disability, and 
promote the inclusion o f  disabled in socio-economic activities. 
And community wide vulnerabilities. As noted above, to address disasteddrought relief, the 
government could develop a package of  interventions: cash/livelihood grants, workfare, and 
social welfare and care services, ready to be scaled up in case of  disasters. Relief for conflict 
njjiicted groups and areas could be strengthened by helping demobilized soldiers to reintegrate 
into civil society, by attending the special needs of  children and youths affected by the conflict, 
and by rehabilitating schools, roads and essential infrastructure through public works. 
11. Main Conclusions 
28. Sri Lanka’s social protection system provides extensive coverage, but could still be 
strengthened to better support growth and equity. The wide range o f  social protection programs 
indicates the Government’s commitment to promote growth with equity. However, the system could be 
much more effective. Many vulnerable groups are not covered, and conversely, some non-vulnerable 
groups are included. Aside from equity issues, the programs also create inefficiencies that can constrain 
growth. For example, pension programs are fiscally unaffordable and limit labor mobility, employment 
protection institutions impede job flows, and safety nets are not linked to improving training and job 
prospects for the poor. 
29. The report outlines strategic directions for reforming social protection programs to 
improve equity and facilitate economic growth. Examples of  such “double dividend” policies are 
discussed for all three areas o f  social protection: 
By opening “good” jobs to underprivileged informal sector workers, improved labor market 
policies would not only level the playing field for these workers but also facilitate the fulfillment 
o f  their potential, thereby enhancing the productive potential o f  the whole economy. 
By enabling widespread risk pooling, social insurance not only helps preserve the wellbeing o f  
individuals but also avoids the use o f  costly self-insurance such as accumulating assets as a form 
o f  precautionary savings, and allows individuals to engage in more productive and higher 
riskireturn production. 
By linking cash transfers to investment in human development o f  children and enhancing income 
opportunities for the poor, social safety nets not only reduce poverty and vulnerability but also 
X 
enhance opportunities o f  the poor, thus helping the poor and making the economy more 
productive. 
30. 
o f  social protection, program administration and garnering broad based support for reforms. 
Moving forward in this direction will require attention to the following areas: the financing 
Ensuring adequate and fiscally sustainable funding for the social protection programs. Social 
protection spending i n  Sri Lanka i s  skewed towards higher income groups both in the case o f  safety 
net programs (e.g., Samurdhi) and in social insurance (e.g., pensions). The proposed Samurhdi 
reforms, as well as social insurance proposals o f  this report, would not only help to correct these 
imbalances, but they would also help keeping public expenditures on these programs in check. In 
particular, improved targeting under the proposed Samurdhi reform wil l create ample room for 
increasing benefit per recipient - the level o f  which has been strongly eroded because the amount 
per beneficiary has been nominally fixed - without necessarily increasing the overall spending level. 
Over the long term, to ensure fiscal sustainability the country will need to reduce spending on pension 
schemes for c iv i l  servants (and the scheme’s large implicit debt burden) and link pension benefits 
strongly to contributions. Moreover, public expenditures may also be re-directed towards (potentially 
subsidized) insurance coverage o f  the poor and towards adequately funded and efficiently targeted 
safety net programs. Overall spending for safety nets i n  developed countries peaks at about 2 percent 
o f  GDP (World Bank 2005e) and could serve as upper bound target expenditure for safety net 
prograins for Sri Lanka, including cash transfers and social welfare services. Some flexibil i ty and set 
aside in safety net spending may be needed to respond to social protection needs stemming from 
emergencies, such as natural disasters. 
Strengthening capacity to administer programs i s  critical for program implementation. 
Although social protection reforms may bring strong efficiency gains and may promise to improve 
welfare o f  the poor, such reforms are technically demanding and, therefore, the capacity o f  the 
country to design and implement such reforms need to be developed. Social protection reforms are 
diff icult to design because they require meticulous attention to adequacy, incentives, fiscal costs, and 
monitoring and evaluation, and because they often have to be coordinated across different areas 
(ranging from social protection to financial markets, fiscal management, education, and health), and 
because local circumstances need to be carefully accounted for. 
Appropriately accounting for political economy considerations i s  vital for ensuring successful 
adoption of proposed changes. Social protection reforms are polit ically diff icult because many 
groups prefer the status quo. For example, current beneficiaries o f  strong employment protection- 
incumbent workers and their unions-may oppose any reduction o f  j o b  protection as they consider 
alternatives, such as iinemployment insurance, inappropriate; existing beneficiaries o f  Sainurdhi may 
oppose reforms because they do not wish to lose eligibil i ty if a more transparent method o f  selection 
i s  adopted. And because potential beneficiaries are often without adequate political representation 
(informal sector workers, or the poor who are excluded from safety net programs, for example), and 
because the benefits o f  reforms often accrue only in the long run (such as in reforms o f  o ld age 
income support), social protection reforms need to be coupled with adequate attention to political 
economy o f  reform. 
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Summary o f  Social Protection Policy Options 
Employment Protection 
and Promotion 
Create a more equitable and efficient employment protection program by reducing excessive j o b  
protection (reducing termination benefits and discretionary powers for layoffs, avoiding 
excessive interference in wage setting mechanisms, phasing out ad hoc civil service recruitment 
practices) and strengthening protection o f  basic rights and social protection o f  workers 
Consider cost effective active labor programs, e.g. job counseling and information, and demand 
driven training programs for vulnerable, disadvantaged workers (incorporating employment 
options for youth and disabled from respective national action plans) 
II. SOCIAL INSURANCE: Prom 
Social security: old age, disability 
and survivor 
unenlployment 
insuranceiworkfare 
All social securityiinsurance 
Ill. SOCIAL SAFETY NETS: EI 
Samurdhi program, civil-conflict 
relatcd programs, flood and 
drought relief. other safety net 
programs 
ting Security 
Improve the adequacy and fiscal sustainability o f  formal social security schemes (e.g. gradually 
reducing target benefits, increasing retirement age, increasing employee contributions and 
strengthening their links to benefits, improving record keepingiforecasting, strengthening fund 
management, and developing sound investment options) 
Explore possibilities to expand the coverage o f  formal social security schemes to the informal 
sector, including potential subsidization o f  the very poor 
Introduce a modified version o f  the UI system by eliminating personalized monitoring o f  
beneficiaries and simplifying benefit and administrative procedures, consistent with Sri Lanka’s 
income level, labor market conditions, and administrative capacity 
Strengthen self-targeted workfare programs to help individuals cope with unemployment that can 
be scaled up during seasonal downturns, droughts, and other natural disasters 
Over the long term, under appropriate pre- conditions, explore options for creating an integrated 
social security system, based on a defined contribution scheme (or with contributions strongly 
linked to benefits) with parameters set so as to produce a target replacement rate, to allow 
portability o f  benefit, and to increase economies o f  scale in  administration (e.g. record keeping), 
and to avoid the creation o f  new liabilities. 
ancing Equity 
( 1 ) Address chronic poverty: 
Improve targeting o f  the program by introducing proxy means testing, and avoid poverty traps 
Increase benefit level, without compromising work incentives and f iscal  sustainability 
Improve fiscal, administrative and targeting efficiency by gradual consolidation o f  disability 
by introducing exit /incentive policies (e.g. workfare) 
and other cash payments under the Samurdhi program 
(2) Help the poor escape poverty: 
* Consider conditional cash transfers to reduce school non-attendance and child malnutrition 
Promote access of to poor through skill development and access to micro-finance 
Strengthen delivery social welfare and care services through public private partnerships 
Implement national disability policy focusing on raising awarenessireducing stigma, 
( 3 )  Address individual vulnerabilities: 
preventing disability, and including disabled people in socio-economic activity) 
(4) Address aggregate vulnerability: 
Develop a package o f  interventions: cashilivelihood grants, workfare, and social welfare and 
care services, to be scaled up in case o f  disasters 
Strengthen relief for conflict affected groups and areas by helping demobilized soldiers to 
reintegrate into civil society, by attending the special needs o f  children and youths affected by 
the conflict, and by rehabilitating schools, roads and essential infrastructure through public 
works. 
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1. POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY 
“I cannot think of earning even the minimum for 
my family to survive ifI do not go in search of work 
like this JFom place to place. ” 
P.H. Sirisena, a 41 year old casual laborer in 
Kegalle district 
1 .  As a natural starting point for designing an effective social protection system, this chapter 
reviews growth, inequality and poverty trends, identifies key sources o f  risk, and profiles the most 
important poor and vulnerable groups.‘* The chapter finds that a large proportion o f  households in Sri 
Lanka live in poverty (wi th low levels o f  income), and these and many other individuals are also 
vulnerable to income shocks (or variance in income) resulting from individual specific shocks, such as 
sickness, loss o f  employment, or more community wide shocks, such as natural disasters and the c iv i l  
conflict. Across the l ife cycle, the chapter uses a m i x  o f  poverty estimates and more qualitative evidence 
to identify the poorest and most vulnerable groups as children: chi ld workers, children living in large 
fain i l ies and disabled children; working age adults: informal sector workers (particularly uneducated, 
casual and own-accoiint workers), unemployed youth, farmers and others affected by natural disasters, 
internally displaced persons, and the disabled; and the oldest among the elderly. While precise estimates 
o f  vulnerability are not undertaken in  this report, the poor, those without any human and physical assets, 
are likely to be the most vulnerable and hardest hit by income shocks. 
2. This chapter begins by describing the macro picture in Sri Lanka in  terms o f  trends in economic 
growth, inequality and poverty. Then the chapter describes the main risks and identifies chief poor and 
vulnerable groups in society. The fol lowing chapters o f  the report draw on the findings o f  this chapter to 
discuss formal and informal social protection programs aimed at reducing poverty and vulnerability in Sri 
Lanka, and evaluate their ability to protect the poor. 
1.1 Growth, Inequality and Poverty 
3.  Sri Lanka’s economy has been steadily 
growing over the last few decades. The average 
yearly GDP growth i n  the last decade (1994-2003) 
averaged at 4.5 percent (with a large drop in 
2001-Figure 1.1). Trend in GDP per capita has a 
similar pattern and grew steadily since 1990s. 
Compared to other countries in the region, Sri 
Laiika’s GDP growth was average-it equaled the 
rate o f  growth o f  Nepal, lagged behind India’s 
Figure 1.1: Growth o f  GDP and G D P  per capita, 
1991-2003 (in percent) 
‘ - - ~ G D P  1, G D P  p e r c a p i t a  
average growth rate o f  5.8 percent, and exceeded 
the Pakistan’s a average growth rate o f  3.6 percent 
(the comparison refers to 1990-2003). 
Source: Central Bank o f  Sri Lanka, Annual Report 
(various issues), 
Guidelines about building social protection systems are provided by World Bank (2000) and World Bank (2002a). I 2  
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4. Economic growth raised incomes, but inequality increased. The per capita consumption o f  
richer segments o f  the population grew much faster than iiicome o f  the poorer segments (Figure 1.2). A 
recent study (Gunatilal<a 2005) showed that higher per capita consumption o f  the lower and middle 
income classes i s  associated with their 
iI11proveI11el1ts in edLIcationa1 attainlnent. Figure 1.2: Change in consumption expenditure by quintile, 
The same study also found that while 
increases o f  per capita consumption were 
associated with improvements in 
Poorest 2nd 3rd 4th Richest 
infrastructure access (telephones, electricity 
and roads) across all points o f  distribution, 
these associations were particularly strong 
for middle income g r o u p ~ . ’ ~ T I i e  unequal 
growth o f  per capita consumption is  
retlected also in the strong increase o f  Gini  
coefficients both at the national as well as 
sectoral level. The Gin1 increased from 0.32 
to 0.40 and now exceeds all other countries 
South Asia with the exception o f  Nepal.’4 
Source Gunatilaka (2005) based on Dept o f  Census and Statistics’ 
LFSS data for 1980 and 1985 and HIES data for 1990, 1995 and 2002 5.  Unequal growth across provinces 
Notes Nominal values deflated using temporal and spatial price indices 
contributed to the increase Of constructed with the Country Product Dummy Method Northern and 
That national illeqllality of per capita Eastern Provinces excluded from the analysis due to non-availability o f  
consumption increased can be partially data 
explained by the unequal growth o f  output across provinces. As shown in Figure 1.3, index o f  GDP 
change between 1996 and 2003 varies tremendously across provinces (earlier data i s  not available). 
Output growth was the highest in Western and Southern, and, interestingly, also in Eastern and Northern 
provinces, where the increase was about 45-50 percent; in contrast, in several provinces output in this 
period increased only by up to 20 percent, and Sabaragamuwa faced a reduction o f  ~u tpu t . ’ ~  
1980-2002 (per adult equivalent, in %) 
1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 1980- 
1985 1990 1995 2002 2002 
6 .  Moderate growth and growing inequality resulted in a modest reduction o f  poverty. 
Although Sri Laiika’s poor do not l ive in the destitution encountered elsewhere in South Asia, significant 
poverty and vulnerability remain. After an increase in the early 1990s, poverty declined from 29 percent 
in 199516 to 23 percent in 2002 (Figure 1.4). Compared to other countries in the region, in the 1990s 
Pakistan reduced poverty more slowly, and Bangladesh and India more quickly (World Bank 2005a).’6 In 
Sri Lanka, a significant proportion o f  the population lives just above the poverty line and small declines 
in income can make them vulnerable to poverty.” 
l3  Gunatilaka’s (2005) regression-based decomposition o f  per capita consumption inequality shows that the 
contribution o f  education and infrastructure to inequality increased over the years, and that changes in these 
characteristics are responsible for the lion’s share o f  the inequality increase, particularly between 1995 and 2002. In 
contrast, spatial and demographic factors, contributed relatively litt le. 
The inequalities in the region, however, are st i l l  vastly lower than in Latin America (for example, Brazil’s Gini 
coefficient o f  income inequality was 59) ,  and also lower than in some East Asian countries (in early 200s, for 
example, Gini coefficient o f  income inequality in was Thailand 43 (World Bank’s World Development indicators, 
data refer to early 2000s). 
These results also show that the cease-fire agreement of  February 2002 spurred economic growth primarily in the 
conflict zone i t s e l f  (note the large increases o f  output in the Northern, Eastern, and North Central Provinces in 2001- 
2003 period)-the result which hints at the vast potential economic dividends o f  the lasting, full-fledged peace. 
” Raising the poverty line by 20 percent in 1995196 increased poverty incidence by 56 percent (Gunewardena 
2000). 
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Figure 1.3: Index o f  real GDP change by province, 1996-2003 (in percent) 
0 1996- 2001 
2001-2003 
0 1996-2003 
Source: Own calculation based on Government's Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace 
Process, "Impact o f  the Ceasefire Agreement on Regional Economic Growth in  Sri Lanka." 
7 .  Assuming constant inequality, the 
same economic growth would have 
significantly reduced poverty. I f  a 
household's per capita consumption 
increased at the average national rate o f  29 
percent, simulations show that economic 
growth would have reduced poverty by 
more than 15 percent nationally, and by 12 
and 18 percent in urban and rural areas, 
respectively (Narayan and Yosliida 2004). 
I n  contrast, because o f  growing inequality, 
the true reduction in poverty was only 3 
percent nationally (8 and 5 percent in urban 
and rural areas, respectively). 
Figure 1.4: Incidence o f  poverty by sector, 1990/91-2002 
National Urban Rural Estate 
Sector 
1990-1991 E91 1995-1996 2002 
Source: Narayan and Yoshida (2004). 1.2 Sources of Risk 
8. Aside from low income, Sr i  Lankan households experience variance in income as a result of 
income risks (uncertain events that can damage well-being). Some o f  these risks affect specific 
individuals (idiosyncratic risks), and others affect whole communities (community-wide or covariate 
risl<s)." Coininon idiosyncratic risks include sickness/accident or death and loss o f  employment, and 
common covariate risks include natural calamities, drought and crop failure. Such shocks reduce 
household income and may force the whole communities into poverty, transiently or permanently. While 
considerable work needs to be done to ascertain the sources and impact o f  vulnerability, evidence from a 
2004 survey o f  members o f  microfinance institutions i n  Sri Laiika confirms the importance o f  these 
shocks to households. During 12 months prior to survey, over a ha l f  o f  households experienced 
ldiosyncratic risk affects a specific individual or household in a way unrelated to the risk o f  other individuals or 
households, in contrast to covariate risks which typically affect entire communities or regions. Inter-household risk- 
sharing i s  possible to address idiosyncratic risks, depend on availability o f  inter-household networks; in contrast, 
covariate risks make risk-sharing within a community difficult if not impossible. 
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significant income shocks (Tilakaratna and Wickramasingha 2005).'9 The results f rom the survey are 
consistent with evidence on income shocks from other South Asian countries and regions (World Bank 
2005b, 2005c, and 2005d). 
Aggregate Shocks 
9. While the 
tsunami o f  December 2004 i s  no doubt the largest natural disaster to affect Sri Lanka in recent times, 
other natural hazards also affect Sri Lanka. For the 1948-1992 period, Zubair et al (2005) report 27 
major episodes o f  drought and 24 o f  floods, as well as 17 landslides and 10 cyclones. Moreover, the high 
density o f  people in tlie wet parts o f  the island converts into a larger number o f  persons vulnerable to 
floods and landslides (Ralapanawa and Zubair 2003). The above-mentioned microfinance survey found 
that during t l ie course o f  a year, 23 percent o f  households experienced income shocks due to natural 
calaniities and 18 percent due to crop failures. 
Sri  Lankan households are prone to climactic shocks and natural disasters. 
Landslides are localized to seven districts in the central massifs (Badulla, Ratnapura, Matale, 
Kegalle, Nuwara Eliya, Kandy and parts o f  Kalutara). The frequency o f  landslide occurrences has 
been increasing each year, the l ikely causes being changes in land use due to rapid urbanization 
(Ralapanawa and Zubair 2003). 
Drought i s  the most significant hazard in terms of  people affected and the needed relief 
(Ralapanawa and Zubair 2003). While Sri Lanka receives on average 1,800 mm o f  rainfall 
annually, it i s  distributed unevenly over the year and over the land so that a large part o f  the 
island is drought-prone particularly during the subsidiary rainy season. 
10. The on-going civil conflict in the North and East o f  Sri Lanka i s  also a major social calamity 
for the country. About 2.5 mi l l ion people lived in areas o f  military activity, o f  which up to 700,000 le f t  
the country and about 800,000 did not return to their homes as o f  2002 (World Bank, 2002b). An 
estimated 65,000 persons were ki l led during the conflict and several hundred thousand have been 
displaced. 
1 1 .  Being one of  the fastest aging countries in the world, Sri Lanka must also get prepared to 
face the challenge of  population aging. Over the next 25 years, the share o f  the population over 60 will 
double from about 10 to 20 percent (Figure 1 S),  a process that unfolded over the course o f  a century in 
France and 75 years in the United States. This unprecedented speed o f  ageing i s  driven by a rapid decline 
o f  fertility coupled by a strong increase o f  l i fe expectancy, which, over last 40 years, occurred much faster 
than in the rest o f  the world. 
This study was conducted before the tsunami that hit Sri Lanka's coastline on December 26, 2004. 19 
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Figure 1.5: Demographic ageing, S r i  Lanka and world regional 
averages (percentage of  population over 60 years old, 200@2050) 
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Source: World Bank demographic projections 
Individual-Specific Risks 
12. Sickness, injury, and death are the main shocks affecting Sr i  Lankan households. The 
above-mentioned microfinance survey found that a large share o f  respondents (2 1 percent) experienced 
sickness, injury and death shock over the study period (Table 1.1). While al l  individuals are subject to 
health shocks, the health outcomes are particularly poor for l ow  income groups (see reproductive health 
indicators and outcomes in  Table 1,2).*' According to Aturupane (1999), the poor are especially 
vulnerable to three types o f  conzmunicable diseases: (i) respiratory infections, where prevalence i s  high 
among urban poor, particularly due to air pollution; (ii) mosquito-borne il lnesses like malaria, filaria, and 
dengue fever, due to low quality o f  the housing o f  the poor, unhygienic garbage accumulation and 
disposal, and under-niitrition; and (iii) water-borne diseases like cholera, dysentery and diarrhea, because 
the poor lack access to clean drinking water and safe sanitation. Moreover, Aturupane reports that non- 
communicable diseases (cardiovascular, diabetes, tuberculosis) are among the leading causes o f  morbidity 
and mortality among poor individuals i n  Sri Lanka, partly because they are less aware o f  the importance 
o f  early detection and possibilities o f  effective treatment for diseases l ike cancer and heart disease. This 
result i s  consistent wi th  other studies o f  risk and vulnerability in South Asia. 
13. Unemployment was the next most frequent shock affecting households. Over a twelve month 
period, nearly 16 percent o f  the surveyed households experienced unemployment that resulted in 
significant iiicome shock (Table 1.1). While the incidence o f  unemployment among the respondents o f  the 
reported microfinance survey was disproportionally high (unemployment rate declined strongly from 
nearly 16 percent in 1990 to 8.2 percent in the fourth quarter o f  2004), Sri Lanka's unemployment rate, 
together with Pakistan's 8.3 percent rate in 2002, i s  amongst the highest in the region.2' Apart from the 
labor market constraints (see chapter 2), aggregate shocks also contribute to unemployment. For example, 
Senaka-Arachchi (1 998) reports that droughts-mainly affecting dry zone farmers cultivating paddy and 
chena-cause large losses o f  employment and therefore income. Displacement suffered by populations 
Sri Lanka's achievements in health are much better than in other countries at a comparable level o f  development, 
partly because many health cares services are offered to the poor and the rich alike. I n  the area o f  reproductive 
health, for example, indicators o f  the services received (such as immunization coverage, percentage who received 
antenatal and postnatal care) show remarkably equal access to health care across socio economic quintiles (see Table 
2.2). 
? '  According to ILO Labor Statistics; available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. 
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from tlie conflict and natural disasters i s  another cause o f  unemployment. According to UNCHR, 342,000 
persons were displaced by tlie recent tsunami, wi th virtually all o f  them (97 percent) suffering from the 
loss o f  employnient, property and other assets. Moreover, an estimated 200,000 jobs were lost in fishing 
and rural industries, tourism, and agriculture (World Bank 2005h), with some o f  the worst affected 
districts (Galle, Hanibantota, and Matara) being among the poorest ones (Figure 1.6). 
Table 1.1: Vulnerability to shocks by members o f  microfinance institutions, 2004 
Nature of  Risk Type of  risk No. o f  Households Percentage 
SicknessiAccidentiDeath Idiosyncratic 306 20.7 
Employment Related Idiosyncratic 232 15.7 
Indebtedness Idiosyncratic 185 12.5 
Marriagelchild Birth Idiosyncratic 96 6.5 
Other Personal Problems Idiosyncratic 30 1.4 
Natural Calamities Covariate 3 3 5  22.6 
Crop Failure Covariate 27 1 18.3 
Soc i a I Ca I a in i t  i es Covariate 48 3 .1  
Others 154 10.4 
................ ............................................. ..... I "_ .. " ..--I_.__I.." ___...--- "__.I___." -.__I---- "I"- 
Source: Adapted from Tilakaratna and Wickramasingha (2005), data from Microfinance Survey 
2004, administered to 1,480 households whose members participate in microfinance institutions. 
14. Death and disability risks have been exacerbated by the conflict and natural disasters 
(particularly the recent tsunami). According to tlie Census o f  population o f  2001, the share o f  disabled 
(with intellectual, mobility, psychiatric, hearing, or speech disabilities) in population was 1.6 percent 
(Mendis 2004). As noted, the on-going conflict in t l ie  North-east has contributed significantly to disability 
and death in that region, particularly for t l ie  poor. While 8 percent o f  households in the North-East had a 
ineniber I<illed in the conflict, this share was nearly double for t l ie  poorest quintile o f  households (World 
Bank, 2002b). The recent tsunami and other natural disasters (see below) have also contributed to 
disability and to the loss o f  l i fe. Aside from physical disability, many individuals and households affected 
by the conflict and natural disasters are also prone to psycho-social distress, which also limits their ability 
to function as productive members o f  society. 
Figure 1.6: Employment losses in tsunami-affected districts 
~~ 
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1.3 Poverty Profile 
15.  Who are the poor and vulnerable in Sr i  Lanka? To identify the poor, the fo l lowing section 
rel ies on the national consumption threshold definition o f  poverty. The vulnerable are those either above 
6 
or  below the tlireshold w h o  are l ikely to  suffer a decline in wellbeing, including fa l l ing  into poverty, as 
the result of an income shock (see Box 1.1 for  the definit ion o f  poverty and vulnerabi l i ty).  Hav ing  few 
resources and facing l imi ted access to  credit and insurance markets, the poor are often the hardest hit by 
adverse shocks, so poverty and vulnerabi l i ty are intrinsically l inked. This chapter thus does not undertake 
a formal analysis of vulnerability-an important gap that needs t o  be addressed in future analysis-and 
mainly relies on  qualitative and quantitative evidence to identi fy the poor and vulnerable groups. 
Table 1.2: Reproductive health indicators by socio-economic groups, 2000 - 
Socio -economic quintile Poor i 
Rich Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest ratio 
_ " _ _ _ _ _ L . l _ l _ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - - .  
Pre- and post-natal care (percent) 
Pregnant women who received measles 
i in in un izat ion 
Pregnant women who received tetanus 
i tnin u t i  ization 
Pregnant women who received 
domiciliary ante natal care 
Pregnant women who received iron 
tablets 
Women who received domiciliary post 
natal care 
Prevalence o f  breast feeding YO 
Women who were aware o f  symptoms o f  
pregnancy coin p I i cat i on s YO 
Home delivery % 
Mother with body mass index <18 % 
Infant h e a l t h  and mortality indicators 
Prevalence o f  low birth weight YO 
Prevalence o f  stunting (HtiAge) YO 
Prevalence o f  wasting (WtiAge) YO 
Prevalence o f  under weight (Wti  age ) 
YO 
Infant Mortality Rate / lo00 LB 
Memorandum items 
Women who ever attended school % 
Age at first birth 
Mean ideal number o f  children 
85.8 
93.9 
80.2 
92.4 
75.4 
98.6 
68.0 
5 .O 
37.8 
19.4 
25.1 
19.6 
44.3 
26.8 
83.5 
21.0 
3.2 
88.9 
95.2 
83.7 
96.5 
77.9 
99.2 
71.8 
2.5 
30.2 
21.2 
23.1 
19.3 
40.5 
22.8 
92.9 
20.0 
3 .O 
89.6 
96.3 
87.9 
94.4 
75.6 
98.4 
77.6 
1.2 
22.0 
16.2 
12.0 
14.6 
30.7 
18.3 
96.6 
22.0 
2.9 
90.6 
96.2 
90.1 
97.8 
80.2 
99.7 
85.3 
0.4 
18.3 
14.6 
9.9 
11.7 
22.0 
16.7 
98.7 
23.0 
2.7 
89.5 
97.6 
81.6 
98.0 
76.7 
99.0 
85.4 
0.0 
13.5 
11.3 
4.3 
10.4 
13.5 
14.6 
99.2 
25.0 
2.6 
0.96 
0.96 
0.98 
0.94 
0.98 
0.99 
0.8 
510 
2.8 
1.7 
5.8 
1.9 
3.3 
1.8 
0.84 
0.84 
1.23 
Total Fertility Rate 2.43 2.04 2.0 1.97 1.61 1.5 
Sozirce: The World Bank (2005i) based on the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey. 
.\'ore: The distribution b), socio -economic quintiles i s  based on a wealth index. This index i s  the composite score which reflects 
the presence o f  selected consuiner items (such as radio, television. and car), the quality o f  dwelling (such as flooring materials, 
type o f  drinking water, toilet facilities), and some other household characteristics. 
--*-------- 
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Box 1.1: Definition o f  poverty and vulnerability 
There are different definitions and measures of  poverty-ranging from income poverty (absolute or relative poverty 
lines) and social exclusion, to poverty defined by capabilities o f  individuals. Sen’s capabilities approach defines 
poverty as not being able to do certain things, lacking capabilities to function or lacking “the substantive freedoms [a 
person] enjoys to lead the kind o f  l i fe  he or she values” (Sen, 1999). The World Development Report of  2000 
defines poverty as “unacceptable deprivation in wellbeing.” The dominant approach in measuring poverty i s  by 
income. using a threshold income per capita as the poverty line (Ravallion 1998). Poverty i s  typically measured 
using an absolute poverty line. In Sri Lanka, the official poverty line in 2002 was Rs. 1423, corresponding to the 
per-capita consumption expenditure providing nutritional intake of  2030 kilocalories (Department o f  Census and 
Statistics 2004a). 
Vulnerability refers to the relationship between poverty, risk and efforts to manage risk (Alwang, Siege1 and 
Jorgensen 200 1). One definition o f  vulnerability i s  “the possibility o f  suffering a decline in wellbeing, in particular 
a fa l l  under some minimum benchmark or poverty threshold [where] the fall i s  brought about by shocks against 
which protection i s  either costly or not possible” (Duclos 2002). I t  i s  therefore the “expected welfare loss above 
socially accepted norm, which i s  caused by uncertain events and the lack o f  appropriate risk management 
instruments” (World Bank, 2002). Vulnerability has multiple dimensions including consumption, health, physical 
wellbeing, social capital, and insecurity o f  old age (World Bank, 2002). An interesting paper, applying innovative 
empirical measurement o f  vulnerability, i s  Christiaensen and Subbarao (2005). Cross-sectional methodology i s  
provided by Chaudliuri, Jalan and Suryahadi (2002). 
Regional Poverty 
16. Rural areas and estate sectors have higher poverty rates than urban sectors. Urban areas 
have a poverty rate o f  7.9 percent, almost a third o f  the national poverty rate (22.7 percent). In contrast, 
poverty rates in rural (24.6 percent) and estate sectors (30.0 percent) are much higher than the national 
poverty rate (see Table A 1 . 1  in Annex 1.1 for poverty statistics by province). Moreover, over the recent 
years rural and estate areas have realized a smaller decline in poverty than urban areas. I n  contrast to 
urban areas, where the incidence o f  poverty since 1990 has been strongly and steadily reduced, rural areas 
and particularly the estate sector witnessed not only a slower reduction o f  poverty but also an increase o f  
poverty in the first hal f  o f  the 1990s (Figure 1.4)- 
17. North and Eastern provinces have poverty rates that are likely higher than in the rest o f  the 
country (no data exist the 1985-1996 period). This disparity i s  evident at every level; average income 
levels are lower in the Northern and Eastern provinces than in any o f  the others, while average 
expenditure in the North i s  similar to that in the poorest provinces, and that o f  the East to middle-level 
provinces (Figure 1 .7).” The distribution o f  income within these provinces i s  similar to that o f  the rest o f  
the country. Thus, with lower average incomes, and a similar income distribution, it i s  likely that the 
incidence o f  absolute poverty i s  higher in these provinces. 
Children 
18. Children in large families are particularly prone to poverty. The incidence o f  poverty i s  
particularly high iii households with many children, the pattern shared by urban, rural, and estate sectors. 
For example, the poverty o f  households with 2 children i s  27 percent (about equal to the national 
7 7  
- -  Note that while the data for the North and the East are from an HIES conducted during the six months September 
2002 to February 2003, the data for the rest o f  the country are from the HIES conducted from January to December 
2002. 
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average), but poverty incidence for households wi th 3 children i s  3 8  percent and for those with 4 or more 
children it is 5 1  percent, nearly double the national average (Table A1.1). Note that more than over 30 
percent o f  all poor in Sri Lanka live in households having 3 or more children. Multivariate analysis also 
shows that other things equal, the presence o f  additional child increases the likelihood that the household 
i s  poor (Table 1.3). Of  particular concern are the following groups, several o f  which may well be over- 
lapping. Poverty among children, which leads to poor human development outcomes, can lead to vicious 
cycle o f  poverty. 
Figure 1.7: Income and expenditure by province 
i 
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Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2002, Bas C 
Information at District Level, Department o f  Census and Statistics (2004b), and 
Results o f  the Household and Income Expenditure Survey conducted in 
Northern and Eastern Province (HIES-NE) 200212003, both available at 
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19. The school attendance of  poor children is  hindered by high direct and indirect costs of 
schooling. As substantiated i n  chapter 2, high direct costs o f  schooling (fees, etc.), the presence of large 
number o f  young children, and being in the poorest expenditure quintile negatively affect school 
attendance. Disabilities also reduce enrollments, particularly for girls (see chapter 2). 
20. Many children who do not attend school work-though the incidence o f  child labor in Sri 
Lanka i s  much lower than in other South Asian countries. I n  2000, around 25,000 children aged 
between 10 and 14 were economically active in Sri Lanka (DCS 1999), wi th  majority (90 percent) of 
them being located in rural areas. These childreii work either as paid employees, in fami ly enterprises or 
farms without payment, or on their own account. Overall there are about 38,000 children school-age 
children who do not attend school, wi th majority o f  these children being girls (56 percent). The majority 
o f  children not attending school are poor. I t  should be noted that the incidence o f  chi ld labor i s  very l ow  
in Sri Lanka relative to other South Asian countries, but needs to be addressed nonetheless. Recent data 
show that 2 percent o f  children were economically active in Sri Lanka, in comparison to 27.8 percent in 
Bangladesh, 12 percent in India, 15 percent i n  Pakistan, 51 percent in Bhutan, and 42 percent in Nepal 
(data from I L O  Labor statistics). 
2 1.  Children in the conflict areas may not attend school as they face the risks of  being recruited 
as soldiers. As o f  September 2005, UNICEF (2005) reported that the number o f  children (those below 18 
years) recruited as L T T E  soldiers was 5,198. Some were recruited when they were as young as 9 years, 
about one third were 11-13 years old, and about one hal f  o f  them were 15-17 years old (UNICEF 2005). 
While the majority returned home or was released, UNICEF reports that in September 2005, 1,284 (two 
thirds boys) were s t i l l  being held as soldiers. These children are also more likely to suffer disability from 
land mines and other impact o f  armed struggle. 
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Table 1.3: Probit estimates o f  the probability that a household i s  poor, 2002 
Coefficient Robust z statistic 
Household characteristics 
Presence o f  elderly 
Family member abroad 
Presence o f  a child or children 
Receiving domestic remittance 
Receiving foreign remittance 
Receiving pension payment 
Receiving disability payment 
None employed 
Two or more employed 
One unemployed 
Two or more unemployed 
Household size o f  4-6 members 
Household size more than 6 members 
Located in the rural sector 
Located in the estate sector 
At least one formal sector worker 
At least one informal sector worker 
-0.07 
-0.34 
0.19 
-0.18 
-0.50 
-0.82 
0.39 
0.13 
-0.25 
-0.02 
0.20 
0.49 
1.00 
0.72 
0.49 
0.35 
-0.42 
-2.2 
-6.2 
6.2 
-2.8 
-5.8 
-8.9 
5.2 
1.9 
-8.0 
-0.6 
3.6 
13.7 
22.7 
16.4 
7.2 
-9.5 
11.1 
Characteristics o f  t h e  household head 
Male 0.05 1 .o 
U n em p I o y ed -0.05 -0.6 
Inactive 0.01 0.2 
Completed 5 grade or less 0.82 15.7 
Completed 6-9 grades 0.41 7.9 
Completed AIL &above -0.42 -4.0 
Single 0.01 0.3 
Separated 0.03 0.3 
Source: Own computations based on HIES 2002 data. 
Nofes: Significance o f  coefficients o f  5 percent or more i s  reported in bold. The coefficients represent deviations 
from the reference household: a small household (3 members or less), with no presence o f  elderly, having no family 
member abroad. with no children, receiving no domestic of  foreign remittance and no pension payments, having one 
employed and no tinemployed workers, located in the urban sector, and with an employed, married female 
household head, possessing O/L and above but not AIL education. Number o f  observations i s  17,066. 
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22.  Malnourished children have increased risk o f  sickness and their development o f  cognitive 
skills i s  hindered. Although severe malnutrition is  low in Sri Lanka, among children below 5 years 
nearly one third are underweight and more than ten 
percent suffer from malnutrition, which places Sri (percent) 
Lanka below the outcomes o f  countries with similar per 
capita national income (World Bank 2005a). While 
growth o f  children in Sri Lanka i s  satisfactory during 
the  first 4 to 6 months o f  infancy, there i s  a strong 
sixth to 23rd month, and the deterioration continues 
during the rest o f  the first four years o f  l i fe  (Figure 1.8). lo 
Evidence shows that child malnutrition increases 0 
Figure 1.8: Children with low weight for age 
40 
3 
deterioration o f  growth later on, particularly during r-c-19s3- , 
-2 
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vulnerability o f  children to infections and mortality. 55 811 11-23 2435 3 3 7  4899 
Malnutrition can also l imi t  the acquisition o f  cognitive Mnths 
and psychosocial skills at young ages, hinder 
educational attainment, and reduce employment prospects (see B o x  1.2). The causes o f  malnutrition in Sri 
Lanka are not fully understood. Some factors include inappropriate breast feeding, poor complementary 
feeding practices or a combination o f  the two (de Silva 2001). 
Box 1.2: Life cycle effects o f  child malnutrition 
Evidence shows that child malnutrition affects mortality, cognitive and psychosocial skills in the young age as well 
as later outcomes related to education and labor market: 
Malnourished children are susceptible to infections, leading to further malnutrition and affecting school 
attendance and thus learning. Another consequence i s  increased mortality-about one-half o f  a l l  deaths in 
developing countries in children under five are due to the interaction between malnutrition and common 
infections such as diarrhea, respiratory infections, and measles. 
Motor and mental development i s  also affected negatively by poor nutrition. For example, iodine 
deficiency and anemia cause poor cognitive development, particularly in children under two. 
Evidence also shows that unhealthy children do not perform well in school, as they enter school later and 
perform more poorly on cognitive achievement tests. 
Early childhood human capital has important effects on adult productivities, both directly through health 
status over the l i fe  cycle and indirectly through schooling. 
Source: Behrman et al, 2004. 
The Poor and Vulnerable Among the Working Age Population 
2 3 .  Poverty disproportionally affects informal sector workers, comprising in 2003 nearly two 
thirds o f  all workers. The incidence o f  poverty among households with at least one informal sector 
worker is much above the national average, exceeding it by 60 percent i n  urban areas, by 40 percent in 
rural areas, and by 7 percent in the estate sector (Table A l .  l).23 Households with informal sector workers 
represent more than hal f  o f  all households (45 percent o f  all households in urban areas, 50 percent in rural 
areas, and 90 percent in the estate sector), and these households account for more than 70 percent o f  the 
poor. Multivariate analysis also shows that other things equal, the presence o f  at least one informal sector 
worker significantly increases the likelihood that the household i s  poor, and that the presence o f  at least 
one formal sector worker significantly reduces this likelihood (see Table 1.3). Note that the informal 
sector workers are a diverse group o f  comprising casual workers, own account workers and unpaid family 
' 3  Poverty analysis is  based on household income and expenditure surveys and the definition o f  the informal sector 
workers deviate somewhat from the one in the analysis based on labor force survey data. 
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workers, and that since 1997, i t s  proportion in comparison to formal sector workers stayed roughly 
constant (Figure 1 ,9).24 I n  contrast to the formal sector workers who enjoy income security, better 
occupation health and safety, and fringe benefits such as j ob  security, pensions, paid holidays, informal 
sector workers are faced with low income security and informal t e r m  and conditions o f  work. Informal 
sector workers are also much less educated, which partly explains their higher poverty incidenceszs 
Judged by their long working hours, male own account and casual workers are particularly in the 
precarious position (Arunatilke 2005a reports that in 2003, 26 percent o f  them worked longer than 60 
hours per week). 
4 000 000 
poverty o f  households wi th two or more i s  3 5 0 0 0 0 0  
Similarly, in the context o f  multivariate analysis, 2500000 
while the presence o f  one unemployed i s  not 1500000 
associated with higher probability o f  1oooooo 
uneniployment, the presence o f  two or more 
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25. The incidence o f  unemployment i s  slightly ‘U shaped’ relative to income (as suggested by 
Rama 2003). The unemployed are those who can afford to stay out o f  the labor force and those with 
worse j ob  opportunities.26 The distribution o f  unemployment by household income has one peak at low 
income level, t l ie one associated wi th  “involuntary unemployment”-inability to find any kind o f  job, and 
a second peak at high income levels, reflecting unemployment as a choice while searching for a “good” 
job (Figure 1.10). The unemployment rate i s  t l ie highest among the youth, women, and highly educated 
(particularly those with A/L level education). 
26. The disabled are particularly vulnerable to poor employment prospects. Few disabled work. 
According to a survey o f  the Ministry o f  Social Welfare (2003), in 2003 16 percent o f  persons with 
disability worked (22 percent o f  men and only 8 percent o f  women). Employment rates among disabled 
varied from an extremely low 1 percent for persons with intellectual disability and 7 percent for those 
24 To be able to analyze informality using labor force survey data, informal workers are defined as own account 
workers, unpaid family workers and those private sector workers who are paid daily (this operational definition may 
underestimate the number o f  informal workers, as some informal sector workers may be paid weekly or monthly). 
Note that informal workers are predominantly engaged in agriculture, fishing, and livestock rearing, as well as in 
petty trade, other sinall commerce, and industry and service occupations. 
As shown in Table 2.3, higher education i s  strongly associated with lower risk o f  poverty, the finding confirmed 
also in iniiltivariate analysis (household head possessing AIL level o f  education o f  above i s  shown to be negatively 
associated with poverty o f  the household, other things equal). 
l6 Affordability factors are suggested by Arunatilake (2005a), who shows that in comparison to employed workers, 
Unemployed are more likely to come from a family with fewer children and possessing more assets and less likely to 
be a household head. Arunatilake also points to the opportunity factors-residing in Western province and in a 
community with better infrastructure-in influencing the unemployment status. 
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with psychiatric disability to a high o f  26 percent for those with mobi l i ty  disability. O f  those employed, 
32 percent were self-employed, 29 percent were in public employment, and only 13 percent in the formal 
private sector. For most employed, personal income was below US$1 per day, varying from 43 percent 
for those with visual disability to 88 percent with speech disability. In general, the incidence o f  poverty 
among households receiving disability payments (after disability payments are accounted for) i s  52 
percent above the national average. The lack o f  participation o f  disabled in society may be the result o f  
stigma. According to the above survey, only 33 percent went out with the rest o f  the family. Many 
disabled had never been to a wedding nor taken part in community activities and festivals. However, poor 
employment status also l ikely reflects a lack o f  mobil ity. Many disabled are constrained in their mobility. 
The same survey found that only 35 percent o f  individuals who fe l t  that a tricycle or wheelchair would be 
o f  use to them had such devices. A large proportion o f  disabled also have limited access to basic aids to 
correct sensory disabilities. Only 24 percent o f  those who fe l t  the need for a hearing aid had been able to 
get theni. 
Figure 1.10: Share o f  unemployment by income decile, 2002 
Source: Arunatilake (2005a) 
The elderly 
27. While the elderly tend to be better off compared to other population groups, some older 
groups remain vulnerable to poverty. As shown in Table Al.1, the poverty rate has an inverse U 
shaped relationship wi th  age. Poverty declines with age till the 55-64 group, and then gradually increases 
with age (the incidence o f  poverty among households wi th member over 80 years old i s  10 percent above 
the national average). Our results show that pension payments are associated wi th  lower likelihood o f  
poverty o f  the household where the recipients reside. Most elderly currently rely on the family for  income 
support-though only two  thirds prefer th is  arrangemen?’-but growing urbanization and break up o f  
traditional values may erode this support (World Bank, 1994). Family support may not always be 
costless. There may well be some discrimination against elderly (as found by Kochar, 2005, in Pakistan, 
for example). The elderly may also be vulnerable i n  the future, although it i s  likely that they wi l l  adjust 
their labor supply or savings to adjust for aging. Nannayakkara (2004) found that the labor force 
participation rate o f  males age 60-64 has fallen by about 20 percent in the last two decades, a pattern 
reminiscent o f  the OECD trends over the last 40 years. Public policies such as increased retirement age 
can ameliorate, but not reverse these long term trends. Households may not save more in preparation for 
this unprecedented period o f  population aging. High discount rates or myopic behavior may prevail. For 
example, a recent survey found that only 16 percent o f  Sri Lankan elderly had planned for their old age. 
7 7  - Hinting at possible future changes in family support i s  the preferred living arrangement found by Rajan et a l  
(2005). They report that although 90 percent o f  elderly Sri Lankans presently live with their children, this i s  the 
preferred arrangement only for 65 percent o f  them (21 percent would prefer to live alone or with the spouse, 11 
percent in old age homes, and 3 percent with relatives or friends). 
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2, ENHANCING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND 
EMPLOYABILITY 
“We are one happy family, but you want that some 
of us to lose jobs. That’s why we hate you.” 
A representative of an interest group in Sri Lanka 
speaking to representatives of an international agency 
28. Labor i s  typically the most important and often the only assets o f  the poor. Some of the most 
effective policies o f  helping individuals to manage social risk thus consist o f  promoting job creation, 
ensuring equality in access to jobs, and helping the poor and vulnerable to acquire appropriate 
skills. This chapter evaluates these policies for Sri Lanka, focusing on labor market institutions 
(severance pay, wage setting, civil service Iiiring), education programs, and micro-finance institutions. I n  
doing so, it centers i ts  attention upon several o f  the groups identified in Chapter 1 as the most poor and 
vulnerable, the groups whose labor market prospects are the most bleak and uncertain: the subset o f  
informal sector workers who are pushed into informal sector by circumstances beyond their control, often 
living in remote and infrastructure poor areas; the children o f  these workers, who are facing a vicious 
circle of poverty; the unemployed youth; and the disabled. The chapter also discusses the prevalence o f  
wage discrimination among various population groups. 
29. The chapter finds that Sri  Lanka’s labor market i s  affected by a counterproductive duality 
between formal and informal employment, Labor market institutions provide generous wages and 
protect the rights o f  insiders (of workers employed in the formal sector), and, coiisistent with international 
experience. the high level o f  protection adversely affects job growth, contributes to informal employment, 
and increases uneniployment among youth and marginalized groups. The limited education of  informal 
sector workers and their location in poorer rural areas also reduce their access to better paying formal 
sector jobs. And by lowering expected returns from schooling, restricted formal sector job opportunities 
also appear to reduce schooling participation of  the poor, creating a cadre of  less educated workers, with 
lower formal job prospects, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle of  poverty. Thus the chapter concludes that 
more efficient labor market institutions-that provide essential but reduced protection-not only help 
promote growth, but somewhat paradoxically, also help improve employment prospects of  informal sector 
workers, women, youth and other marginalized groups. Given the political difficulty o f  instituting such 
reforms, the chapter notes that reducing job protection should be complemented by appropriate social 
protection policies-the ones that help workers insure against unemployment, as well as addresses their 
t rai 11 in g needs. 
30. The chapter i s  organized as follows. To set the stage, the first section summarizes labor market 
trends and outcomes. The second section analyzes the impact o f  labor market institutions, focusing on 
employment protection legislation, wage setting, and civil service hiring policies. The third section 
examines the labor supply, focusing on education and training as determinants o f  the quality of labor 
force. The last section concludes by drawing policy implications. 
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2.1 Key Labor Market  Trends and Outcomes 
3 1 .  Labor force growth has been aligned 
with population growth, so participation in Sri 
Lanka has remained stagnant despite economic 
growth. From 1994 to 2003, the labor force grew at 
an annual average rate o f  2.9%, in line with the 
increase in the working age population. Labor force 
participation rates remained constant-about 55  
percent-over this time, but varied widely across 
population groups (Figure 2.1). The male 
participation rate (76 percent) was more than twice 
that o f  women (35 percent). Participation by age 
had a familiar inverse U shape, with participation 
rates lower for young and old relative to prime age 
adults. The participation rate was highest in the 
estate sector, followed by rural and urban 
participation rates. 
32. The structure of employment- 
particularly the large share of informal sector 
em p I o y m e n t-h as rem ai n ed constant. During 
1997-2003, the distribution o f  workers among 
public sector employees, formal private sector 
employees, informal private sector employees, 
own-account workers and unpaid family workers 
has remained constant (Figure 2.2). The share o f  
informal workers in total employment has also 
remained stable at about 65 percent. 
Figure 2.1 
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Labor force participation rate, total and by 
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Figure 2.2: Employment by type of job, 1992-2003 (in 
million) 
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(Characteristics o f  informal sector workers and the unemployed are described in chapter 1 .) 
Figure 2.3: Unemployment rate by age group 33.  Unemployment rates have 
declined by almost half in recent I 
years, but remain very high among 
pa r t ic u 1 a r and 
youth. As noted in the previous chapter, 
unemployment rate declined strongly 
froin nearly 16 percent in 1990 to 8.2 
percent in the fourth quarter o f  2004. 
Unemployment rate varies widely 
across sub-population groups, and it i s  
pai-ticularly high among the females, 
youth and the more educated. I n  2003, 
female titiemployment rate ( 1  3 percent) 
w a s  sliglitly more than twice that o f  the 
male rate (6 percent). By age group, 
unemployment rate i s  highest in the 15- 
19 age group followed by that in the 20- 
g ro  11 ps-wo m e n 35 0 
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Source: Computations based on LFS. 
29 age group (Figure 2.3). Close to one-third and one-fifth o f  the individuals in the 15-19 and 20-29 age 
groups are unemployed, respectively. I n  all other age groups, the unemployment rates are less than 5 
percent. 
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34. Unemployment rates are highest for 
the well educated. By level o f  education, 
unemployment rate i s  highest for t l ie  A/L 
qualified (18 percent in 2003), followed by 
that for OiL qualified (13 percent i n  2003) 
i nd i v id  ua I s . I n  coin pari son, for i nd i v  id  ual s 
Figure 2.4: Unemployment rate by education 
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35.  Real earnings have increased for all, but estate sector workers lagged behind. During 1992- 
2002, real earnings increased at the annual growth rates o f  1.5 percent for median and 2.6 percent for 
mean earnings. Growth o f  real earnings was shared by men and women, as wel l  as by urban and rural 
workers-but tlie real growth o f  estate sector workers was lagging behind and stagnated in real terms 
(Heltberg and Vodopivec, 2004). 
National 
36. I n  2003, average wages in public sector exceeded those in formal and informal private 
sector in almost all occupations (Arunatilake 2005a). While informal sector workers were paid more 
than worker in tlie formal private sector in occupations at the upper end o f  the ladder, they were paid 
about equal or less at the lower-end occupations. This suggests a large wage premium o f  public sector 
jobs that offer also additional non-wage benefits Gob security, extensive holidays, and, on average, low 
effort required at the job). B y  law formal sector employees also enjoy other types o f  benefits such as paid 
leave days and j o b  security. On tl ie other end o f  the ladder are informal sector workers who do not enjoy 
any o f  t l ie  above fringe benefits. 
2.2 Labor Market Institutions: Impact on Equity and Growth 
37.  The deniand for labor depends critically on overall growth i n  output. However, growing evidence 
suggests that labor mar1;et iiistitiitioiis-laws, unions, collective bargaining, core labor standards) can 
iinpact tlie deniand for labor, particularly for vulnerable groups. While basic protection o f  worker rights 
(e.g., worker safety or contract violations) improves welfare and productivity, excessive protection that 
raises the costs o f  f i r ing workers (e.g., severance) can paradoxically increase hiring costs and reduce 
employment opportunities for many labor force participants (particularly those with less skills) and hinder 
j o b  creation. We therefore turn to evaluating three main employment protection institutions: severance 
pay system embodied in the Termination o f  Employment o f  Workman A c t  (TEWA), the wage setting 
mechanism, and c iv i l  service hiring practices. We examine how these institutions affect the demand for 
labor and thus influence labor market outcomes.28 
Severance Pay 
38.  Sri Lanka's severance pay system-embodied in the Termination of  Employment of 
Workman Act (TEWA) o f  1971-is one of  the costliest and most restrictive severance pay systems 
in the world. The T E W A  requires employers with more than 14 workers to seek the authorization o f  the 
In  line with its focus on social policies, Sri Lanka has devoted significant attention to worker protection. For 
example, extensive legislation covers different aspects o f  working conditions and the government has ratified eight 
ILO conventions on core labor standards (although some weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement o f  labor 
standards need to be addressed). Tripartite mechanisms for social dialogue have been in place for a long time and 
trade unions, employers and the government interact and collectively resolve critical issues in industrial relations in 
the labor market. 
28 
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Commissioner o f  Labor for intended layoffs. I t  not only requires that employers pay high compensation 
to laid off workers, but its discretionary nature and lengthy procedures further restrict the ability o f  
employers to lay o f f  workers. By  ex-ante determining the amount o f  severance pay, the recently 
introduced formulas somewhat reduced arbitrariness, but payments remain well above international norms 
(employment protection legislation i s  described in Annex 2.1). 
39. Sri Lankan severance pay system, by limiting access to “good” jobs and by reducing job 
creation, i s  likely to hurt vulnerable groups and reduce productivity o f  firms. This report empirically 
documents that TEWA regulations influence firms in two ways.29 First, job creation and job destruction 
flows o f  formal sector firms in Sri Lanka are unusually low by international standards, a trait that can 
undoubtedly partly be explained by restrictive employment protection legislation. Second, the growth 
pattern o f  firms in the neighborhood o f  15 workers i s  peculiar, with firms with 15 workers recording 
exceptionally large changes both when shrinking and when growing. As a consequence, formal sector 
employment i s  likely lower, reducing the size o f  higher productivity formal sector firms and limiting 
access to “good” jobs to one o f  the most vulnerable groups-informal sector workers, and firms’ ability 
to introduce technological innovations i s  lower, reducing their productivity. 
40. Sri Lanka’s low intensity of job flows i s  likely the consequence of  its restrictive TEWA 
system. In  early 2000s, job creation exceeded job destruction, with the average job creation rate of 7.9 
percent and the job destruction rate o f  4.1 percenta3’ The resulting average gross job reallocation rate (the 
sum o f  jobs which disappeared in shrinking firms and those which were generated in  expanding firms) 
was 12 percent, and excess job reallocation rate (a measure o f  the “job turnover”) was 8.3 percent. Job 
flow o f  for temporary workers, quite expectedly, strongly exceeded job flows o f  permanent workers (see 
Table 2. I). International comparison presented in Figure 2.5 shows that in each dimension, job flow rates 
o f  other countries vastly exceed job flow rates o f  Sri Lanka (note that the comparison includes a range of 
developed, transition and developing countries). While job flows can be low because o f  several other 
factors (exposure to macroeconomic and trade shocks, for example), compelling international evidence 
suggests that restrictive employment protection legislation, like TEWA, i s  the major contributing factor 
(see, for example, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 2002). 
In addition, labor regulations were identified as one o f  the most important obstacles to investment climate 
perceived by urban enterprises in Sri Lanka (Asian Development Bank and World Bank 2005). 
Consistent with Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), job creation i s  defined as the sum o f  increases in employment in 
a l l  firms that expanded in a particular year, and job destruction as a sum o f  employment losses in firms that 
contracted in the particular year. We also use two summary job flow measures: job reallocation (the sum o f  job 
creation and job  destruction) and excess job reallocation (the difference between the job reallocation and net 
em p I oym en t growth) . 
29 
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Table 2.1: Job flow dynamics, 2001/02 and 2002/03 
200 1102 2002103 
Total Permanent Temporary Total Permanent Temporary 
I-“-- --I 
Rate o f  job creation and destruction (percent) 
Job creation 8.2 8.2 13.5 7.6 6.2 39.3 
Job destruction 3.9 3.9 6.3 4.4 4.4 6.6 
.I ob rea I Io cation 12.1 12.1 19.8 12.0 10.6 46.0 
Excess job reallocation 7.7 7.8 12.5 8.8 8.9 13.3 
Memorandum items 
Employment 160,167 153,814 6,353 165,337 156,502 8,835 
Number o f  firms 418 426 
Source: Own computations based on 2003 urban ICA data. 
4 1, TEWA explains the irregular size distribution o f  firms and limited growth o f  firms with 15 
workers. If the TEWA i s  creating adverse consequence for firms, they must be trying to avoid it. One 
way to do i s  by keeping their workforce below 15, thus benefiting f rom the TEWA exclusion. The 
Employees’ Provident Fund data shown in Figure 2.6 indicates that each distribution o f  firms in 2000-03 
has “a kinl<” at the size 14.” While the number o f  firms falls monotonically with the size o f  the firm for 
the firms larger than 10, there i s  an irregularity at the size 14, with the number o f  firms o f  this size being 
about the same as the number o f  firms o f  the size 13, followed again with a reduced number o f  firms o f  
the size 15.  Moreover, Figure 2.7 shows that to take advantage o f  the TEWA exclusion, firms o f  size 15 
are shrinking more intensely than firms smaller or larger (and, since they have already passed the critical 
threshold, growing firms o f  th is  size are exceeding the intensity o f  growth o f  their immediate 
~ i e i g l i b o r s ) . ~ ~  I n  other words, the f i rm size o f  15 i s  found to be particularly “unstable”, and the firm size of 
14 particularly stable. 
42. Sri Lanka’s depressed low job flows, relative to other countries, have potentially adverse 
implications for productivity growth. I t  has long been recognized that i n  a well-functioning market 
economy, there i s  large scale, ongoing reallocation o f  inputs and outputs across individual producers. 
Recent empirical evidence shows that th i s  reallocation contributes significantly to aggregate productivity 
growth (for a survey o f  th i s  area, see Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). Caballero and Hammour (2000) also 
show that constrained labor markets may create a host o f  inefficiencies in the process o f  “creative 
destruction”-the process that i s  an important part o f  normal functioning o f  market economies. 
3 ’  While Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) provides an extremely rich database on the firm-level number o f  
workers-all registered firms are required to pay contributions for their permanent workers-the data i s  not free o f  
problems. Above all, firms report only workers for whom EPF contributions are paid. If for whatever reason such 
contributions are not paid, the true number o f  workers o f  the firm deviates from the number reported to the EPF- 
the deviation which figures prominently particularly when computing growth rates. To improve reliability o f  the 
data, in the analysis o f  the growth o f  firms we therefore excluded firms with less than 10 workers (either in current 
o f  previous year), as well as firms with growth rates in the current year (positive or negative) exceeding 20 percent, 
as such large changes almost certainly reflected reporting inaccuracies. ’’ Figure 2.7 plots the coefficients-size-specific dummies-in the following two regressions. For each year during 
1996-2003, we grouped firins into a growing and shrinking group and then regressed growth (reduction) rates on 
firm size and year dummy variables. All size-specific dummies-reflecting deviations from the common growth 
trend-were found statistically significant. 
Figure 2.5: Job creation and job destruction flows 
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Figure 2.6:  Number o f  firms by size, 2000-03 
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Figure 2.7: Employment growth o f  firms (deviations 
from the common growth trend), 1995-2003 
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43. International evidence shows that restrictive employment protection legislation, like 
TEWA, also reduces job prospects o f  women, youth and elderly-as observed in Sri  Lanka. There i s  
growing and abundant evidence that strict employment protection reduces employment, particularly o f  
women, young people and older workers, and that it hinders technological innovations (for a recent 
survey o f  such effects, see Vodopivec 2004 and Heltberg and Vodopivec 2004). And in India, protective 
worker legislation hurts precisely the most vulnerable groups.33 The poor employment prospects o f  young 
Besley and Burgess (2004) show that legislation introduced in the name o f  equity can hurt precisely the group it i s  
intended to protect. They found that pro-worker labor regulations reduced manufacturing output and employment 
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people and women may wel l  be explained by restrictions on firing, which in turn hinder j ob  creation. I n  
short, large fir ing costs contribute to the emergence o f  dual labor markets, with well protected formal 
sector workers (which tend to be predominantly prime-age males) contrasted by much less protected 
infornial sector workers and the unemployed. 
44. TEWA likely reduces prospects Of Figure 2.8: Coverage of  TEWA by income quintiles 
hiring informal sector workers who lack the 
opportunity to influence legislation, While 
(in percent, 2000) 
33 
formal sector workers have a strong formal 30 
representation via trade unions, informal sector 25 
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workers have been without an effective voice and 
their interests have therefore not been adequately 
represented when setting up the regulatory 5 
framework. The evidence about the T E W A  0 
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coverage i s  consistent wi th  th i s  interpretation, The Middle The 
poorest richest 
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As shown in Figure 2.8, in 1999/2000 nearly one Source: Heltberg and Vodopivec (2004), based on SL IS  
third o f  workers covered by the TEWA came data. 
from the richest quintile o f  population; in contrast, the rest o f  population was covered less than 
proportionally, with the lowest coverage in the poorest quintile. 34 
Wage Setting Institutions 
45. Pay Commissions, Tripartite Wages Boards and Collective Bargaining institutions play an 
important role in establishing wage levels. There i s  a three-tier wage-setting structure: the public sector, 
the formal (‘protected’) private sector and the informal (‘unprotected’) sector. Public sector wages are 
governed by two key mechanisms: periodic recommendations by government-appointed pay 
commissions, and adjustments by the Cabinet i n  the cost o f  l iv ing allowance. Formal private sector wages 
are determined via tripartite Wages Boards (which determine minimum wages) and via collective 
bargaining between unions and the employers represented by the Employers Federation o f  Ceylon. 
46. Wage setting institutions increase wages o f  formal sector workers relative to informal sector 
workers. There i s  compelling evidence that wage setting institutions have created an artificial gap 
between better-paying jobs in the public and the “protected” private sector and low-paying jobs in the 
“iinprotected” private sector. Empirical analysis shows that public and formal private sector jobs 
command an important wage premium which cannot be explained by the productive characteristics o f  the 
workers. Other things equal, returns o f  public sector workers are 14 percent more, and returns o f  the 
‘protected’ private sector workers are 11-12 percent more than returns o f  informal sector workers (see 
regression results in Table 2.2, taken form Heltberg and Vodopivec, 2004).35 In addition, public sector 
and increased agricultural output (because investment shifted into farming) and increased urban poverty. And the 
ef fects  were large: each pro-worker regulatory amendment, on average reduced registered manufacturing 
employment by 7 percent and daily employment in manufacturing by 29 percent. 
3 4  The TEWA systein is  likely to create other adverse consequences for businesses, many o f  which also affect 
workers in those firms. Among others, due to the TEWA, firms lack the flexibility to redeploy workers within the 
firm and to hire workers during a TEWA inquiry, and they may try to outsource parts o f  their business operations so 
as to circumvent the TEWA (Ranaraja, 2005). 
The analysis does not account for possible selection bias resulting from workers choosing the sector of  
employment-according to Rama (2003), however, accounting for the selection into public sector jobs has not 
altered significantly the estimates o f  earnings function returns. 
3 5  
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workers enjoy other benefits such as tax exemption, j ob  security and non-contributory pensions. Separate 
regressions (not presented here) show that the earnings premium tends to be concentrated at the lower 
education levels, including workers with GCE O/L level, the result consistent with findings o f  Rodrigo 
and Munasinglie (undated) who found that the pay advantage o f  c iv i l  service workers over their private 
sector counterparts applies particularly to lower level occupations. Note that formal private sector 
(represented in the table under the “TEWA job”) denotes workers in firms employing more than 14 
barkers wli icl i are therefore liable to the employment protection legislation under the T E W A  (see above) 
and hence proxies the private sector ‘protected’ by l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Unions are also more likely to be active 
in this sector, compelling greater compliance with protective labor legislation and engaging in collective 
bargaining. The largest premium (36-44 percent) i s  for military employment, probably reflecting the 
inherent risk factor in such employment. 
47. Women earn less than men, as a result o f  productivity differences but also because of other 
factors, such as discrimination. There i s  substantial evidence o f  the presence o f  gender-based 
discriinination (see Table 2.3). Both Aturupane (1996) and Ajwad and Kurululasuriya (2002) found that 
discrimination in the labor market rather than differences i n  productive characteristics accounted for a 
large fraction o f  the gender-wage differential-which may be the result o f  discrimination or other 
institutional rigidities in hiring women.37 Meanwhile, i n  a time-series analysis o f  the gender-wage gap in 
the agricultural sector during the period 1979-1998, Gunatilaka and Hewarathna (2002) show a persistent 
and stable gap between male and female wages for the same task in the tea, coconut and paddy sectors. 
48. On the positive side, there i s  no evidence of ethnicity-based differences in earnings. With few 
exceptions, studies summarized in  Table 2.4 show statistically insignificant differences in earnings, once 
differences in observable Characteristics o f  individuals are accounted for. 
Civil Sector Hiring Policies 
49. Wage setting institutions and civil service recruitment practices have been advanced as 
reasons explaining high unemployment, particularly among young people. Several hypotheses have 
been advanced to explain unemployment. The unrealistic wage expectations hypothesis maintains that 
more educated workers seek jobs which would pay them more than the market i s  willing to pay, perhaps 
because workers possess the wrong set o f  skills (or there i s  a skills mismatch, see Wor ld  Bank 1999). The 
other two hypotheses assume that there exist “good” and “bad” jobs in Sri Lanka. The queuing hypothesis 
argues that the unemployed wait for an opportunity to take a j ob  in the c iv i l  service which i s  known for 
offering stable jobs wi th generous fringe benefits (including pensions), and for requiring l ow  work effort. 
Similarly, the ins/itu/ional hypothesis maintains that unemployment arises because j o b  creation o f  the 
“protected” private sector i s  hindered by high labor costs created by costly employment protection 
legislation and strong bargaining power o f  workers under conditions o f  virtually complete j o b  security. 
The protected sector denoted by the variable “TEWA job” also includes BO1 firms. Although there few unions in 
this sector, workers in BO1 firms producing for the export market usually enjoy better terms and conditions o f  work 
than informal sector workers, partially due to the concerns o f  international buyers and the implementation o f  social 
compliance contracts. 
In  contrast, Gunewardena (2002) found that the OLS methodology used by the other two studies tended to 
overestimate the extent o f  discrimination. Having corrected for the omitted variable bias o f  the OLS methodology, 
she found that even though returns to education for women were higher than for men, initial disadvantages were so 
great that favorable returns were insufficient to eliminate the gender gap. 
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Table 2.2: Estimation o f  earnings func-hour take-home and total pay), 2000 
Take-home pay per Total pay including . . .  
." ..... " ............ ".. "" ,..... ....,... " " ....................... ...,.. " "!our<!%J .l..,..ll,,..l....... "."l.".l"._"._" benkts  _" ker hour (r~)",--- 
Public sector job 0.137** 0.144 
(4.15) (4.41)** 
TEWAjob 0.106 0.120 
(2.91)** (3.35)** 
Military job 0.356 0.437 
(7.28)** (9.06) * * 
Grade 1-4 -0.025 -0.004 
(0.12) (0.02) 
Grade 5-9 -0.000 0.027 
(0.00) (0.14) 
GCE OIL 0.091 0.139 
(0.46) (0.71) 
GCE AIL 0.353 0.370 
(1.78) (1.89) 
Degree and above 0.677 0.681 
(3.34)* * (3.40) * * 
(5.99)* * (5.83)** 
Estate duininy 0.050 0.032 
(0.53) (0.34) 
Age 0.047 0.047 
Rural dtininiy -0.171 -0.165 
(7.33)** (7.35)** 
(5.65)** (5.74)* * 
(4.62) (4.74)* * 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 
Male 0.125 0.126 
Co 11 st an I 1.972 1.989 
(8.58)' * (8.77)' * 
0 bsr rva t i o 11s 3187 3188 
R-squared 0.19 0.20 
Source: Heltberg and Vodopivec (2004) based on Sri Lanka Integrated Survey (SLIS). 
h'otes: .Total pay' includes other payments such as tips and bonuses, and 'Take-home pay' does not 
include siich payments. Pension benefits are not included in either definition. Province dummies are 
included in both regressions. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; * *  
significant at 1%. 
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Study Gunewardena (2002) 
Key results 
Method 
Period 
'ote: The above 
Gunatilaka and 
Hewarathna (2002) 
Table 2.3: . 
Atiirupane (1996) 
Gender difference in 
log o f  earnings 
reduced from 0.45 in 
1985186 to 0.3 1 in 
199019 1. 
Although returns to 
education were 
higher for women 
than for men in 
1990191, initial 
disadvantages so 
great that favorable 
returns insufficient 
to eliminate gender 
gap. 
OLS regression 
corrected for omitted 
variable bias using a 
fixed effects 
61 percent o f  
earnings differential 
between sexes not 
explained by 
differential 
end o w  men ts o f  
per son al 
characteristics. 
Persistent and stable 
gender wage 
differential for male 
and female workers 
in  same task. 
Time series analysis 
using stationarity 
tests and 
Oaxaca 
Decomposition 
using OLS 
I994 
ndings need to be qualif 
Study 
Key results 
Method 
Period 
ialyses on gender-w 
A,iwad & 
Kurukulasuriya 
(2002) 
Hourly wage 
premium for males 
15% 
Conditional gender 
wage differentials 
l6%, 5%, 16% and 
for Sinhalese, 
Tamils, and Moors 
when male wage 
structure assumed to 
be true. More than 
95 YO o f  the gap not 
explained by 
productivity related 
characteristics 
Ajwad & Kurukulasuriya 
Tamils earn 7% more and 
Moors 2.5% less than 
Sinhalese, results not 
statistically significant. 
Aturupane ( 1  996) (2002) 
Men: Sri Lankan Tamils 
earned 9.2%, Indian Tamils 
19% and Muslims 10% less 
than Sinhalese men. Results 
not significant. 
I U'omen: Sri Lankan Tamils 
earned 1 I%. Indian Tamils 
2.9% and Muslims 17% less 
than Sinhalese women 
Results not statistically 
significant. 
Oaxaca Decomposition using 
OLS quantile regressions 
1994 199912000 
Blinder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition using OLS and 
B I i nder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition 
using OLS and 
quantile regressions 
199912000 
1 by the fact that estimat 
approach. 1 cointegration. 
1985, 1991 1 1979-1998 
g the impact o f  discrimination on wages i s  
complicated by the fact that many endogenous factors affect labor market outcomes. For example, the decision to pursue 
cducation may be affected by discrimination itself, with the discriminated group either having lower school attainments 
dt ie to discrimination at that level. or having high school attainment because o f  over-education to compensate for the 
difference in wages due to discrimination (A.iwad and Kurukulasuriya 2002) 
l.ote same as under Table 2 3 
is differentials 
Gunewardena (2002) 
1985186: 
Men: Sri Lankan Tamils earn 
4.9% more, Indian Tamils 
earn 4.7% less than Sinhalese 
men. Results not statistically 
significant. 
Women: Sri Lankan Tamils 
earn 14.3% more (statistically 
significant), Indian Tamils 
earn 13.7% more (not 
statistically significant) than 
Sinhalese women. 
OLS regression corrected for 
omitted variable bias using a 
fixed effects approach. 
1985, 1991 
50. Recent evidence supports the queuing nncl institutional hypotheses linked to labor market 
As shown above, the regression analysis confirmed the existence o f  a positive public sector 
preniiuiii relative to the private sector, other things equal, as well as the wage premium o f  TEWA- 
3 8  We are referring to the findings o f  Rama (2003), World Bank (1999), and Heltberg and Vodopivec (2004). 
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protected jobs over other private sector jobs. B y  implication, the c iv i l  service wage premium attracts job- 
seekers to queue and thus generates unemployment. Similarly, the wage premium o f  TEWA-covered jobs 
increases costs and reduces labor demand. Note that TEWA-covered jobs also carry non-wage costs-the 
expected costs o f  layoffs (if explicitly acknowledged at the time o f  the contract, the expected costs o f  
layoff  should reduce wages, and so the amount o f  the wage premium o f  the TEWA jobs underestimates 
the additional costs borne by employers). 
5 1. Government ad-hoc recruitment policies also contribute their share to unemployment (via 
queuing). Above evidence about the wage premium shows that queuing for public sector jobs has made 
good sense-and that perhaps the appeal o f  public sector jobs i s  also the reason for the poor success o f  
j ob  subsidy programs (see Box 2.1). Adding to perverse labor market incentives (and contributing to 
government overstaffing) are patronage-based appointments to the c iv i l  service as a way o f  obtaining 
political support or fu l f i l l  promises, wi th insufficient private j o b  creation often used as an excuse. 
Political motivation o f  regular large scale recruitments i s  evident from the fact that such recruitments 
often mirror electoral cycles. I n  the 2005 Budget announcement, for example, 30,000 graduates were 
recruited and 40,000 temporary staff were made permanent. Note that with 14 percent o f  the labor force 
employed in Government (1 8 percent if semi-government i s  included) in the 1990s, Sri Lanka had one o f  
the largest bureaucracies in the region. According to the World Bank (1998), Sri Lanka had 3.9 c iv i l  
servants per 100 population compared to the average o f  2.6 per 100 population in Asia. Moreover, during 
1998-02 the number o f  employees o f  the Central Government increased by 23 percent (form 354 to 436 
thousand), strongly exceeding corresponding increases o f  the population and labor force (which were 6 
and 9 percent, respectively-Sri Lanka DCS, 1998 and 2002). 
Box 2.1: Helping job-seekers to be placed in the private sector 
The Distance Education Modernization Project, launched in December 2003, has been seeking to place young 
workers who finished A-level but failed to enter universities to the private sector (subsidizing their pay by Rs. 4,000 
for the first nine months o f  employment). With not much success. 
Since December 2003, 36,000 youngsters applied, and the project solicited 2,554 job offers from 184 private sector 
firms. After interviewing 16,481 o f  candidates, firms offered jobs to 1,273 o f  them. But by August 2005, only 432 
students have actiially accepted these offers. And students often had second thoughts about taking these jobs. For 
example, a leading private sector manufacturing firin accepted 37 candidates (after interviewing over 300 of them), 
but after they were given an orientation at the factory, the candidates sent a letter announcing collective withdrawal 
just a few days before the agreed upon date for starting a job. 
Source: Management o f  Distance Education Modernization Project, Ministry o f  Education. 
2.3 Enhancing Labor Supply by Increasing Education and Training of  the Poor 
52. The above discussion has largely focused on the constraints imposed by labor market institutions 
on the demand for labor. We now turn to a brief discussion o f  education and training as determinants o f  
the quality o f  the labor supply (for a comprehensive discussion education i n  Sri Lanka, see World Bank 
20059. 
53.  Workers are pushed to informal sector by lack of human capital, poverty, and distance to 
markets. Given that informal sector workers are disproportionally poor and that significant inequities 
follow the formal-informal split, a natural question arises-why do people choose such jobs? I s  this 
option primarily a matter o f  ability and personal preference, or are there specific circumstances outside 
the control o f  individuals that influence such decisions? I n  a background paper for this study, Arunatilake 
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(2005a) shows that informal sector workers are over-represented in communities with higher 
uiieinploymeiit rates and in provinces other than Western province and the North/East. Many o f  them are 
pushed in the informal sector by large distance from commercial sectors, the lack o f  adequate community 
infrastructure (access to roads and electricity), and by poverty which l i m i t s  their investment opportunities 
(including investment in schooling and health). Aruantilake thus shows that the lack o f  equal 
opportunities underlies the decision to enter the informal sector. 
54. Informal sector workers are much less 
educated, which partly explains their higher 
poverty incidence. The share o f  workers with less 
than primary education and wi th  secondary 
education in the infornial sector i s  much higher, 
and the share o f  workers with the above-secondary 
education i s  much lower than in the comparator 
sectors-public sector and formal private sector 
(Figure 2.9).  And as shown in  the previous 
chapter, lower education i s  strongly associated 
with higher risk o f  poverty. 
5 5 .  Informal sector workers include many 
individuals who dropped out o f  school because 
o f  high costs o f  schooling and because o f  low 
perceived benefits o f  education. According to 
S L I S  survey, 7 percent o f  a l l  5 - 14 year olds did 
not attend school. More than hal f  o f  these children 
did not attend school because o f  financial 
constraints, 17 percent because they had to work on 
the farm or in business, and 26 percent because they 
had to help at home (Figure 2.10). Moreover, 41 
percent o f  respondents stated that they were 
satisfied with the level o f  schooling and 7 percent 
that additional schooling was not useful for finding 
a .job. 
56. The regression analysis confirms that 
poverty affects school attendance. Being in the 
poorest expenditure quintile, the presence o f  large 
number o f  young children, and direct costs o f  
schooling, on both essential school materials and 
on private tuition, were all found to negatively 
affect school attendance (Arunatilake 2005b). 
Arunatilake's results also suggest that lower 
attendance i s  associated with lower expected 
benefits from schooling for children from poor 
families. She found that school quality (as proxied 
by unfilled teacher vacancies) negatively 
influenced school attendance, and schools catering 
the poor are known to be given less resources (see 
Figure 2.1 1). Moreover, the importance o f  the 
occupation o f  the household head for school 
Figure 2.9: Education by sector o f  employment 
0 8 ~ ~~ ___ ~~- ~ ~ 
n 
Formal - pub. F o r m a l  - priv. Informal 
Secondary Above upper secondary 
~ 
Figure 2.10: Reasons for not attending school, in 
percent (for those who have dropped out) 
No school 
[close by, 8.1 Due to war 
disruptions, 5, ~ 
Work in 
fa rm/b u s in es s 
1  Satisfied with 
level of , 16.9 
schooling, 
40.6 
School not 
good, 1.3 
Help at home, 
25.5 
eaching not 
aood, 0.9 - 
Schooling not Financial 
useful for .' constraints, 
jobs, 7.7 50.9 
Figure 2.11: Children in communities with poor 
school resources, by expenditure quintile (percent o f  
total) 
I""% 1 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
F c h i n p  materials BJTeacher vacancies 0 Poor physical facilities 
Source: SLIS  199912000. Note:  Percentages do not add 
100, since more than one reason could be cited 
up to 
(and attendance suggests that household characteristics may influence the expected benefits o f  schooling 
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o f  j ob  search), as parents wi th  more influential positions and thus better social networks may affect the 
returns o f  education by increasing the chances o f  accessing higher paying jobs.39 This finding i s  
strengthened by the fact that socio-cultural factors, such as ethnicity o f  the father, also affect schooling 
behavior ( ArLinat i laka 2005 b). 
57. The l o w  education of informal sector workers reduces education prospects o f  their children, 
despite universal access to education. For this reason, intergenerational schooling mobility is  low in 
Sri Lanlta by international comparisoii-reflecting i n  part institutional constraints that result in limited j o b  
opportunities. Intergenerational economic mobil ity i s  an important indicator o f  social and economic 
progress made across generations. Comparing the educational attainment across three generations, 
Ranasinghe (2004a) finds that an additional year o f  parental education for the older generation implies an 
increase o f  nearly 0.6 years o f  schooling for children, i n  comparison to only about 0.3 years for the 
youngest generation (Table 2.5). The comparatively low intergenerational mobil ity in Sri Lanka could be 
due to the children o f  poorly educated parents having high out o f  pocket costs, or the high opportunity 
costs involved in sending children to scliool, or low expected returns f rom education, including low 
opportunities for employment. Findings that are consistent wi th the results noted in the last two 
paragraphs. 
58 .  Informal sector workers living in rural areas have limited access to ‘second chance’ offered 
by training. Tlie challenges o f  training as a tool to give workers a “second chance” seem to be very 
similar to the challenges o f  education. I n  its comprehensive evaluation o f  Sri Lanka’s training, World 
Bank (20050 shows that training i s  an effective labor market tool, as it reduces job search times and 
increases earnings. I n  i t s  analysis o f  training participation, the study finds that (i) parental schooling 
positively influences children’s training decisions, (ii) the probability o f  getting training in the Western 
Province is higher than in all other provinces, and (iii) the probability o f  training, especially o f  formal 
training. i s  strongly correlated with level o f  schooling attainment (as individuals with higher levels o f  
education also tend to benefit more from training). This analysis implies that members o f  poor families 
have worse access to training, and suggests that reducing regional inequalities in access to training as an 
important priority. These constraints are l ikely to be also important for poor unemployed youth and the 
d i sabled. 
39  Both Arunatilake (2005b) and Ranasinghe and Hartog (2002) find that children o f  fathers with professional or 
administrative (managerial) occupations have a much higher probability o f  staying in school and completing higher 
level o f  education than children o f  fathers o f  lower level occupations. 
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Table 2.5: International - comparison of intergenerational schooling correlations 
Count ryiyea r Source Father- Mother- Father- Mother- Year of  
~ Son Daughter Daughter Son Birth 
Sri Lanka (1 8+ 
year olds) 
Ranasinghe (2004) 
US (20-30 year 
olds) 
Germany (19-26 
year olds) 
Malaysia (8-50 
year olds) 
Mexico (23-69 
year olds) 
South Africa 
( 1  6-65 year olds) 
Panama ( 1  8- 
year olds) 
Israel (22 + year 
Older and younger 
generations pooled 
Older generation 
only 
Younger generation 
only 
Couch & Dunn 
[ 19971 
Couch & Dunn 
[ 19971 
Lillard & Willis 
[ 19941 
Binder & Woodruff 
Hertz[200 I] 
[ I9991 
Heckinaii & Hotz 
[ 19861 
Beenstock [2002] 
0.52 
0.5 1 
0.42 
0.4 18 
0.237 
0.194 
0.488 
0.408 
0.57 
0.2928 
0.54 
0.48 
0.46 
0.43 1 
0.391 
0.358 
- 
0.42 
- 
0.3427 
- 
- 
- 
0.402 
0.016 
0.226 
0.517 
- 
- 
0.3479 
- 
- 
- 
0.423 
0.097 
0.239 
- 
- 
0.75 
0.2678 
1920- 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1964 
1965 
1980 
1971 
1977 
1983 
1920- 
1945- 
1954- 
1958- 
1938- 
1925- 
1928- 
1965- 
1953- 
olds) 1973 
Source: Ranasinghe (2004a). 
59. Disability also reduces school participation, 
particularly for girls, and despite their special needs, 
few disabled have received any training. At present 80 
disabled children can attend government schools either ~ 60 
through t l ie inclusion in ordinary classrooins or i n  40 
special education tinits attached to ordinary schools. 
Those who cannot or do not want to f i t  into either o f  
these streams, attend special schools run by NGOs and 
the private sector. However, according to 2003 survey, 
schooling, ranging from 12 percent for persons with 
psychiatric disability, 24 percent for those with mobil ity 
disability, to 67 percent in t l ie case o f  those with a intellectual disability (Ministry o f  Social Welfare 
2003, see Figure 2.12). Disabled female cliildren were found far less l ikely to go to school than disabled 
male children. Moreover, children wi th  disability have high school attrition rates. M ino r  vision and 
heariiig disability can result in children being out o f  scliool, or dropping out. For example, only 24 
percent o f  those who fe l t  that a hearing aid would improve their hearing had been able to receive them. 
Disabled also face difficulties in their access to training - despite their special needs, in 2003 only 5-20 
percent have undertook a training program, wi th  tlie percentage ranging from 5 percent for persons with 
intellectual, to 1 5  percent for those with visual and speech disability and 20 percent for hearing disability 
(Ministry o f  Social Welfare 2003, see Figure 2. lq4' 
Figure 2.12: Education and training received by 
disabled, 2003 (by type of disability, in percent) 
20 
0 
a large share (39 percent) o f  disabled had never started 
~ 
OStar ted  education DUnder took  training 
Source: Ministry o f  Social Welfare (2003). 
According to 2002 labor force survey, 13 percent o f  working-age population reported having received training 40 
(World Bank 2005f). 
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60. The Ministry o f  Labor has developed active labor market programs, but their impact i s  not 
well known. A review o f  current programs and piloting o f  new programs i s  warranted (paying special 
attention to youth, women and disabled) to arrive at the appropriate scope and the national ~ t ra tegy .~ ’  
Findings from industrialized countries 011 the effectiveness o f  such programs from developed countries 
suggest that training programs can be costly and ineffective (see, for example, Betcherman et al, 2004, 
and their summary in Table 2.6). On the positive, side, most programs also appear to work best under 
conditions o f  economic growth (as currently the case in Sri Lanka). But findings from industrialized 
countries about the impacts o f  these programs may not apply to developing countries, which are 
characterized by a much larger informal labor markets and weaker capacity to implement programs. 
Evidence from less industrialized countries suggests that outsourcing programs to the private sector may 
be most effective, with potential use o f  vouchers to help ensure that private information i s  maximized in 
niatcliing suppliers o f  training with those seeking training, with the Government setting the standards and 
regulating the sector (see B o x  2.2 for such experience in Kenya in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Box  2.3 for a 
successful approach to public private partnerships in Mexico). 
2 .1  Policy Options 
61, Labor market institutions that help protect basic rights o f  workers can improve equity and 
efficiency. However, the above analysis shows that consistent with international evidence, excessive 
protection embodied labor market institutions and practices in Sri Lanka-severance pay, wage 
setting institutions, and the civil service hiring process-have adversely affected equity, 
productivity and economic growth. They have (i) hindered j o b  creation and raised returns o f  privileged 
groups, thereby worsening labor market outcomes o f  vulnerable groups, including limiting their access to 
“good” jobs; (ii) constrained the restructuring and investment capacity o f  businesses; (iii) and via 
generating perverse incentives o f  “waiting” for public sector jobs, they have contributed to 
uneinployinent. Consequently, they contributed to the high share o f  informal sector employment-which 
critically affects poverty- and to high unemployment among young people, particularly women.42 
Moreover, employability (the capacity o f  individuals influencing their labor market success) o f  the poor 
also suffers because o f  important inequalities i n  access to education and training. While economic growth 
w i l l  be the main driver o f  j o b  growth and poverty reduction, the role o f  efficient labor market institutions 
in ensuring a more equitable growth in jobs i s  also ail important one. To move in this direction, two key 
areas need to be addressed: (i) reducing j o b  protection in favor o f  worker protection, and (ii) enhancing 
access to trainingiskills for informal sector workers and youth to improve their j o b  prospects (addressing 
school participation via demand side interventions i s  relegated to chapter 4). 
To assist the Sri Lanl<an government in the preparation o f  a National Action Plan on youth employment and to 
improve the country’s capacity to address youth employment issues, the World Bank, together with the ILO, in 2004 
launched a special 2-year initiative under the UN-sponsored “Youth Employment Network.” Under this initiative, 
conceptual foundations for the National Action Plan will be prepared, partly based on new studies in the areas o f  
employment creation, employability, entrepreneurship, and equal opportunity have been commissioned. Among 
others, these studies wil l look at the institutional factors affecting employment creation and the effectiveness o f  
active labor market programs, focusing on the youth. The World Bank i s  also preparing a survey investigating 
factors that are instrumental for a successful school-to-work transition, perhaps the most important transition for the 
youth. ‘’ An important implication o f  restrained demand for labor i s  migration. I n  2003 there were more than a million Sri 
Lankans working abroad, with females accounting for up to 60 percent (Sri Lanka Bureau o f  Foreign Employment 
2004). While the analysis o f  migration is  beyond the scope of  the report, its opposing effects are worth mentioning: 
while migration provides productive opportunities for many Sri Lankans and contributes to increased consumption 
o f  migrant households, it also brings a host o f  problems both for migrants and for their families. For example, data 
from the SL lS  1999100 show that children with a migrant parent have lower educational attainment and worse health 
status than other children. The absence of  the mother, in particular, i s  seen as affecting the stability o f  the family and 
the welfare o f  the children (Ranasinghe 2004b). 
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Table 2.6: Summarv o f  imnact evaluations of active labor market Droprams 
Intervention 
Job search assistance 
Training for 
u nein p I o yed 
Retraining for 
workers in mass 
layoffs 
Training for youth 
Wageieinployment 
subsidies 
Public works 
Micro-enterprise 
' s  e I f-e in p I o y in en t 
i s s  i s  tan ce 
7ource: Betcherman, 1 
Summary o f  overall impact 
Generally positive impacts on 
employment and earnings in developed 
and transition countries. 
Costs relatively low so cost-benefit ratio 
usually positive. 
Very little evidence for developing 
countries 
Positive impacts on employment but no 
overall effect on earnings in developed 
countries . 
Positive on both in transition countries. 
Evaluations in developing countries not 
positive (but few studies). 
More information on costs needed. 
Often no positive impact on employment 
and earnings but there are exceptions. 
Very little evidence for transition and 
developing countries. 
Very negative impacts on employment and 
earnings in developed countries. 
Positive impacts in developing countries 
(Latin America), though few studies. 
No evidence from transition countries. 
Overall negative impacts on employment 
and earnings in developed and transition 
zountries. 
Very l i t t le evidence in developing 
zountries. 
3verall negative impacts on employment 
ind earnings in developed and transition 
:ountries. 
Very little evidence on LM impacts in 
jeveloping countries, despite widespread 
Jse. 
Vot enough LM-oriented evaluations to 
jetermine overall employment and 
:arnings impacts. 
ivas and Dar (2004). 
Comments 
Programs have most positive impacts 
when economy good. 
In  developing countries, questions 
about coverage and effectiveness o f  
these services, given informal LMs. 
Program effectiveness benefits from 
on-the-job training and employer 
involvement. 
Women often seem to benefit more 
than men. 
Programs have most success when 
economy good. 
Better results may be achieved with 
integrated training and employment 
services. 
Youth employment problems more 
effectively addressed through earlier, 
education-related interventions. 
Training most effective when 
combined with other employment, 
basic education, and social services. 
Successful programs require intensive 
services and, thus, are costly. 
Recent evaluations in developed 
countries more favorable (e.g., 
welfare-to-work programs). 
Programs may be more effective 
when combined with training. 
Deadweight and substitution effects 
likely important but often not fully 
assessed. 
Can be effective as a short-term safety 
net for the poor but generally not as 
program to improve future LM 
prospects. 
Very low take-up. 
Some evidence o f  positive impacts for 
older, better-educated individuals. 
Results likely better when technical 
and advisory services accompany 
financial aid. 
Vote: Based on the findings o f  152 rigorous impact evaluation studies. 
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Box 2.2: Training for the informal sector: The Jua Kali experience, Kenya 
The successful Kenyan Jua Kali project sought to provide training for about 25,000 informal sector manufacturing 
workers. A key feature o f  the project was a successful voucher program, enabling informal sector workers to 
purchase the training they wanted from any registered training provider. 
Several important lessons emerged. First, the use o f  a voucher mechanism enabled the project to stimulate demand 
for training, technology, and management and marketing consultation among micro and small enterprises. A supply 
response was generated and a training market established to address the needs o f  micro enterprises. Second, an 
unexpected impact o f  the voucher training program was the emergence o f  skilled craftsmen as the leading providers 
o f  training. The strong preference o f  Jua K a l i  workers for training by master craftspersons was reflected in the fact 
that 85  percent o f  all vouchers were used for the services o f  master craftspersons, and only 15 percent for private 
and public training institutions. The training by master craftspersons was well adapted to entrepreneurs’ need for 
short, practical training. The project strongly increased the demand for craftpersons training. And third, the 
experience o f  the project underscores the importance o f  appropriate management arrangement: a project for the 
private sectors i s  best managed by the private sector with government playing a facilitating role. 
The following general features should be taken into account when governments seek to facilitate training for an 
in formal economy: 
Demand for training among micro and sinall enterprises in the informal sector i s  likely to be low and need 
developing in order to demonstrate the benefits o f  skills development. 
Informal sector associations can help to raise awareness o f  skills shortages among members, as well as 
addressing other shared needs. 
Training for the informal sector differs from the formal sector in i t s  preference for merging technical skills with 
business management skills and in delivering courses with a flexible schedule. 
Training must have immediate application, since the poor cannot afford long periods o f  training before seeing a 
payoff. Evaluating competencies achieved through training i s  important to ensure quality. 
Sources: Johanson and Van Adatns (2004) and World Bank (2005k) 
Reforming Labor Market Institutions: Moving from Job to Worker Protection 
62. Considerations about the reduction o f  the generosity o f  severance pay. The March 2005 
formula increased the already exceedingly high employers’ costs o f  severance pay, and the discretionary 
power o f  the Labor Commissioner has been preserved. In the light o f  international experience, these two 
aspects need to be reexamined, if Sri Lanka is  to become a more dynamic economy. Options to be 
evaluated include (note that along with these measures, complementary measures to compensate for 
changes in risk bearing would have to be carefully sequenced, particularly the introduction o f  
11 ne m p Io ym e n t i n s uraii ce - see be I ow) : 
Reducing the factor o f  generosity for each year o f  service as wel l  as the maximum payment, thus 
aligning better the generosity o f  severance pay with international practice. 
Al lowing individual layoffs without notifying the Commissioner, and retaining the requirement of 
notification only in cases o f  mass layoffs (as widely practiced internationally)-there i s  no need 
to retain the discretion after the compensation formula has been introduced. 
Avoidance o f  charging “double-compensation” to employers (TEWA payments could be reduce 
by the amount o f  gratuity paid to laid o f f  workers). 
Excluding the coverage o f  worker incompetence under the TEWA. 
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Box 2.3: A proactive approach to small- and medium-size enterprise support 
The Integral Quality and Modernization Program (CIMO-now renamed as PAC), established in 1988, has 
been effective in reaching small and medium-size enterprises and assisting them to upgrade worker skills, 
improve quality, and raise productivity. Set up as a pilot project to provide subsidized training, CIMO 
evolved when it became apparent that lack o f  training was only one factor contributing to low productivity. 
By 2000 CIMO was providing a package o f  training and industrial extension services to over 80,000 
enterprises each year and training 200,000 employees. Private sector interest has grown. More than 300 
business associations now participate in CIMO, up from 72 in 1988. 
All states and the Federal District o f  Mexico have at least one CIMO unit, each staffed by 3 or 4 promoters. 
Most units are housed in business associations that contribute office and support infrastructure. The 
promoters organize workshops on training and technical assistance services, identify potential local and 
regional training suppliers and consulting agents, and actively seek out enterprises to deliver assistance on 
a cost-sharing basis. They work with enterprises to conduct an initial evaluation o f  the firm, as the basis 
for training programs and other consulting assistance. CIMO i s  expanding in two directions: assisting 
enterprises with specific sectoral needs, and providing an integrated package o f  services, including 
information on technology, new production processes, quality control techniques, and marketing as well as 
su bsid ized training . 
Evaluations found that CIMO had been effective in improving the performance o f  targeted companies. 
Compared to a control group, CIMO firms increased investments in worker training, had higher rates of 
capacity utilization, and were more likely to adopt quality control practices. These improved outcomes 
were associated with increased productivity. Evaluations found CIMO-PAC to be a cost-effective way o f  
assisting small and medium-size enterprises. Other performance indicators were: increased profitability, 
sales, capacity utilization, wage and employment growth, reduced labor turnover, absenteeism, and 
rejection rates for products. The most dramatic impacts were among micro and small firms. 
Source: World Bank (2005k). 
63. Avoiding direct government interference in wage setting (except minimum wages). The 
effects found by the report-the premium paid to formal sector workers-should be further studied, 
primarily by trying to disentangle the  effects o f  wage setting f rom the effects o f  constrained access to 
formal sector jobs imposed by the TEWA. The government should restrict i ts involvement i n  wage setting 
to the determination o f  minimum wages as a partner under the tripartite minimum wage setting 
mechanism. I t  should not directly interfere in private sector wage setting, even in the form o f  
"recommended" wage increases, as they, too, may introduce distortions i n  wage setting. 
64. Reforming civil service recruitment practices Ad-hoc government recruitment o f  unemployed 
graduates i s  counterproductive, as it reduces incentives for youth to take non-government jobs. 
Commitment to recruit according to preset long-term schedules would re-orient young j o b  seekers to 
search for jobs outside the public sector, increasing the pool o f  talents available to employers and 
ultimately improving overall capacity o f  the economy. 
65. Developing explicit social protection (or worker) measures to complement reduced 
protection o f  jobs. International experience shows that reducing the protection o f  jobs wi l l  have to be 
simultaneously supported by the enhancing other parts o f  social protection, for example, by introducing 
an explicit protection system o f  workers in the form o f  unemployment insurance (Vodopivec 2004). 
Explicit worker protection arrangements would help preserve the welfare o f  workers and thus help 
reducing the opposition to j o b  protection reforms. Such arrangements were successfully introduced in  
Eastern European countries when they reformed their employment protection legislation. And  
irreversibi I ity o f  reforms needs to be assured, so that the newly introduced unemployment insurance does 
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not become yet another benefit for already privileged formal sector workers without commensurate 
changes in the j o b  protection system. 
66.  Promoting a social dialogue to engage all stakeholders in the decision making process. Even 
so, some workers may not consider the provision o f  worker protection, such as unemployment insurance, 
appropriate. Promoting a social dialog on these issues i s  necessary, and reforms wil l  undoubtedly be a 
lengthy process. Adding to the complexity o f  the task i s  the fact that reforming employment protection 
legislation is  technically demanding, because reforms have to be coordinated across different areas and 
attuned to local circumstances (see the discussion o f  the introduction o f  the unemployment insurance 
system in chapter 3). 
Improving Access to Education and Training 
67. Improving access to training and other services for informal sector workers and 
unemployed vulnerable groups. The participation o f  the informal sector workers, the unemployed and 
other vulnerable groups in active labor market programs (ALMP)-such as training, j o b  search 
assistance, self-employment programs, i s  called for, and international evidence on the effectiveness o f  
such measures should be taken into account. Preference should be given to programs that are cost 
effective (e.g., j ob  search and information assistance, including j o b  matching services v ia JobsNet 
network, and job  counseling). Programs may need to be directed at particular regions (such as the North 
East), and cater also to women, youth, and disabled individuals. Outsourcing programs to the private 
sector i s  l ikely to be most effective, wi th potential use o f  vouchers to help ensure that private information 
i s  maximized in the matching supplier to demand. To maximize their usefulness, a careful analysis and 
piloting o f  siicli p r o g r a m  is called to arrive at the appropriate scope and the national strategyP3 
Moreover, the access o f  people with disability to training programs should be strengthened, among others 
by expanding the range o f  training programs, providing additional training to the trainers, the 
development and use o f  sign language, and the use o f  community-based rehabilitation approach. 
68.  Ensuring access o f  poor children and youth to education and/or well designed training 
programs. As noted, avoiding low skill levels requires increased participation o f  children in school and 
reducing their dropouts. These issues have already been addressed in an earlier report World Bank 
(20050. However, from a social protection perspective, one option i s  to defray the costs o f  education o f  
the poorest children by, for example, providing safety nets contingent on school participation (see more 
discussion and international experience in chapter 4). Innovative approaches to tailor schooling and 
training around the needs o f  the working children, or children who have dropped out o f  school, may also 
be needed (see Box 2.4 on an innovative program in Bangladesh program). 
69.  Linking the participation o f  the poor in sk i l l  development programs to their participation in 
social protection programs-in unemployment insurance programs, micro-finance, and (for able 
bodied) in workfare. Ensuring participation in these programs may help ensure the poor escape poverty 
To assist the Sri Lanltaii government in the preparation o f  a National Action Plan on youth employment and to 
improve the country’s capacity to address youth employment issues, the World Bank, together with the ILO, in 2004 
launched a special 2-year initiative under the UN-sponsored “Youth Employment Network.” Under this initiative, 
conceptual foundations for the National Action Plan will be prepared, partly based on new studies in the areas of 
employment creation, employability, entrepreneurship, and equal opportunity have been commissioned. Among 
others, these studies will look at the institutional factors affecting employment creation and the effectiveness o f  
active labor market programs, focusing on the youth. The World Bank i s  also preparing a survey investigating 
factors that are instrumental for a successful school-to-work transition, perhaps the most important transition for the 
youth. 
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(see chapter 4). This i s  the practice in most OECD countries where unemployment benefit claims are 
contingent on participation in training programs, 
Box 2.4: Bangladesh: underprivileged children’s education program (UCEP) 
UCEP, established in the early 1970s as a non-government organization, seeks to raise the living standards o f  poor 
urban children and their families in Bangladesh. I t  focuses on the target group o f  working street children and aims 
to provide them with skills to enhance their employability in the local labor market, often in the informal sector. In 
1997, it had 30 general schools for non-formal basic education working on three shifts per day in four major cities, 
with total enrollment of  18,300. UCEP has extraordinarily high completion and employment rates for i t s  graduates, 
both averaging about 95 percent. 
UCEP’s program can be divided into three stages. The first stage i s  accelerated non-formal basic education starting 
at age I O  or 1 1. Basic education up to grade 8 i s  covered in about four to four-an-a-half years. About half the 
graduates from the non-formal basic education program are admitted into vocational training. The second stage 
consists o f  fundamental skills training, which lasts from six months to two years. And the third stage i s  placement 
in employment, and follow-up on the job. 
Factors that have contributed to making UCEP successful include: 
Providing students with a solid base o f  general education. 
Focusing on the proper target group, i.e., those with “blue collar working aspirations”, those who intend to enter 
the labor force after training as semi-skilled workers. 
Continuous linkages with industry to ensure that trainees are trained in the knowledge, skills and attitudes 
sought by employers, and that employers are aware o f  the competencies o f  UCEP graduates. 
Focus on acquisition o f  skills and competencies through highly structured, supervised individual “hands-on” 
instructions (rather than being driven by credentials and certificates). 
Rigorous follow-up o f  each graduate in terms o f  employment, earnings and performance on the job. 
Soz~rce: World Bank (2005k). 
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3. IMPROVING SOCIAL INSURANCE 
“ I t  is of great value because when you grow old 
and cannot work your$elds, you know there is a 
permanent payment that you can bank on every 
month. ‘ I  
Gange Elison, a 63 year old small farmer, talking 
about the Farmers ’pension scheme 
70. This chapter examines how social insurance in Sri Lanka can be improved in order to reduce 
vulnerabilities related to old age, injury, disability, death, and ~ n e r n p l o y r n e n t . ~ ~  I t  thus focuses on t l ie 
group identified i n  chapter 1 as one t l ie  most poor and vulnerable: informal sector workers, left out not 
only froin old age, but often also from disability and death insurance. The chapter also addresses the 
needs o f  workers who are currently covered by formal schemes but their benefits are inadequate and/or 
the schemes may be financially unsustainable. The fact that Sri Lanka has o f  the most rapidly aging 
populations renders tlie discussion o f  these issues a particular urgency and importance. 
71. I n  high income countries, social insurance schemes provide old age, survivor and disability 
pensions, unemployment benefits and often, health services. Sri Lanka also has some o f  these programs 
and offers the most extensive social security (pensions, disability, survivor and health) coverage in South 
Asia. The provision o f  social security i s  largely tied to participation in t l ie formal sector, although since 
t l ie  1990s, a new public sponsored scheme reaches a significant number o f  farmers and fishermen, despite 
its voluntary nature. Together, these programs cover a third o f  the population, much more than any other 
South Asian country. But  as described below, these programs are l imited in terms o f  both adequacy and 
siistainability, resulting in a dual challenge: to address the shortcomings o f  existing schemes and to find 
ways o f  expanding coverage to the informal sector workers. The chapter finds that the coverage of 
existing formal and informal insurance schemes could be increased, and their financial efficiency 
improved, if certain changes were made to their design, administration and regulation. Coverage 
expansion would need to be phased in order to take into account administrative complexity o f  programs. 
Finally, expansion o f  social insurance coverage i s  closely linked to the level o f  formality in the labor 
market, and labor market and other reforms to increase formality wi l l  be critical complement. The 
expansion o f  this system would also reduce burden on the safety net. 
72. This chapter i s  divided into four sections that address the risks o f  o ld age, disability, death and 
unemployment in Sri Lanka. The first section briefly reviews existing schemes for formal sector workers, 
\4 ith a focus on areas where iniprovenient i s  needed. The next section looks at schemes that are available 
By providing insurance against a series o f  risks including unemployment, illness, disability and longevity, social 
insurance schemes can both foster equity and enhance economic growth. Wh i le  the equity enhancing aspects o f  
insurance are clear, insurance can also help to promote growth. For example, insurance allows individuals to avoid 
“dynamic poverty traps” whereby uninsured shocks drive households into chronic poverty (Ravallion 2003), avoid 
costly forms o f  consumption smoothing such as borrowing or removing children from education (Chetty and Looney 
2005), and allow households to channel their savings to more productive activities (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). 
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to informal sector workers and the population at large. The last section provides recommendations for 
improving the efficiency of  existing formal and informal insurance schemes. 
3.1 Formal Social Insurance Schemes 
73 .  Sri Lanka provides the most extensive social security (pensions, disability, survivor and 
health) coverage in South Asia. The provision of  social security i s  largely tied to participation in the 
fornial sector, although since the 199Os, a new public sponsored scheme reaches a significant number of 
farmers and fishermen, despite its voluntary nature. Together, these programs cover a third of  the 
population, much more than any other South Asian country. Aside from pensions, these workers are 
offered disability and survivor insurance as part o f  their benefit package. 
Old Age Income Support through Pensions 
74. Sri Lanka has four programs providing income support for old age, but all have major 
shortcomings. Three of  these-the Employees Provident Fund (along with the “approved” private funds 
that operate under the same rules), the Civil Service Pension Scheme (CSPS), and the two voluntary 
schemes for informal sector workers-are directed at those households with some capacity to save for the 
long term. The fourth i s  a broad social assistance program-Samurdhi (discussed in detail in the next 
chapter) that includes among i t s  beneficiaries also households with elderly members. Studies of  Sri 
Lanlca’s pension sector (most done by local researchers) find that these programs have shortcomings in 
meeting at least one of  the two key criteria for success-adequacy and sustainability. These problems 
must be addressed before policymakers can confront the final challenge, namely to extend coverage of  
these programs to the majority o f  the population. 
75. The pension system (exception civil servants) does not allow consumption smoothing over 
the lifecycle (Gaminiratne et a1 2004). Their budget financed, defined benefit pension i s  the only annuity 
available iii Sri Lanlca. The target benefit levels are high relative to pre-retirement incomes and retirement 
can take place at the early age of  55.  I n  contrast, members of  the EPF scheme tend to have insufficient 
balances as investment returns trail the growth of  their own incomes and retirement ages have not 
adjusted to increased longevity (Eriyagama and Rannan-Eliya 2003a). Even were the balance to be 
sufficient, the lump sum payout does not provide longevity insurance. In fact, survey data suggest that 
most retirees distribute their balance among children in what may be seen as an implicit intergenerational 
contract. Similarly, members of  the Farmers and Fishermen and Self-employed pension funds are 
promised future benefits in nominal terms. As a result, the real value of  their future pension income 
depends on inflation rates and possible ad hoc adjustments of  nominal benefits and is, therefore, 
unpredictable (Eriyagama and Rannan-Eliya, 2003 b and 2003~). Finally, elderly covered by the Samurdhi 
program (the general social assistance scheme) are exposed, as are other individuals, to the weaknesses of  
the prograni-sinal I benefits and serious inclusion and exclusion errors (see the discussion of  Samurdhi in 
chapter 4). 
76. There are large gaps in pension coverage o f  the population. The combined coverage o f  the 
EPFO, CSPS and the two informal sector schemes comes to about one quarter o f  the working age 
population and around a third o f  the labor force (Table 3.1). The latter schemes covering farmers, 
fishermen and the self-employed that meet certain criteria were created as a policy response to low 
coverage and the programs have indeed led to improvement in this regard (particularly the coverage o f  the 
farmers’ and fishermen’s schemes i s  high for an informal sector scheme). 
7 7 .  Labor mobility i s  also inhibited by the existing pension system. There i s  no mechanism for 
shifting accrued pension wealth between the different kinds o f  scheme. Civil servants moving to the 
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private sector stand to lose much o f  their pension wealth due to the rules o f  the defined-benefit scheme. 
Also, pension rights from the self-employed, farmers and fishermen are not portable. 
,--\*-~--- Table 3.1: Nominal, actual and potential coverage o f  formal old age schemes, 2002 
Scheme and year o f  Coverage Share in working age 
in trod u c t i on population 
ercent) .................................................................................................... .... .......................... .......... " I ..... .l.l.lllll. I .ll ".I._ I ""-& .__I" _I_." " -"" 
Actual Actual Nominally Actually 
(thousands) (thousands) coverage covered cover e d 
rate 
(percent) 
Civil service pension 880 880 100 6.5 6.5 
sch e in e 
,l/lnndoloiy .scliei17 CJ 
Employees' provident fund 3,000 1,900 63 22.1 14.0 
(1958) 
funds 
Other private pension n.a. 61 n.a. n.a. 0.5 
schemes 
Approved private provident n.a. 165 n.a. n.a. 1 .o 
Voluntary schemes 
Farmers' pension scheme 2200 607 28 18.1 5.0 
Fish e rni en ' s pension 5 5  43 78 0.3 0.3 
sch erne 
S e I f -e  in p I o y ed pe t i  s i on 950 47 5 7.7 0.4 
scheme 
TOTAL 7.085 3.703 52 52.5 27.7 
-- .......................... ....................................................................................................... " .. "._...I.-_..-__.---._._.____--I_ " ,..-ll-_l_._ 
Source: Adapted from Gaininiratne et  a1 (2004). 
78. The pension system i s  also fiscally unsustainable. A recent estimate put the CSPS liabil i ty at 
around 60 percent o f  GDP, for exa~nple!~ Relatively generous pensions for c i v i l  servants are not funded 
(as nominally in the case o f  the EPF), resulting in a huge liabil i ty and contributing to current fiscal 
deficits. The stistainability o f  the CSPS thus depends on the overall fiscal situation and eventually on cuts 
in other parts o f  the budget since there are no funds backing these l i a b i l i t i e ~ . ~ ~  Note that at close to two 
percent o f  GDP and more than 10 percent o f  government revenues, Sri Lanka ranks among the highest 
spenders among developing countries on c iv i l  service pensions (and spending i s  expected to grow as the 
c iv i l  service continues to age and the average duration o f  retirement for public sector workers increases). 
79. Although the EPF i s  a defined contribution arrangement which i s  in principle self-financing 
it, too, is  dependent on government financial capacity. Practically the entire EPF portfolio consists o f  
government debt. If the government reacts to the presence o f  th i s  captive credit by increasing i t s  spending 
proportionately, the EPF reserves are effectively spent each year and the practice simply shifts the burden 
o f  the aging population onto taxpayers responsible for paying o f f  the public debt. While the mechanism i s  
more subtle, the current investment regime for th is  'fully-funded' scheme may not contribute much to 
sustainability at a broader level. Moreover, the impact o f  the accumulated balances o f  the EPF on national 
savings i s  also questionable for the same reason. 
45 See Palacios (2005). 
46 A reform introducing a contributory, defined benefit scheme in 2003 has not been implemented and i s  currently 
the subject o f  legal disputes. 
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Disability and Survivors Insurance 
80. The Sri Lankan disability and survivor insurance consists o f  a patchwork o f  ad hoc 
programs not arising from a coherent national strategy.47 Although the risks o f  disability and death 
are significant (see chapter l), the system leaves many individuals uninsured, particularly the The 
ad hoc nature o f  these schemes also does not facilitate labor mobil ity. To  our knowledge there are no data 
available on the incidence o f  death and disability among the members o f  these programs, much less an 
actuarial assessment o f  their finances. The major programs and key issues are described below. 
8 1 I I n  Sri Lanka, disability and survivor benefits o f  public sector workers are tied directly to 
coverage in the pension system and are provided as defined benefits. This i s  a typical arrangement in 
many countries, even in  countries where retirement savings scheme i s  defined contribution (Demarco and 
Gruschka 2004). The government thus insures disability and survivor risks for public sector workers, 
although the value o f  the benefit may be eroded in time due to the lack o f  indexation. Because o f  the long 
civ i l  conflict, spending on th i s  part o f  the government pension system i s  higher than what i s  typically 
observed in other countries. 
82. Workers in the formal private sector are covered for death and permanent disability 
through lump sum payments o f  the Employees Trust Fund (ETF). Financed from an employer 
contribution o f  3 per cent o f  wage, the death benefits are set at 10 times the monthly average wage o f  the  
member during the final three months o f  coverage up to 50,000 rupees (this benefit i s  i n  addition to the 
balance that i s  received by the designated s ~ i r v i v o r ) . ~ ~  Permanent disability triggers a payment o f  up to 24 
times the average monthly salary o f  the last three months prior to the accident up to 150,000 rupees, along 
with withdrawal o f  balance. The scheme covers accidents that result in loss o f  limb or vision, 30 types o f  
industrial disease and, since 1993, paralysis. Self-employed and foreign workers can also j o in  subject to a 
minii i i i im contribution o f  150 rupees per month. 
83. While insurance benefits o f  this type help members absorb income shocks, its financing i s  
not transparent. Asid e froin death and disability, ETF contributions cover f ive additional benefits 
including three health related benefits (heart surgery, hospitalization, and intra-ocular transplants), as well 
as an education and a housing benefit. It i s  not clear whether the premium that i s  paid for these sel f -  
insured benefits bears any relation to an actuarially determined premium, although it appears unlikely. An 
alternative approach would be to cost out the fair price o f  the insurance and to purchase a group policy in 
the same way that i s  prevalent in the Lat in American DC pension  scheme^.'^ Finally, integrating the 
EPFiETF both administratively (currently there are parallel recordkeeping systems) and in terms o f  the 
benefits may be worth considering. The group insurance that could be purchased, for example, could take 
A National Policy on Disabilities was approved in July 2003 by Sri Lanka’s Council o f  Ministers. This statement 47 
encompasses a inucli wider scope than insurance and includes labor market and education issues. For a discussion, 
see Mendis (2004). 
48 Major illness or accident have been shown to result in a major reduction in short term consumption (for example, 
Gertler and Gruber 2002), and death of  a breadwinner may send their spouses and orphans into a permanent state o f  
destitution. Moreover, in contrast to the risk o f  outliving one’s savings in old age, the risk o f  morbidity or mortality 
are higher among the poor. 
Employees’ Trust Fund Board, Benefits and Services Handbook. Available at 
http://www. lanka.net/etf/member-services. htm. 
The policy would insure the difference between the balance in an individual’s account at the time o f  the event and 
the pre-specified annuity payment. The fair premium would be a function o f  the disability and mortality rates of the 
group as well as the investment returns, and prevailing discount rates. See Demarco and Grushka (2004). This 
costing is  most straightforward in the case o f  death and permanent disability as both are easy to monitor given the 
narrow definition o f  disability. 
49 
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into account the balances in both accounts since members withdraw both in the case o f  either death or 
d i sabi I ity . 
Unemployment Insurance 
84. To address unemployment risks, Sri Lanka i s  considering an introduction o f  an 
unemployment insurance (UI) system, but its introduction should be carefully considered. 
Recognizing the need to make labor market more flexible, Sri Lanka has started to reform i t s  inefficient 
and excessive j ob  protection legislation (see Annex 2.1). For political economy reasons, reducing the 
protection o f  jobs can only succeed if other parts o f  social protection are strengthened. This fact has been 
duly recognized in Sri Lanka. To provide additional benefits to laid-off workers, the government i s  thus 
determined to introduce a more explicit protection scheme v ia  unemployment insurance. This reform 
would be the first step in moving from the policy o f  protecting jobs to protecting workers. But while 
introducing this scheme i s  positive from the transparency and efficiency perspective (bringing worker 
protection and reducing j ob  protection), it will most likely impose additional costs v ia increased payroll 
contributions from both employers and workers. 
85. Since 2003 the government has formulated several proposals o f  a UI system, mostly 
reflecting design parameters o f  such systems in OECD countries. While proposals vary, under most 
variants program eligibil i ty and coverage coincides with eligibil i ty to and coverage of T E W A  
compensation. The proposed replacement rate i s  50 percent (that is, the level o f  compensation i s  to equal 
50 percent o f  the wage the beneficiaries received in their last job), and the proposed maximum duration o f  
benefits varies from 12 to 24 months. Several financing options have been proposed, most relying on 
additional contributions on employers and workers. Proposal have differed about the implementation 
agency o f  the program (EPF and ETF have been suggested), and employment services are to be provided 
by the JobsNet network. 
86. However, the introduction of the standard, OECD-type o f  UI system requires certain 
conditions which are not met in Sri Lanka (see Vodopivec 2006). First, weak administrative capacity 
renders personalized monitoring o f  benefit eligibility under a standard UI program infeasible (ineffective 
and prone to corruption). I n  addition to requiring a benefit payment network, the implementation o f  the 
UI system requires extensive and sophisticated information about fulf i l lment o f  both starting and above 
all, continuing eligibility requirements that current administrative capacity cannot support. Second, the 
lorge iifor/nol sector provides abundant opportunities for undeclared paid work and thus makes 
monitoring o f  such incomes diff icult and ineffective. Moreover, eligibil i ty monitoring i s  more demanding 
and costly also because Sri Lanka’s administrative database may not allow cross-checking o f  the benefit 
receipt which are used in developed countries. Ineffective monitoring would produce more disincentives 
and misuses than a similar program in developed countries: benefit recipients may not be looking hard for 
a j o b  or failing to take a j o b  if opportunities arise, and they may actually be working whi le receiving the 
benefit. Third, there are other aspects-such as high political risk and environment prone to corruption- 
that may jeopardize the implementation o f  standard, full-fledged UI system. 
3.2 Schemes for the informal sector 
Perisioiis 
87. Pension schemes for informal workers help address some coverage gaps, but also lead to 
unfunded liabilities. Because the benefits under these schemes are determined in nominal terms, the size 
o f  that liability depends largely on future rates o f  inflation. I t  i s  worth noting that the parameters o f  the 
original scheme have been changed on an ad hoc basis in a way that has consistently increased the 
liability. I n  addition, government has not contributed to the fund as was originally planned (and as 
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required by law). I n  short, there i s  significant potential for a future l iabil i ty to emerge as political pressure 
to raise benefits combined wi th  government’s desire to defer i ts  own payments increase the actuarial 
deficit o f  t l ie scheme. 
Disability and Survivors Insurance 
88. Members o f  the pension scheme for informal sector-farmers, fishermen, and self- 
employed-are also covered by partial and total disablement and death insurance. The benefit i s  
paid as a Itimp sum and i s  defined in  nominal terms, thus resulting in a declining real benefit level, unless 
ad hoc adjustments are made. Under these circumstances, i t  i s  not possible to  ascertain the actuarially fair 
premium (premium that adequately reflects the risk involved) that would have to be charged for the 
prescribed level o f  benefits and determine the long run sustainability o f  the scheme. 
89.  That there i s  latent demand for insurance against the above r isks  i s  evidenced by the 
number of non-governmental organizations that offer such products. For example, s e l f  help 
associations have traditionally provided funeral assistance or death benevolence benefits. These 
contribution-based informal micro-insurance schemes that assist at the event o f  a death in the family have 
indemnities either through lump-sum payments and/or in kind. They account for  a large proportion 
(nearly 30 percent) o f  all non-goveriiiiieiital and community-based organizations (see chapter 4). 
90.  A few non-governmental organizations have ventured recently into the field of micro- 
insurance for social protection (see Box 3.1). They appear to have adopted innovative approaches to 
provide cover in t l ie  event o f  death, disability, ill-health, maternity care and fami ly calamities. 
Networking among other microfinance organizations and re-insuring with national and international 
insurance providers are methods used to both expand membership and secure finances. However, the 
regulatory environment for these initiatives remains exceedingly weak, being identical to the one for 
microcredit (see chapter 4). 
9 1 .  The Samurdhi Social Security Trust Fund (SSSTF) i s  yet another source o f  coverage. The 
scheme i s  t?nanced through deductions from the income transfer at source and i s  not a conventional social 
insurance program. While mandatory contributions reduce tlie size o f  the income transfer and minimize 
i ts  impact on ~ ~ n ~ i i m p t i o n ,  the social security appears to be operating relatively wel l  and seems to help 
reduce tlie vulnerability o f  the poor. There are also plans to further develop the scheme by offering 
additional insurance products such as education insurance, old age pensions, and medical insurance. 
Proposed reforms o f  tlie Samurdlii Program as envisaged by the passage o f  the Welfare Benefits Act are 
likely to de-link tlie social security trust fund from the income transfer component, so that it becomes a 
t r 11 I y co t i  t r i but ory scheme. 
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Box 3.1: Examples of informal social security schemes in Sri Lanka 
The 2003 mapping o f  informal sector social security schemes by the Institute for Participatory Interaction in 
Development notes four such initiatives: the Yasiru micro-insurance scheme, the micro-insurance facility o f  the 
Women’s Development Foundation, Hambantota, Sanasa’s Al l  Lanka Mutual Assurance Organization (ALMAO) 
and the Diriya Matha Rakshana (Courageous Mothers’ Insurance) o f  the National Forum o f  People’s Organization. 
Yasiru was originally based on the funeral society concept and in fact came into existence when the civil 
disturbances in southern Sri Lanka in 1989 placed existing funeral assistance societies under tremendous pressure. I t  
began initially with a re-insurance facility from the State Insurance Corporation and i s  currently re-insured with 
Interpolis o f  the Netherlands. I t  has established partnerships with other networks o f  NGOs and CBOs including the 
Small fishermen’s Federation. Membership o f  the scheme stood at 7000 in March 2003, a phenomenal increase from 
2500 in December 2002. Well-represented in the Southern, Uva and Western Provinces, the organization has 
recently begun work in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
ALMAO i s  established as an incorporated company with legal status. Its capital i s  contributed by the parent 
organization, Sanasa and funeral assistance organizations in addition to shares worth Rs. 100 each bought by 
members. In addition to death and disability coverage it also has a savings and credit insurance component. The 
Diriya Matha Rakshana i s  an innovative social protection scheme which provides services to female street vendors 
in the suburban city o f  Moratuwa. The scheme i s  based on a reinsurance program arranged with the Insurance 
Corporation. 
Source: Institute for Participatory Interaction in Development (2003). 
The SSSTF offers nominal insurance to poor households. Under the scheme, households receiving Rs. 
1000, 500 and 250 as income transfers contribute Rs. 25 each month to the insurance fund. Insurance can 
be claimed in the fo l lowing circumstances: death o f  any family member (Rs. 5000), marriage o f  one child 
(Rs. 3000), birth o f  first child (Rs. 2000), and sickness (Rs. 50 per hospitalized day up to a maximum o f  
Rs. 1500 for a year). By 2000, about 11 percent o f  beneficiaries covered by the scheme have claimed 
insurance, amounting to roughly Rs. 3 5 5  m i l l i ~ n . ~ ’  However, the actuarial soundness, adequacy, and 
financial viability and effectiveness o f  this scheme are not well known. 
Unemployment 
92. Workfare schemes also exist in an ad-hoc basis to provide employment for low wage 
workers. As described in chapter 4, during the recent tsunami many NGOs operated public works 
schemes to help provide employment for affected groups. Sri Lanka, however, does not have a permanent 
workfare scheme to help informal sector workers in times o f  unemployment from layoffs or as a result o f  
natural disasters. These schemes provide labor intensive l ow  skill jobs for the poorest unemployed, s e l f  
targeted through the payment o f  low wages. Many countries have extensive workfare, such as Argentina, 
and Bangladesh and most recently India. International experience shows that one o f  the key design 
elements for making these programs pro-poor i s  to use very low wages to self-target to the poorest 
workers. Workfare programs have also been used as a work test for cash transfer schemes, with social 
assistance benefits provided contingent on work (see chapter 4 for discussion). 
Cross Cutting Issues 
93.  Existing formal and informal social security schemes in Sr i  Lanka suffer from the lack o f  
coordination, problems of  fiscal sustainability, gaps in coverage and weak administration. Some o f  
This figure excludes the districts o f  the Eastern Province where the program began only in 1998. 51 
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these problems cut across programs and would ideally be addressed in tandem. For example, coordination 
o f  the administration o f  various programs would be based on harmonized recordkeeping systems. 
Actuarial capacity, which i s  largely absent i n  the different institutions that oversee programs, could be 
developed and applied to all programs (for example, generating financial projections o f  the c iv i l  service 
pension scheme as wel l  as o f  the retirement schemes for informal sector workers, or the calculation o f  the 
cost o f  insuring EPF members for death benefits). As argued below, there may also be merit in searching 
for strategies that lead to a convergence o f  systems for formal and informal sector workers. At present, 
however, extending coverage o f  formal schemes without reforming them would only expand these 
problems. Nevertheless, access to social protection beyond the formal sector workers i s  clearly an 
objective. L ike formal sector schemes, informal sector social security programs are financially 
tinsustainable, with poor recordlteeping, regulation and supervision, and with limited capability o f  
est i in at i ng financial I i ab i I i t ies. 
3.3 Policy Options 
94. As noted above, insuring individuals against income loss from unemployment, disability, death o f  
family member, and old age can facilitate consumption smoothing and improve welfare, and also support 
economic growth. The main directions o f  reform in the social insurance that supports this objective are: 
( 1 )  reforming formal system to render them financially sustainable and well administered, so as to be able 
to expand their coverage to the informal sector, (2) making current informal sector schemes more 
efficient, so as to allow them to expand their coverage to a larger group, and (3) undertaking these 
reforms so as to eventually create a seamless insurance system that covers both formal and informal 
sector workers. However, this expansion w i l l  need to be phased, initiated based on a thorough assessment 
o f  current experience, and piloted first for schemes where moral hazard i s  lower (life, pensions), and 
whose administration i s  less complex. The expansion o f  social insurance coverage i s  closely linked to the 
level o f  formality in the labor market. Thus, reforms in the labor market (noted in the previous chapter) 
and in other areas (such as tax policies) that help increase the coverage o f  the formal sector will be 
critical. 
Improving the Coverage and Efficiency o f  Formal Sector Schemes 
Pensions 
95. A number o f  studies have made it clear that there i s  ample room to improve formal income 
support schemes on two fronts, adequacy and sustainability. There are a number o f  concrete, 
incremental steps that could be taken within the existing framework to begin to address both issues. In the 
case o f  the CSPS: 
Civ i l  service target replacement rates could be gradually reduced, calculated on the basis o f  a 
longer earnings base and subsequently adjusted for inflation. Contributions from employees 
co~ i l d  be introduced. 
A strategy for prefunding the remaining liability could be developed. 
Improved administrative recordkeeping could be introduced (perhaps as part o f  an overall 
H R M  I S strategy). 
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For the EPF and approved schemes: 
Retirement ages could be gradually increased to reflect longevity gains. 
EPF fund management could be outsourced and investment policy could shift toward greater 
d i ve rs i fi c at i on i n c I u d i n g foreign invest in en t . 
Private pension supervision could be developed with a view toward improving the quality o f  the 
approved funds and expanding the role of  the private sector. 
Recordkeeping systems could be upgraded and service improved. 
Alternative minimum annuitization strategies could be considered. 
97. Partial reforms along these lines are themselves a major challenge. A more holistic approach 
however, i s  to reconsider the entire framework-one that has evolved in different directions for different 
parts o f  the population for historical reasons. Indeed, there i s  little rationale for differences in replacement 
rate targets, funding strategies and other key elements o f  the different formal sector schemes. 
98. As a starting point of a reform, policymakers should determine realistic target levels of 
income support for the elderly both as a minimum (safety net) as well as in comparison to the 
consumption levels in active years (the consumption smoothing function o f  income support). This target 
represents the objective o f  the system in te rm of adequacy and i s  a subjective choice in each country. 
The international experience i s  diverse with OECD pension systems replacing as anywhere between 3 5  
and 80 percent o f  pre-retirement earnings (Whitehouse, 2007). Because pension systems often have 
redistributive objectives, targeted replacement rates for lower income workers are generally higher, and 
for high income workers generally lower. I n  the case o f  informal sector workers, targets may have to be 
defined differently, but nevertheless, in a way that i s  meaningful from an adequacy perspective. For 
example, the voluntary scheme for farmers and fishermen could have, as its objective, the payment o f  a 
inonthly benefit after a particular age specified in inflation-adjusted terms. 
99. Currently, the target benefit levels across schemes in Sri Lanka appear to vary arbitrarily 
as do the risks inherent in each of  the pension schemes. For example, civil servants are at risk froin ad 
hoc indexation decisions, farmers froin future inflation, and EPF members from low (or negative) returns 
on the fund investments and longevity. There i s  no obvious rationale for these differences. 
100. A clearly defined objective for adequacy would imply a certain financing stream needed to 
meet the second criterion, sustainability. Defining the real benefit levels targeted for the farmers’ 
pension scheme would imply a certain stream of minimum contributions and investment returns 
(assuining the liability i s  to be prefiinded). The realism o f  these implied figures could be assessed 
periodically and appropriate changes made as needed. A similar exercise would yield the financing stream 
needed to provide a certain pension level for public sector workers covered under the CSPS. Finally, the 
balance required at retirement in the EPF that would produce the target monthly, indexed benefit could be 
calculated and the stream o f  contributions and investment returns necessary to arrive at that balance could 
be ascertained. 
10 1 ,  To arrive at realistic target benefit levels, reforms should ensure that target benefit levels 
are financed from realistic sources in the long term (over multiple decades). One useful benchmark i s  
that the financing should be robust at least through the lifetime o f  the system’s youngest member. This 
implies adjustment o f  target benefit levels in accordance with financing sources. 
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102. The models available to meet these objectives differ by the amount of redistribution they 
imply, by the required pre-funding, and by risk allocation. In the first panel o f  Table 3.2, five 
methods o f  providing a minimum income in old Table 3.2: Options for old age income support 
age are listed (the aspect related to redistribution schemes by redistribution, required pre-funding, and 
o f  scheme). Targeting the poor elderly would risk allocation 
require one o f  the first three approaches. The 
means-tested schemes are specifically targeted to 
the elderly. A universal flat scheme i s  one in (a) Redistribution 
wliicli all citizens above a certain age (e.g., 75 in 
Nepal and 60 in N e w  Zealand) receive a flat 
amount. Clearly, the most affordable way to 
ensure that everyone i s  provided by a given target 
income i s  the narrow means-tested scheme, 
followed by the broad means-tested scheme and 
finally the universal flat scheme. On the other 
hand, universal scheme avoids the costs o f  means- 
testing and ensures complete coverage. The two 
minimuin pension approaches listed at the bottom 
o f  the panel are relevant for contributory schemes 
wit11 M idespread coverage.” 
Country example 
Narrow means-testing 
Broad 
Universal flat New Zealand 
Minimum within DB France 
Minimum within DC 
(b) Required pre-funding and risk allocation 
Partially funded DB 
Pay-as-you-go DB 
Fully funded DC 
Hybrid DB’DC 
Notes: DB - defined benefit, DC - defined contribution 
India 
Australia 
Chile 
funded DB Holland 
Korea 
Germ any 
Hong Kong 
Argentina 
103. There are also several alternative approaches to pre-funding and risk allocation (which 
together determine consumption smoothing properties o f  the system)-see Table 3.2. With regard to risk, 
a defined benefit plan links retirement income directly to a worker’s wage. Depending on the exact 
formula, there w i l l  be a high correlation between his wage history and his pension level. However, when 
the DB promise i s  not indexed (as i n  the case o f  the c iv i l  servants i n  Sri Lanka), there i s  an additional risk 
to the individual in the form o f  inflation. I n  the case o f  a D C  scheme, individuals bear investment risk. 
While defined benefit schemes are most common around the world, most o f  the recent systemic reforms 
introduced hybrid or pure D C  schemes. D C  arrangements are also being applied increasingly for informal 
sector workers where there i s  no reference wage and contributions can be volatile due to the nature o f  
em p I oy in e t i  t (see next section ) , 
104. The approach taken to financing DB o r  DC schemes i s  crucial for sustainability. Fully 
funded DB schemes run by governments are rare as countries have found it expedient to demand less in 
contributions than required to match assets and liabilities. Partially funded schemes are typically those 
that have been set LIP relatively recently and are ‘immature.’ Fully funded D C  schemes and ‘hybrids’ 
where a D C  scheme i s  combined with an unfunded DB element have become more common over the last 
two decades and can now be found in about two dozen countries. Despite the common D C  feature (as 
well as a prominent role for private asset managers and insurers in most systems), the design o f  these 
schemes and the extent to which they relied on funding and the implementation details vary greatly.53 In 
other words, each reform reflected local constraints and  preference^.'^ 
For an illustration o f  the possible costs o f  these approaches in the Sri Lankan case, see Gaminiratne (2004). 
53 See Chlon (2004) for a review o f  eight systemic reforms in Eastern Europe and Palacios (2004) for a review o f  
ten systemic reforins in Latin America. 
The pros and cons o f  these approaches have been the subject o f  heated debate at least since 1994 when the World 
Bank published a major research volume on the subject (World Bank 1994). The subsequent decade, as recently 
documented in another World Bank study, has refined these arguments and provided a wealth o f  experience on 
design and implementation issues (World Bank 2005g). 
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105. Policymakers should review the reasons that the current models are being utilized for 
pension provision and explicitly determine the best approach for Sri  Lanka. Sri Lanka’s pension 
system currently uses several approaches ranging from unfunded, defined benefits with high target 
replacement rates for c iv i l  servants to a defined contribution scheme with lump sum payouts for private 
formal sector workers. The alternatives should then be costed out and their administrative requirements 
assessed. As discussed in the next section, an approach that reduces duplication makes subsidies 
transparent and allows for portability between all sectors o f  the economy should be considered. 
Developing a coherent approach to the risks o f  death, disability, and ill health 
106. Sri Lanka does not have health insurance, however the health care system covers all 
medical costs o f  the population. As noted in chapter 1, health shocks are the most important income 
shocks suffered by Sri Lankan households and the coverage o f  medical fees helps to alleviate poverty. 
However, recent evidence suggests that the loss o f  income from sickness o f  the breadwinner i s  more 
onerous than direct medical costs (Gertler 2004), and lack o f  coverage o f  these costs may lead individuals 
deep into poverty. This may also be the case in  Sri Lanka. More work i s  needed, however, to better gauge 
the impact o f  health and disability shoclcs on the economic welfare o f  households. 
107. Public policy objectives with regard to death and disability insurance should be clarified 
and arbitrary differences between workers eliminated. In  the kind o f  unified framework described 
below, workers could be covered for these risks through group self-insurance or purchase o f  external 
insurance. I n  both cases, the actuarially fair premium could be calculated and where necessary, 
subsidized). The focus from an income replacement standpoint should be on permanent disability that 
leads to large income losses. I n  order to assess the feasibility o f  such a program, information on disability 
incidence among these groups should be collected and published. Parallel reforms in insurance regulation 
would have to be implemented over the longer run, if necessary and particularly if these liabilities were to 
be pre-funded. Disability insurance would have to be closely coordinated wi th  disability payments made 
under safety net programs, and form part o f  disability strategy o f  the country. 
Building Blocks of Unemployment Insurance System Adapted to Sr i  Lanka 
108. Sri Lanka should adapt standard UI system to take into account labor market 
circumstances and existing administrative capacity. To  minimize adverse employment effects, to 
reduce administrative costs, and to ensure affordability and a smooth start o f  the scheme, the following 
features-some deviating f rom the standard, OECD-type o f  the model-are recommended in the short to 
ni ed i ii ni ru ii : 
Eligibility. St~i r / ing eligibility for unemployment benefits should be on the basis o f  involuntary 
separations from employment, wi th a minimum period o f  insurance contributions. For practical 
purposes, starting eligibil i ty conditions should be the same as for T E W A  eligibility. I n  addition, 
UI eligibility could be extended to workers who would lose jobs if employers close down their 
bus inesse~ .~~  Continuing eligibility would require non-employment in the formal sector, which 
would be easily verified from administrative records. The system would thus avoid the need to 
subjectively assess the recipients’ behavior and status (that is, verifying whether the beneficiaries 
are actively seeking a job, and whether they are available for and capable to  work). This would 
not only save 011 administrative costs, but also eliminate the moral hazard associated with UI and 
To qualify, such workers would have to produce a certif icate stating that their employment was terminated 
because o f  the bankruptcy of the employer (such a certificate would be issued by the District Labor Office, based on 
workers’ records kept by the office about the employment spell and the verification o f  the bankruptcy), and their 
contribution history would have to be verified to ensure that a minimum contributory period criterion i s  met. 
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thus encourage j o b  seeking self-protection behavior (see Vodopivec 2004 for the discussion o f  
the moral hazard effects o f  UI systems). 
Coverage. As a starting point and to simplify administration, coverage o f  UI would coincide with 
T E W A  coverage. For example, Korean’s UI system also started with the coverage in large 
enterprises (with at least 3 0 workers) and gradually gained universal coverage. 
The level o f  benefits. Affordabil ity and employment incentives dictate a modest level o f  benefits. 
Based on international standards, duration o f  6 to 12 months and a replacement rate o f  50 percent 
can be recommended (see Vodopivec 2004 for the description o f  the level o f  benefits o f  UI 
systems around the world). A flat rate (equal amount paid to all) i s  also an attractive option, 
because it simplifies the administration o f  benefits, reduces the scope for misuses, contributes to 
affordability, and fosters redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
Financing. The system’s expenditures (benefits and administrative costs) should be financed by 
employer and worker contributions. I t  must be remembered that the recipients o f  unemployment 
benefits w i l l  have the advantage o f  working in formal sector, while many other workers are 
underemployed and/or working in the informal sector. Scarce government resources should 
therefore be used for other purposes and no public funds should finance the operation o f  the UI 
scheme. Because the expected yearly inf low o f  beneficiaries (based on the history o f  T E W A  
beneficiaries) would not exceed 2 thousand workers, the total costs o f  the scheme once matured 
would be about Rs. 80 mi l l ion ($800,000) per year.56 Indeed, as for  sources o f  financing, 
iinemployment benefit could be easily added as one o f  the benefits offered by Employees’ Trust 
Fund (ETF)-which in practice already provides this type o f  benefits, as workers can access their 
individual ETF funds once they lose employment. 
Administration. T o  minimize administrative costs and to enable smooth start, unemployment 
benefit scheme should piggyback existing social security networks (for example, ETF) for i ts  
benefit administration. Such an arrangement would eliminate the need to create another expensive 
b i~ reauc racy .~~  As in the case o f  pensions, a forecasting model for unemployment insurance to 
assess costs and financial sustainability (perhaps in concert with the development o f  actuarial 
costs o f  pensions/disability/death benefits) needs to be developed to better understand the benefits 
and costs o f  alternate options. 
109. Employment services for the benefit recipients. Benefit recipients would be eligible for certain 
employment services, such as j o b  brokerage via the JobsNet computerized bank o f  available jobs; labor 
market counseling; job-search assistance; and, possibly, training. A possible provider o f  such services 
could be a recently created, rapidly growing JobsNet network. The precise modalities o f  the provision o f  
these services need to be determined to ensure that public provision o f  services i s  cost effective (e.g., j o b  
counseling/information) and training services are demand driven, and contracted to private providers (see 
also discussion in chapter 2). 
1 I O .  Other long-term features o f  the UI scheme should also be carefully considered. First, the 
feasibility o f  monitoring o f  j o b  search behavior and labor market status o f  benefit recipients should be 
Assuming a 12-month average duration o f  covered unemployment spell, inflow o f  2,000 beneficiaries per year, 
average salary o f  Rs.6,800 (equal to the average wages o f  TEWA beneficiaries in 2002), and the replacement rate o f  
50 percent. 
For example, if le f t  on i ts  own, the UI scheme would have to acquire the capacity to check whether employers’ 
contributions for prospective beneficiaries have been paid-the capacity already residing by the ETF. Moreover, the 
UB scheme would also have to set up a new network to determine starting and continuing eligibility, to keep the 
balance o f  benefits to be paid, and effect  the payments when they become due. Under the arrangements proposed 
here, existing capacity o f  ETF would suffice to implement the system. 
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explored. In that case, the options of  declining level o f  benefits over individual unemployment spell could 
be considered, so as to minimize work disincentives. Second, active labor market policies would have to 
be carefully designed (including the possibility o f  the encouragement of  private training providers by 
financing v ia  vouchers) and evaluated. Third, the possibilities o f  expanding the UI coverage to include 
workers in smaller establishments would also be worth consideration. 
Improving Coverage and Efficiency o f  Informal Sector Schemes 
I1 1.  
employed, farmers and fishermen), the following measures could be considered: 
T o  improve the pension schemes for informal sector workers (in particular, for the self- 
Instead of  specifying nominal benefits and contributions, a defined contribution approach could 
be considered instead. 
Annuities, based on actuarially fair premia and preserving their real value, could be introduced. 
Information system could be upgraded and service improved. 
Fund management could be improved and investment portfolio diversified. 
I 12. To provide incentive for voluntary contributions, a defined contribution scheme for 
pensions and disability can be subsidized directly through matching contributions. Such a scheme 
should lead to annuities (provision o f  a monthly benefit after reaching certain age limit) or to scheduled 
withdrawals. Direct subsidization is  more transparent with regard to how the government contributes to 
the schemes’ finances but it also requires a higher up front fiscal ~ o m m i t m e n t . ~ ~  The same schemes would 
provide also disability benefits. I n  t h i s  case, insurance i s  appropriate and could be provided on an 
actuarially fair basis. Although the rate of  disability among the covered informal sector workers i s  not 
known, once they are ascertained, self-insurance or eventually, group insurance purchased from an 
insurance firin could be implemented. This may also help provide an incentive for minimizing any abuse 
o f  the system o f  determining eligibility (as it would impinge on costs to members in a transparent way). 
1 13.  To  address the problem of  moral hazard affecting unemployment insurance schemes, 
introducing a self-insurance element via an unemployment savings account may be a useful option. 
This could be incorporated into any workfare scheme should one be developed. 
114. Finally, a permanent workfare program could be instituted to provide income support to 
the poorest workers in case o f  unemployment (until the UI program becomes universal). The 
development of  unemployment insurance and extension o f  its coverage may take time. A workfare 
program could act as stop gap measure o f  providing a form o f  insurance to low income able bodied poor, 
in times o f  uneniployment. However, as noted above, the program would need to be financially viable, 
and coordinated with the social assistance program in terms o f  benefit levels, eligibility and overall costs. 
1 15. The expansion of coverage should be proceeded by an in-depth assessment o f  existing 
formal and informal initiatives and may need to be phased-focusing first on an evaluation of  current 
initiatives to determine best practice, and then a phased expansion to schemes where mora! hazard i s  
lower (l ife, pensions), and whose administration less complex as eligibility i s  easily determined and 
actuarial calculations are relatively straightforward. Finally, expansion of  social insurance coverage i s  
closely linked to the level o f  formality in t i e  labor market. Thus, reforms in the labor market (noted in the 
’* China has instituted a rural DC pension scheme and Vietnam i s  proposing to do the same. In India, attempts at 
extending coverage through DB-type pensions have so far failed. Meanwhile a draft bi l l  wi l l  be considered in 
Parliament in December 2005 that creates the infrastructure for a DC scheme aimed at both informal sector workers 
and civil servants. In West Bengal, a state-run DC scheme with a matching contribution has been functioning since 
2002 with a membership o f  650 thousand unorganized sector workers. 
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previous chapter) and in other areas (such as tax policies) that help increase the coverage o f  the formal 
sector w i l l  be critical. 
Towards a unified social insurance system with greater coverage 
116. Reforming the existing programs for old age, disability, survivors and unemployment is  
clearly a daunting challenge. Nevertheless, these reforms are a critical first step for extending the 
coverage to a greater share o f  the labor force. Furthermore, the recent laudable attempts at coverage 
expansion have tended to create new, parallel schemes that suffer from their own  deficiencies. 
1 17. An alternative strategy would be to aim for a seamless, unified framework for covering each 
of these risks in a way that would lend itself to easier expansion of  coverage. I n  pensions, for 
example, a defined contribution scheme with parameters (contribution rates, retirement age etc.) set in 
such a way as to produce a certain target replacement rate level could be applied for  al l  workers entering 
the labor force after a certain date. This would allow for complete portability and economies o f  scale in 
recordkeeping (which could be centralized) while avoiding the creation o f  new liabilities. Some o f  the 
measures recommended for the EPF, such as shifting to a diversified portfolio o f  investments and 
contracting out asset management could also be incorporated. Death and disability insurance, fairly 
priced based on actuarial results, could be purchased for members o f  this scheme as could some minimal 
level o f  annuitization after retirement. Similarly, a funded severance portion o f  the system could be added 
and integrated into the unemployment insurance program that would supplement individual savings by a 
social insurance component (the payment o f  unemployment benefits at the beginning o f  unemployment 
spell i s  dra\vn froin individual’s own unemployment benefit account, and only upon the depletion o f  th is  
account from the solidarity fund (a version o f  such a program was introduced in 2003 in Chile). 
1 18. This approach has the advantage o f  improving efficiency o f  program administration. 
Greater investment in, inter alia, improving recordkeeping, setting up individual accounts, and fund 
management w i l l  be required, but a unified approach would improve program efficiency: 
A unified architecture and information technology and identification scheme would reduce 
administrative duplication. 
A seamless system based on DC accounts would allow for movement between sectors and 
complete portability o f  benefits. 
An  individual account based pension can be easily adapted for migrant workers. 
Scale economies in terms o f  management o f  funds can be achieved. 
Group purchase o f  insurance for disability, death and longevity helps control costs. 
Moral hazard can be reduced if own savings are drawn down for unernpl~yment.~~ 
1 19. A unified framework with fairly priced insurance premium combined with self-insurance 
(in the form o f  individual DC accounts) also makes would also make it possible to facilitate 
coverage expansion. Recognizing that mandates cannot be effectively extended to the informal sector, 
voluntary participation will have to be promoted through incentives. This i s  especially true for households 
with high discount rates and a preference for liquidity. Recognizing this, subsidies could be introduced in 
a transparent way to help finance part o f  the contributions/premia that the various types o f  coverage 
imply. Successful coverage expansion would then depend on the fiscal constraints for providing the 
subsidy and the perceived benefits o f  joining. The Samurdhi Trust Fund could easily be incorporated into 
60 
See Vodopivec (2004) for a description o f  such a scheme introduced in Chile in 2003. 
Another alternative i s  to ‘top up’ DC balances at the time o f  retirement so as to meet a minimum pension level as 
is  done in Chile and several other countries. This reintroduces a DB component and government liability on an ex- 
post basis as opposed to making the transfer ex-ante. 
59 
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this framework and other existing self-help groups, workfare employees (were this to be implemented) 
and NGOs could ‘plug into’ the system with reduced transaction costs. 
120. Finally, it should be noted that the cost o f  prefunding such a program to the government 
would be offset partially by a reduced demand for social assistance. In the pension area, this offset 
would come only in the very long term as the scheme matured. I f  implemented soon, however, it would 
help defray the cost o f  supporting what would likely be a growing number o f  elderly social assistance 
6 ’  A non-contributory pension scheme or social assistance i s  the only source o f  support for current elderly who 
woii ld not have enough time to accumulate savings in a contributory plan even if coverage could be expanded 
rapidly. 
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4. COPING WITH RISK: SOCIAL SAFETY NETS 
‘Samurdhi is making people walk on 
their posteriors, not on their legs. ’ 
Samurdhi benejciary, Bandarawela, 
as quoted in Gunatilaka et al. (1997) 
I 2  1 .  Social safety net programs traditionally provide families and individuals who fall through the 
‘cracks’ of formal and informal protection systems with cash transfers (or social assistance) to help them 
cope with poverty (that is, they address poverty after the event as opposed to insuring against a potentially 
poverty induciiig shocks). More recently, cash transfer programs have evolved from being a pure coping 
mechanism to one which helps the poor to escape from poverty (for example, by conditioning income 
transfers on health and education outcomes), and to addressing vulnerability (for example, by offering 
workfare programs that serve as unemployment insurance in countries without such formal systems). This 
chapter thus focuses on several important groups identified in chapter 1 as poor and vulnerable (children 
and adults): the chronically poor as well as several subgroups in need o f  special services, ranging from 
school dropouts, child soldiers, malnourished children to the disabled and displaced due to the civil 
conflict or natural disasters. 
122. Sri Lanka has an extensive safety net system comprising income transfers (social assistance) to 
address cliroiiic poverty and individual risks (illness, disability), and covariate shocks (e.g., conflict, 
tsunami). The chapter finds that the safety net system could be strengthened not only to produce more 
equitable outcomes but also to promote growth. The key ways to achieve that i s  by: (i) better targeting 
existing social assistanceicasli transfer programs to the poor; (ii) ensuring that poor participate in human 
development and income earning programs; (iii) ensuring that programs are designed to help individuals 
cope with vulnerability (sickness, disability, and loss o f  employment) by providing them social welfare 
and care services and by integrating workfare into social assistance programs; and finally (iv) scaling up 
safety net programs to help address the community level shocks (natural disasters and the civil conflict). 
123. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section reviews the main social safety net programs 
and presents their key characteristics. The next two sections describe the Samurdhi income transfer 
program and other safety net programs, including programs for displaced, disabled, and tsunami victims. 
The last section concludes by discussing policy options. 
4.1 Overview o f  Social Safety Net Interventions 
124. I n  Sri  Lanka, social safety net programs are implemented by two main ministries and by 
both the Central Government and Provincial Councils. Government agencies provide overlapping 
safety net programs through a number of  authorities and departments, which provide programs addressing 
both individual and covariate risks (see Table 4.1). I n  addition, welfare services are provided also by the 
voluntary sector, but they operate on a small scale (see the composition o f  the voluntary sector in Box 
4.1). The main programs include: 
The Samurdhi income transfer to the poor (Ministry of  Samurdhi and Poverty Alleviation). The 
income transfer is  not indexed to inflation and the fixed amount i s  received as commodities and 
encashment stamps. In  that sense the transfer i s  reliable and predictable. The program also includes a 
microcredit and micro-insurance component as well as a small-scale infrastructure development 
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component. The last two components aim to assist people to move out o f  poverty and to smooth 
consumption respectively, thus reducing reliance on the first component-income transfer. 
Income support for disabled soldiers and families o f  service personnel who died in the conflict 
(Ministry o f  Women’s Empowerment and Social Welfare). 
Assistance for persons displaced by the conflict (Ministry o f  Women’s Empowerment and Social 
We Ifare). 
Emergency assistance to people affected by natural disasters such as drought and floods (Ministry o f  
W onien ’ s Eiii po we rni en t and Soc ial Welfare), 
Provision o f  free textbooks and school uniforms to children (Ministry o f  Education), and 
Assistance for indigent elders and families with disabled persons and people with incapacitating 
illness who are unable to work (Provincial Councils). 
Table 4.1: Social safety nets expenditures, 2000-04 (Rs. Mi l l ion)  
..ll“.l.”_ .. ~ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 20,332 23,918 
Ministry of Samurdhi 
Income transfers 
Micro credit 
Micro insurance 
Sinall scale infrastructure 
1 n fan t in i I I< subs id y 
9,927 
1,822 
218 
548 
135 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Social Welfare 
Payment to disable soldiers 2,282 
Rehabilitation & reconstruction - refugees 2,658 
Tr i po s h a s ti pp I e in en t 320 
Mother’s & child’s nutrition 30 
Rehab i I i t  at i o n d rug addicts 15 
Flood and drought rel ief 75 
Ministry o f  Education 
School uniform 
School text books 
School season tickets 
Other education welfare 
980 
1,000 
250 
64 
Provincial Councils 
Assistance for indigent elders and disabled 8 
Memorandum items (percent o f  GDP) 
Social safety net programs - total 1.6 
Sainurdhi income transfers 0.8 
Education 2.5 
Health 1.7 
12,574 
2,670 
225 
288 
157 
2,655 
2,548 
156 
488 
36 
10 
900 
900 
250 
48 
13 
1.7 
0.9 
2.0 
1.4 
20,66 1 
9,9 10 
1,990 
196 
64 
120 
3,23 5 
2,26 1 
185 
590 
30 
15 
799 
900 
250 
100 
16 
1.3 
0.6 
2.4 
1.6 
2 1,774 
8,715 
3,055 
208 
128 
160 
3,392 
3,392 
273 
49 1 
43 
18 
60 1 
969 
250 
79 
,.. 
1.3 
0.5 
2.2 
1.6 
23,086 
8,498 
3,48 1 
20 1 
343 
127 
3,860 
2,532 
1,466 
305 
100 
35 
788 
1,100 
250 
. .*  
... 
1.1 
0.4 
2.1 
1.5 
Total government expenditures 27.2 28.0 25.8 24.0 23.7 
Sources: Ministry o f  Finance - internal material, and Central Bank (2003, 2005). 
Note: Data reflect both current and capital expenditures (capital expenditures involved in social safety net were 
n eg I i g i b le). 
125. I n  2002, approximately 1.9 million poor families received income transfers. In addition, 
20,000 disabled ex-soldiers and 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) also received assistance. A 
total o f  about 400,000 families wi th  disabled persons and people with incapacitating illness who are 
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unable to work were also targeted. However, there i s  some overlap between the beneficiaries o f  the 
programs administered by the Ministry o f  Samurdhi and Poverty Alleviation and the Ministry o f  Social 
Welfare (World Bank 20051). 
Box 4.1: The voluntary sector 
Many non-governmental organizations and charitable associations provide safety nets for the elderly, orphans and 
disabled children and adults in residential homes. Homes for the elderly, disabled and orphaned are run mainly by 
charitable organizations with religious affiliations. They receive some nominal assistance for recurrent expenditure 
from the Provincial Councils through the program targeted at indigent elders, families with disabled persons and 
people with incapacitating illness who are unable to work. The government does provide funds on occasion for 
capital expenditures. Even so, most o f  the funds are privately raised. The Department o f  Childcare and Probation 
monitors the administration o f  orphanages. The support provided by these institutions i s  o f  variable quality. Most 
are seriously under-funded and badly resourced. The table below l i s t s  non-governmental and community-based 
organizations engaged in social service in 2002: 
Number 
Welfare organizations 1025 
Mutual assistance societies 233 
Social developmenticominunity development organizations 1298 
-I_------- 
Self-employed group organizationsibodies 74 
Association of  unorganized employees 49 
Organizations o f  the poor 3 
Socialieconomic development foundations 507 
Micro-credit institutions 98 
Cooperatives 279 
Pensioners associations 30 
Elderly and aged people’s welfare associations 157 
Funeral assistance societies 2084 
Sarvodaya 152 
Chi Id welfare organizations 164 
Women’s organizations 737 
Disabled welfare organizations 49 
. . ... Oroanizations . ..... 3.. ....I.... ............  . dealin g .......................... with education l-.l......-__l__.__.-. and health ___-I 23?- 
Total 7172 
p-m~-....~-m%-p-p 
Soi i rcr :  Inst i t t i tc  for I’arlictpatory Interaction in Development (2003), based on information from NGO Secretariat, Ministry o f  
Policy Dei#elopment and Implementation and Ministry of Social Welfare. 
126. Expenditures on income transfers programs have declined since 2001 and comprised 1.1 
percent of GDP o r  4.8 percent o f  total government expenditure in 2004. This figure includes 
expenditures on the income transfers and the support to microcredit, microinsurance, and small scale 
infrastructure under the Sainurdhi programs, as wel l  as programs under the Ministry o f  Women’s 
Enipowerinent and Social Welfare, Ministry o f  Education and Provincial Councils (Table 4. 1).62 In 
comparison to 2002, in 2003 and 2004 the expenditures o f  combined Samurdhi programs strongly 
declined both in absolute and relative terms (reflecting the strong reduction o f  the amount o f  the income 
transfer component), and the expenditures o f  the Ministry o f  Women’s Empowerment and Social Welfare 
stayed constant as the share o f  GDP (see Figure 4.1). Reflecting a decrease o f  beneficiaries and an erosion 
o f  nominally fixed benefit levels, program expenditures on the Samurdhi transfers strongly declined from 
0.9 percent o f  GDP in 2001 to 0.4 percent o f  GDP i n  2004 (note that the microcredit component increased 
While most analyses in Sri Lanka include pensions to retired public servants under welfare payments, we have 62 
deliberately excluded them as they are part o f  social insurance, not safety nets. 
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in 2003-04, somewhat mitigating the reduction o f  program expenditures). I t  should be noted that 2004 the 
income transfers provided by the Samurdlii program were roughly equivalent to the three quarters o f  the 
combined amount paid to disabled soldiers and refugees, In broader terms, in 2000-2004 the expenditures 
on social safety net programs lagged substantially behind the expenditures on education (these ranged 
from 2 to 2.5 percent o f  GDP) and, after 2002, also behind health expenditures (see Table 4.1). 
127. Sri  Lanka’s expenditure on social 
amount spent by other countries except in 
2003-04. Sri Lanka’s expenditure on social 
assistance during 1997 - 2002 was at the level 
o f  averages for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Middle East and North Afr ica 
(Figure 4.2). While the countries o f  East Asia 
and the Pacific spent slightly less, the countries 
o f  Eastern and Central European countries 
spent substantially more. As shown above, the 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
spending o f  Sri Lanka in 2002-2003, however, 
substantially declined. In  comparison to other 
South Asian countries for which data i s  
available, Sri Lanka spends more on safety nets than Bangladesh with 0.6 - 0.8 percent o f  GDP or 
Pakistan with 0.5 percent o f  GDP, but less than India with 2-3% o f  GDP (spending refers to 
(s1ib)period o f  2000-2004, Blank et al. 2005). 
assistance has been comparable with the 
4.2 Income Transfer Programs 
128. 
t n o  main income transfer programs: the Samurdhi program and the disability benefits program. 
This section describes the key parameters and main issues confronting the implementation o f  the 
The Samurdhi Program 
129. Eligibility. Households are selected for eligibility for Samurdhi based on their level o f  
income, but rigorous selection criteria are lacking. While eligibil i ty and determination o f  the level of 
benefits i s  based on a means test (Table 4.2)’ Samurdhi Development Officers (Niyamakas) select the 
poor in most areas on the basis o f  a household survey carried out in 1995. Whi le the diff iculty o f  means 
testing was understood, the officially established threshold was set artificially high in order to contain the 
outlay on the program. Niyaniakas were also advised to use other household characteristics such as 
qitality o f  housing and household assets as a means to identify the poor. However, as no specific method 
w a s  established as to how this should be done, too much was left to Niyamakas’ discretion. Meanwhile, 
the grievance handling procedures were not insulated from partisan interference by local politicians with 
the result that the number o f  recipients far exceeded initial estimates. 
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Figure 4.2: International comparison of  social assistance expenditure (percent o f  GDP), 1996-2003 
I 1 __ ____ ~ ~- ~ 
I 
I 
1 2.5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sub-Saharan East Asia and Eastern and Latin America Middle East and 
(1997) (2000.2002) (2003-2004) Africa the Pacific Central Europe and the North Africa 
Caribbean 
Source: For Sri Lanka: Table 4.1 for 2000-2004 and World Bank (2002) for 1997. For comparators, 
Blank, Grosch, Hakim, and Weigand (2005). 
Note: The data represent average regional expenditure on social assistance based on the most recent 
country-specific data available (late 1990s or early 2000s). 
130. Those eligible for Samurdhi benefit are required to participate in microcredit and 
community infrastructure development programs, with uncertain impact on household 
consumption. Linking the poor wi th  consumption smoothing and income generation programs i s  an 
innovative approach that seeks to both reduce vulnerability and help the poor move on to higher income 
growth paths . H o w  ever, questions re  in ai n about their effectiveness . 
Conimodities stamps and encashnzent stamps can be used to purchase goods only at government 
cooperative stores, at unsubsidized prices. The public cost o f  providing food stamps appears to be 
larger than their value to recipients as prices and quality in the cooperative stores are report as 
inferior to those o f  private and government stores (Glinskaya 2000, Gunatilaka et al. 1997).63 
Smiings/credit prograni. A compulsory amount o f  benefit i s  deducted from the transfer and 
deposited in Samurdhi Banks, established through federated savings groups o f  the Samurdhi 
recipients, but the compulsory savings could not be used as collateral or withdrawn. The 
compulsory and voluntary savings accumulated through this program were used to provide 
consumption loans and other small loans to beneficiaries (Glinskaya 2000). However, the threat 
o f  withdrawing the transfer was used to ensure loan repayment and made the viability o f  the 
microcredit system too dependent on the income transfer. 
Social insurance scheme, which provides small lump sum payments in the event o f  contingencies 
such as death or the birth o f  a child (see discussion i n  chapter 3). This, too, was not a voluntary 
insurance scheme but functioned by way o f  mandatory deductions f rom the income transfer. 
Work “test”.  Households receiving the income transfer have also been required to provide the 
labor o f  one member for small-scale infrastructure development projects. Note that although the 
wage rate offered is  at levels far below prevailing market rates (Gunatilaka et al. 1997), it does 
not function as the vehicle o f  self-selection into the program. Households are required to provide 
labor after they were selected for the transfer, and thus the effective reward o f  participation in the 
63  This was also found to be the case with the mid-day mealifood-for-work-rice program in Trincomalee (Pietzch 
200 1). 
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program consists o f  both the wages for providing labor and Samurdhi cash benefits, thus 
rendering the work test ineffective. 
- Table 4.2: Samurdhi eligibility criteria 
Monthly income in rupees and household size 
Household income < 500 and number o f  members >=4 
Grant size (Rs. Per month) 
1,000 
..... . . . . ...... ... ... .. ..... ........................... ..... .... " ..... .............,..... " .............I ... " .._...I.." "~.."..."..l " l_l__ _-.lll._.-l. 
Household income < 1,000 and number o f  members >=3 
Household income < 1,000 and number o f  members 2 
Household income < 1,000 and number o f  members 1 
500 
200 
100 
Former Janasaviya r*ients 250 - 
Source: Ministry of  Samurdhi, Youth Affairs and Sports. "Progress 1999, Programs 2000" 
131.  Coverage nncl expenditures. Samurdhi coverage i s  extensive, with 41 percent o f  the 
population receiving benefit in 2002, with the coverage and expenditures declining since the late 
1990s. A t  the end o f  2002, a total o f  1.9 mi l l ion families or 41 percent o f  the population received the 
income transfer (Central Bank o f  Sri Lanka 2003). The number o f  recipient families increased from about 
1.5 mil l ion families at t h e  start o f  the program to 2.3 mi l l ion families by the late 1990s and remained at 
these levels until 2001, with budget cuts bringing a reduction o f  the number o f  beneficiaries in 2002 and 
thereafter (see Figure 4.3). 64  Program expenditures rose from Rs. 8 bi l l ion in 1995 to a high o f  Rs. 13.9 
billion in 2001, and have declined since. 65 
132. Adequacy and work incentives, The level o f  benefit i s  low, covering a quarter o f  the food bill 
o f  the poorest households, and not adjusted for inflation. The average size o f  the total Samurdhi 
transfer, according to S L I S  1999/2000 data, i s  Rs. 381, which translates into Rs. 95 per person in per 
capita terms (the breakdown o f  the number o f  families by the size o f  the grant in 2002 i s  presented in the 
Table 4.3). I n  1999/2000, an average o f  14 percent o f  total household food expenditure (and 21 percent 
for the recipients in the lowest income decile) could be met by the Samurdhi grant-roughly translated, 
five to seven days o f  food per month. As with previous programs, Samurdhi benefits are not adjusted for 
inflation and so their real value has eroded over time (Glinskaya 2000). 
133. Beneficiaries receive benefit payments that are much smaller than the stipulated grant. As 
noted above, the Samurdhi recipients are eligible for food stamps, and participate in savings/micro credit, 
social security, and other schemes. For th i s  reason, compulsory savings stamp, social security stamp 
(discussed in chapter 3), and a housing lottery stamp are deducted from the transfer at the time o f  receipt. 
Table 4.4 sets out the amounts deducted for each program component for each category o f  grant. S L I S  
data revealed that after deducting forced savings and social insurance, the average size o f  the net transfer 
is Rs. 3 I O  per household and Rs. 78 per person. 
64 As a result o f  these measures, the total number o f  households receiving the supplement fe l l  by 24 percent to 
1,488,493 by end 2002. However, to encourage ineligible families to exit the program, departing families were paid 
Rs. 140 supplement per month to cover compulsory deposits. This brought the total number o f  families covered to 
1,886,737 as at end 2002. 
Note that "transfers" as defined by Samurdhi includes consumption grants to households as well as salaries o f  
Sam LI rdh i officers . 
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Figure 4.3: Growing outreach of  the Samurdhi program 
~ - __ 
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- ~- 
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Source. Central Bank Annual Report (various years). 
Table 4.3: Samurdhi recipients by category o f  allowance, and of  2002 
Cateeorv o f  Allowance (Rs.) No o f  families YO 
IO00 
600 
400 
350 
250 
140 
3,954 
589,460 
320,759 
238,593 
335727 
398,244 
0.2 1 
3 1.24 
17.00 
12.65 
17.79 
21.11 
Total 1,886,737 100 
Source; Samurdhi Ministry Progress report, 2002-2003, cited in CEPA 2004, Table 4.3. 
134. The income transfer at best increased, by 7 percent, food consumption of  the average 
household in lowest 40 percent o f  the income distribution. Glinskaya (2000) also reports that 
conditional on being a Samurdhi recipient, the size o f  the transfer i s  slightly larger among households in 
the lowest quintile, but in per capita terms, the grant i s  larger for better-off households. Nevertheless, 
there i s  also qiialitative and quantitative evidence that the Samurdhi income transfer i s  an important safety 
net, particularly for households wi th unstable income (Centre for Poverty Analysis 2004). 
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Table 4.4: Samurdhi program, deductions of compulsory payments (Rs.) 
Category stamp stamp stamp fund stamp ...... .._....._.__..._..I.~...- E?._mP.. ..__I" ___.______ 
1000 400 3 60 200 30 10 
600 250 210 100 30 10 
400 360 0 0 30 10 
350 340 0 0 0 10 
250 240 0 0 0 10 
140 0 0 100 30 10 
Commodities Encashment Compulsory savings Social Security Housing lottery 
.. 
Source: Samurdhi Ministry Progress report, 2002-2003, cited in CEPA 2004, Table 4.4. 
1 3 5 .  Benefit i s  small when compared with the actual transfer needed to move households out of 
poverty. I n  2002, the average income shortfall needed to move a person over the poverty line, was four 
times the size o f  tlie actual grant. If targeted perfectly, Samurdhi could have moved 60 percent o f  the poor 
out o f  poverty with a budget one and a hal f  times as much as was actually spent that year. Box  4.2 
indicates that tlie average income shortfall needed to move a person over the poverty line in 2002 was Rs. 
320, four times the size o f  the actual grant. 
Box 4.2: How much money will it take to move people out o f  poverty through income transfers? 
The average poverty gap or consumption shortfall o f  the average poor person in 2002 was Rs. 320 per person per 
month.' Twenty three percent o f  Sri Lanka's population outside the North and East were estimated to be poor in 
this year, and thus the total income shortfall was Rs. 1,227.6 million. Assuming a further 10 percent for the North 
and East (allowing for a higher poverty incidence in these provinces), the total budget that was required to reduce 
poverty in Sri Lanka through income transfers (without allowing for leakages and administration costs) i s  Rs. 
1,350 million per month, or 16,204.5 million annually. This i s  1.6 times the budget for Samurdhi benefits in 2002, 
and 4 percent o f  total government expenditure and 1 percent o f  GDP in this year. This implies that with perfect 
targeting, the budget for Samurdhi could have eradicated poverty among 60 percent o f  the poor. In fact, spending 
on Samurdhi was  substantially reduced in 2002-in 2001, at i ts  peak, spending was 0.9 percent o f  GDP, or 3.3 
percent o f  total government expenditure. 
Source: Gunewardena (2005). 
136. Despite the small size o f  the income transfer, labor-leisure decisions may be affected. 
Although the size o f  the benefits as discussed above i s  relatively small, Glinskaya (2000) suggests that the 
possibility o f  a household to lose eligibil i ty upon earning above Rs. 2000 can distort incentives for taking 
a job (for reference, the statutory miniinurn daily wage rate in 2005 for workers i n  the tea, rubber and 
cocontit sectors was Rs. 12 1, Employers' Federation o f  Ceylon 2005). In practice, this criterion has been 
universally ignored, thus making work disincentives less plausible. While no rigorous analysis has been 
done about tlie incentive effects o f  the Sainurdhi program to date, it should be noted that adverse 
incentive effects were found for other welfare prograins i n  Sri Lanka. For example, participation in the 
food stamps program in Sri Lanka (in t l ie early 1980s) was found to have reduced labor supply by two to 
three days per month (Salin and Alderman 1996). 
137. Targeting. Samurdhi program suffers from weak targeting o f  benefits. There i s  considerable 
evidence that the program suffers from both types o f  targeting errors, leakage to the nonpoor and 
undercoverage o f  tlie poor: 
There i s  considerable leakage to the nonpoor. Twenty seven percent o f  the non-poor received 
Samurdlii transfers in 1995196 (Gunewardena 2000), and 44 percent o f  households in the top 
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tliree quintiles received them in 1999/2000 (Glinskaya 2000). Gaminiratne (2004) notes the 
leakage of Samurdlii to tlie non poor and undercoverage o f  the poor elderly. 
The poor, and the elderly poor in particular, are undercovered. Only 66 percent o f  
households in the bottom decile received Samurdhi assistance in 1995/96 (Gunewardena 2000) 
and 60 percent o f  households in t l ie bottom quintile received it in 1999/2000 (Glinskaya 2000). 
Undercoverage i s  even more pronounced for the elderly poor. Gaminiratne (2004) reports that 
only 23 percent o f  the poorest quintile o f  the elderly and 27 percent o f  the second poorest quintile 
received Samurdlii assistance. Targeting outcomes are similar to those o f  untargeted systems such 
as primary health care or primary education. 
138.  Targeting errors are systematic, as some groups more likely to receive Samurdhi income 
transfer than others. Poorer households in irrigation colonies, urban middle income neighborhoods and 
estates were less l ikely to receive Samurdhi than those in a traditional village (but no difference was 
observed for expansion colonies). The probability o f  being a Samurdhi recipient differed significantly 
according to ethnic statiis (controlling for income and area o f  residence, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils 
and Moors are less likely than Sinhalese to receive Samurdlii benefits). Migration status was not related to 
the probability o f  Samurdhi receipt, but not having a national identity card reduced the probability o f  
receipt (Glinskaya 2000). Party political affiliation also plays a significant role in determining one’s 
chances o f  getting the transfer. For example, families identified as traditional U N P  voters were less l ikely 
to have been granted Sainurdlii benefits (ADB-P IMU 2000, Glinskaya 2000, Gunatilaka et al. 1997). 
1 39. Nevertheless, household characteristics associated with poverty also increase the chances o f  
receiving support. Households with disabled or chronically sick members were more l ikely to receive 
Samiirdlii benefits, while houses owning livestock, and other assets, including land and possessing land 
title were less likely to receive Saniurdlii benefits. Housing conditions were associated with the receipt o f  
Samurdlii (households wi th no access to latrines, or communal latrines and households with no lighting or 
kerosene for lighting were more likely to receive benefits). The probability o f  receiving Samurdlii 
differed significantly by occupation o f  household head (farm laborers and members in the military were 
more likely to receive, government and private salaried employees and retirees less likely to receive 
benefits) (Glinsltaya 2000). 
140. Mistargeting i s  the result o f  the lack o f  explicit targeting criteria at the local level. As shown 
in Figure 4.4, tlie allocation o f  Sainurdlii assistance at the central level corresponds to relative share o f  
poor households in districts. The correlation o f  per capita district-specific Samurdhi funds and the poverty 
rate i s  0.814, and the correlation with the poverty depth i s  0.71 1 (Glinskaya 2000). I t  follows that most 
targeting errors occur at the local level.66 Glinskaya also found that poorer provinces allocate a smaller 
share o f  their Samurdhi funds to the poor, so their targeting errors are more prevalent. Therefore targeting 
errors appear to be non-random and tlie consequence o f  the lack o f  rigorous selection criteria, leaving too 
much discretion to Samurdhi Development Officers, who are in turn influenced by local politicians. These 
flaws in tlie design o f  t l ie program thus allow for the deliberate omission o f  certain individuals or groups 
depending on tlie configuration o f  local political forces. 
Income Support for Disabled 
I 4  1 .  Eligibility for disability benefits encompasses various types o f  disabilities. The Protection o f  
the Rights o f  Persons with Disabilities Act No. 28 o f  1996 defines a person with disability as “any person 
who, as a result o f  any deficiency in his physical or mental capabilities, whether congenital or not, i s  
This contrasts to findings in other countries, e.g., Bangladesh, where pro-poor outcomes o f  income transfer 
programs were largely due to the success o f  communities in reaching the poor, rather than central government 
allocation (Glinskaya 2000). 
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unable by himself to ensure for himself, wholly or partly, the necessities o f  l ife". This reasonably broad 
definition encompasses both the medical and socio-economic aspects o f  disability and forms the basis for 
government support o f  the disabled. Accordingly, the Ministry o f  Social Welfare encompasses people 
who have visual, speech, hearing, mobility, intellectual, and psychiatric disability and disability arising as 
a result of epilepsy and other causes in determining eligibility for income support. The Ministry's 
definition also encompasses multiple disabilities, which are a combination o f  two or more of  these 
disabilities in a single individual (Ministry o f  Social Welfare 2003). 
Figure 4.4: District allocations for Samurdhi income transfers 
- ~~ ~ - ~ p ~ - ~ -  
__ _ _ _ ~ ~  
OShare of Samurdhi HH 8 %  of poor HH (DCS) 
- - - - ~ - ~ ~ p ~ ~ - p p ~ A  
-- - - -~ - p ~ ~ ~ ~  ___ 
Source Ministry o f  Samurdhi, Progress Report 2003-2004, Central Bank (2003), DCS Poverty indicators/ 
CEPA 2004 
142. A survey o f  tlisablecl persons showed that only 41 percent receive any sort of income 
transfer (including the disability allowance) from the government (of persons suffering from 
intellectual, mobility, psychiatric, hearing, or speech disability, with no figures are available about the 
share of  disabled in population-Ministry o f  Social Welfare 2003). Within the recipients, roughly 60 
percent get Samurdhi income transfers and only the rest received income transfers for disabled persons 
from the Ministry o f  Social Welfare (the latter transfer can be received in addition to Samurdhi benefits). 
This split in transfer makes i ts  administration more costly than if it were administered by a single agency. 
Eligibility for the disability benefit i s  determined through the Divisional Service Office o f  the Department 
o f  Social Services, and since 2003, it has been fixed at a low level of Rs. 100-300 per month. 
143. The main beneficiaries among the disabled are soldiers injured by the conflict, leaving other 
poor disabled groups undercovered. Income transfers to the vulnerable by the Ministry o f  Social 
Welfare are highly skewed towards disability payments for soldiers injured in the conflict and families of  
soldiers killed in action. This component consumed 92 percent oftransfers by the Ministry in 2003 and 85 
percent o f  i t s  total budget, leaving very little support for other vulnerable disabled groups. 
144. Expenditure on disability payments has increased over time. This increase i s  explained by the 
growing burden on the exchequer through mounting loss o f  lives. The allocations have continued to 
increase in 2002 and 2003, both years where the ceasefire was in place and casualties among the armed 
forces were virtually nil. This i s  because payments have to continue until the year o f  retirement of a 
solider who lost hisiher life. I n  many developed countries, disability payments comprise the most rapidly 
increasing expenditures of  any cash transfer programs. Disability payments suffer from moral hazard or 
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collusion problems. I n  many countries, individuals who certify disability can collude with individuals to 
help the latter obtain disability payments. There i s  often constant pressure on Government to extend the 
definition o f  disability which increases the number o f  individuals eligible for disability and therefore 
d isabi I ity expenditures. 
145. Disability payments are a very limited way of supporting the disabled poor. As noted in  
chapter 1, information about disability i s  i n  short supply, and the disabled suffer f rom stigma and lack o f  
acceptance into society. Tlie disabled face limited educational opportunities that increase the likelihood 
that they drop out or not attend school, and therefore have limited employment prospects. A more 
comprehensive approach to disability i s  needed that addresses prevention and enables the disabled to 
integrate better into society. 
4.3 Coping with Large-Scale Disasters, Droughts, and Displacement 
146. I n  the short-term, disaster rel ief  covers all affected persons on the basis of the impact and 
injuries suffered (Welfare Benefits Board 2003). Divisional Secretaries in the affected regions select 
beneficiaries with t l ie assistance o f  Grama Niladharis and Social Service Officers at the Divisional level. 
The value o f  t l ie assistance varies according to the type o f  relief and i s  delivered in the form o f  cash 
grants, food relief, food stamps, etc. Selection o f  beneficiaries i s  carried out on the basis o f  the impact 
caused by t l ie disaster and not on income poverty criteria. However, a broad income criterion o f  Rs. 3000 
per family per month exists for  long-term assistance for recipients o f  disaster rel ief.  
147. Drought relief i s  provided to families with income less than less than Rs. 2000 a month from 
agriculture or  related activities. Families become eligible for the relief if the cultivation o f  seasonal 
crops have been disrupted or damaged for at least two consecutive seasons due to drought, the crops have 
not been insured, and the family does not have an alternative source o f  income. The drought rel ief  
program seems to work effectively. I n  a case study o f  paddy farmers and chena cultivators in the dry zone 
area o f  Anuradhapura, Senaka-Arachchi (1 998) found that drought rel ief  by the government constituted 
the most important source o f  income for 85 percent o f  afflicted households. However, Samurdhi 
beneficiaries do not qualify for drought assistance as they receive rel ief  through the Samurdhi program 
(Senaka-Arachchi 1998). Once again, the payment o f  cash through two  separate ministries likely 
increases administration costs o f  delivery. 
148. Relief for displnceclpersons comprises food assistance but the amount i s  insufficient to meet 
basic nutrition needs. The Ministry o f  Social Welfare provides food assistance to internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) if their monthly income less than Rs. 1,500 for 12 months f rom date o f  permanent 
resettle~iient.~’ From September 2004 there has been strict adherence to the eligibility criteria. As a result, 
tlie number o f  eligible families decreased by almost half, w i th  127,479 families receiving rations in 
January 2005. The non-eligible IDPs are expected to receive Samurdhi assistance, provided they are 
eligible for Samurdhi. Tlie quantity o f  dry rations issued by the Ministry o f  Social Services i s  insufficient 
to meet nutritional needs (Jayasinghe 2005). 
149. Displaced persons are also eligible for rehabilitation assistance for permanent settlement. 
Rehabilitation assistance i s  also provided but Permanent settlement i s  supported by the Unif ied 
Assistance Scheme (UAS) coordinated by the Ministry o f  Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. I t  i s  
“made available only to families who have returned to land/property that they own, or which has been 
granted by the authorities, or i s  available to returnees for the purpose o f  durable settlement, and where the 
returnee and his family have demonstrated a clear intention to remain i n  the location in a permanent 
There were roughly 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in June 2002, o f  whom 172,000 lived in refugee 67 
camps. Since the ceasefire, 345,000 IDPs have returned to their original homes (World Bank 2004). 
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capacity”. The government offers Rs. 25,000 as a grant to returning IDPs to acquire basic tools, inputs 
and temporary shelter and to restart productive livelihoods. Each permanently resettled refugee/IDP 
family i s  also provided with an additional Rs. 250,000. 
150. However, fiscal restraints have limited the coverage of  this provision and many families 
await assistance. Currently, over 100,000 families have been paid this assistance, with a further 125,000 
families awaiting assistance (of  which funds are available only to pay 25,000 families) (Jayasinghe 2005). 
I DPs in government-controlled and LTTE-controlled areas receive food assistance through the 
Commissioner General o f  Essential Services (CGES). I n  2000, 186,33 1 families comprising 674,150 
persons received food assistance including 40,668 families comprising 170,857 persons in welfare 
centers, I 4  1,353 families comprising 484,258 persons l iv ing with relatives and friends and 4,3 10 
economically affected families (Gunewardena 2005). 
151. I n  late 2004 and early 2005, the government, aided by multilateral agencies, launched 
several Tsunami rel ief  initiatives to prevent chronic poverty and help restoring livelihood o f  the affected 
population. The main prograins included cash transfers and the provision o f  loans and grants for 
niicroenterprises v ia microfinance institutions. In addition, numerous public works projects have been 
successfully carried out by several international agencies and NGOs. I t  must be stressed that the 
eiioriiious proportions o f  the disaster provoked an unprecedented response from the indigenous voluntary 
sector immediately after the disaster and even today, it shoulders a large part o f  the re l ie f  and 
rehabilitation work. The groups involved included not j u s t  NGOs described in B o x  4.1, but many others, 
including private sector firms, university students, schools associations, and other spontaneous groupings 
o f  individuals, revealing a bedrock spirit o f  voluntarism, self-organization, resource-mobilization and 
self-reliance across social strata. 
152. A cash transfer program o f  Rs. 5,000 per affected families was launched in the immediate 
aftermath o f  the disaster. As o f  August 2005, three rounds o f  payments were completed. By the second 
quarter o f  2005, over 245,000 families had received at least one round o f  the cash transfer. While no cases 
o f  deserving houses being excluded were reported, there was significant inclusion o f  unaffected 
households in the program confirmed for the first round o f  payments. The results wi l l  help understand if 
siich error i s  preventable in case o f  a major disaster. 
153.  Public works were widely implemented in tsunami-affected communities to help 
households cope with employment loss. As noted i n  chapter 3, public works programs were mostly 
implemented through NGOs and CBOs. As o f  August, the total value o f  the programs was nearly $6 
mill ion, and the prograins have been implemented in al l  affected districts (see Table 4.5). Abeyratne and 
Weeratunge (2005) report that participation in the programs was most sought after b y  wage laborers and 
youth. According to Abeyratne and Weeratunge, these people considered public works as a temporary 
measure that would ease the immediate effects o f  the crisis, expecting to return to their customary 
livelihoods as the crisis eased. Dai ly wage rates for participating in the program ranged from Rs. 300 to 
400. I t  therefore appears that the principle that participants are paid slightly below the prevailing local 
market rate for unskilled agricultural labor has been violated (note that according to the Central Bank 
data, in December 2004 daily wages in  agriculture were Rs. 322-377 for males and Rs. 227-266 for 
females). Indeed, Abeyratne and Weeratunge report that in certain sectors in some districts, labor 
shortages resulted from these programs (for example, in the paddy sector in Trincomalee district), raising 
daily wage rates by 20 to 30 percent. 
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Table 4.5: Public works orpanized in tsunami-affected areas. 2005 
Donor Agency Tota l  Value Period o f  Location/ district Activity 
ADF (Govt. o f  25,000 Feb-Aug 2005 Betticaloa, Debris cleaning & roads 
France) Trincomalee 
.. ." ............ _. activity ...... " . ..... " " .... "l."."l."",l I 
CARE - Germany 
& EU 
USIAD 
DFIDALO + FA 
UNOCHA - Flash 
Appeal 
DCA - Germany 
JCCP - Japan 
Spanish - Red 
Cross SP 
Govt. o f  Japan 
World Vision 
International & 
USAID 
OXFARM GB* 
530,400 
1,204,000 
998,130 
750.000 
1 1  5.450 
77,500 
130,000 
800,000 
100,000 
1,150,200 
Apr-Dec 2005 
Jan-Sep 2005 
Apr-Sep 2005 
Jan-Sep 2005 
Feb-Jun 2005 
Jan-Apr 2005 
Jan-Aug 2005 
Jan-Dec 2005 
Mar-Dec 2005 
Feb-Dec 2005 
Hambantota 
Am para, 
Hambantota, Matara 
Kalutara, Trinco, 
Galle, Batti & Jaffna 
5 Districts 
Ampara, Batticaloa 
Trincomalee 
Galle, Kalutara 
12 districts 
Galle & Jaffna 
Batticaloa, 
Debris, drainage, 
irrigation 
Debris, roads, irrigation, 
env. Construction 
Infrastructure 
construction 
Infrastructure 
construction 
Debris cleaning & roads 
Debris cleaning roads 
Debris, roads, drainage, 
env. construction 
Debris cleaning roads, 
env. Improvement 
Debris clearing & 
infrastructure 
improvement 
Rehabilitation o f  rural 
..................................................................... Ham bantota, ........... ".... " Matara " ........ roads?...!!I"! 
TOTAL 5,880,680 
Sozo.ce: ~ L O ' S  survey among donor agencies, September 2005. 
Note: The data may be underestimated, because not a l l  donor agencies responded to the survey. 
--*\-.-- 
4.4 Reforming Safety Nets 
154. Reforming safety nets requires the development o f  an overall strategy that will re-orient 
safety nets to contribute to both equity and growth. A four-prong strategy i s  proposed. First, cash 
transfers/social assistance should be better targeted to the chronic poor, with design features that reduce 
work disincentives (e.g., appropriate benefit levels, workfare). Second, safety nets should increasingly 
become "safety ~-opes"-nieans o f  helping people to move out o f  poverty and vulnerability-through 
improvements o f  the human capital and earning possibilities o f  the poor. Third, social assistance should 
also be linked to individual vuliierability-(orphans, at risk youth, abused women, and seasonal 
unemployment) by strengthening social welfare and care services. And finally, the response to aggregate 
vulnerability, such as natural disasters should be scaled up. 
(a) Reforming the Samurdhi System: Addressing Chronic Poverty 
155. The Government of Sri Lanka has recognized the need to reform the welfare system, mainly 
by improving transparency in targeting the poor. Welfare Benefits Act  No. 24 o f  2002 has paved the 
way for key r e f o r m  in the sector. The Act's mandate is  to provide the necessary legal framework for the 
payment of all welfare relief, to set out a transparent process by which the recipients o f  such benefits can 
be identified, and to provide for the termination o f  such benefit. The main thrust o f  the Ac t  is  to (a) l imi t  
the program to the bottom 25-27 percent o f  the population (around 900,000 households), which will 
enable the increase o f  the transfer amount; (b) achieve better accuracy in identifying the poor; and (c) 
make the transfers progressive, i.e., give larger amounts to poorer households. 
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Eligibility 
156. The Act requires that eligibility of households for the program will be made more objective 
and transparent and be assessed periodically. I n  this regard, the government has implemented a 
formula-based system in  the North and East and i s  looking to implement it in the rest o f  the country as 
well. Accordingly, households that have characteristics most closely associated with poverty-as 
determined by a transparent, proxy means test formula (PMTF>-will become eligible to benefits. The 
number o f  households w i l l  depend on tlie available budget constraint. The selection o f  eligible individuals 
w i l l  thus be made more transparent. Household eligibil i ty i s  proposed to be checked every 1-3 years. 
However, higher administrative costs o f  re-checking beneficiaries wi l l  need to be balanced against 
addressing vulnerability, as new beneficiaries may become eligible for assistance, and reduce leakage- 
some may move out o f  poverty and should become ineligible for  the benefit, making more frequent 
check-ups o f  eligibil i ty (for example, every 6 months) necessary. The Samurdhi Ministry i s  currently 
engaged in devising alternative income generation schemes - as opposed to handouts - for those who w i l l  
transit out o f  the cash transfers scheme as a result o f  better targeting. 
157. All homeless households are to be included in the program automatically, without applying 
the P M T F  (which would be diff icult to calculate in any case). This would not lead to any significant 
change in the coverage and other estimates-homeless households are only about 1.3 percent o f  all 
applicant households in pilot areas, and the average household size i s  much lower for homeless 
households, which translates to relatively low amounts per household using the payment scheme 
described previously.68 
1 5 8 .  Ensuring exit clauses-helping people to move of f  eligibility rolls. The program design should 
also include methods to help households (who can do so) to move out o f  the program. In some countries, 
exit i s  forced by l imi t ing the duration o f  benefit (e.g., US) and with certain conditions for re-entering 
welfare rolls) or through improving the households prospects for  earning income and helping their 
children escape poverty (through conditional cash transfer programs, e.g., Mexico and Brazil). 
Adequacy and work incentives 
159. The benefit will consist o f  two components: a fixed component that is  an equal amount for all 
eligible households, and a variable component that has a fixed amount per member or appropriately 
defined subsets o f  members. The variable amount has been defined as per vulnerable member o f  the 
household, where the vulnerable are children aged between 0 and 15, elderly aged 66 and above, and 
those who are disabled or permanently ill. The rationale for this scheme i s  that such individuals cannot, or 
slioiild not earn income for the household, and are also the ones most affected by shocks to household 
in co in e. 
160. The reform aims to increase the amount of support within existing budget through better 
targeting. Siniiilatioiis show that with t l ie current transfer budget held constant (Rs. 9 bn.), a program 
targeted to around 27.5 percent o f  t l ie  population (which corresponds to the cut-off being considered by 
t l ie Welfare Benefit Board), would cover a little over 900,000 households. Each household on average 
would receive around Rs. 830 per month, compared with the current average grant o f  Rs. 320 per 
household. I t  would also be important to avoid erosion o f  the benefits by inflation, so period adjustments 
o f  benefits in line wi th inflation rate should be considered. 
Twenty four percent o f  homeless households comprise o f  a single member, compared to one percent o f  those 68 
living in homes. Five percent o f  homeless households comprise o f  a 6 or more members, compared to 37 percent of  
those living in homes (World Bank 2005). 
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161. The increase in benefit level may create disincentives to work and should be carefully 
monitored. I f  the average household transfer i s  significantly raised, this may create disincentives to take 
a job and may create a poverty trap. The option mentioned above, raising the benefit to Rs. 830 per 
month, may create si icl i  disincentives (such a transfer would amount to slightly more than a third of 
monthly wages o f  unskilled workers-daily wage earners in the tea, rubber or coconut sectors earn a 
minimum wages of  Rs. 3,025, assuming they work 25 days per month). The impact o f  the increase in 
benefits will therefore have to be carefully monitored. Similarly, the eligibility for benefit needs to be 
monitored on an on-going basis (see above). Workfare programs (discussed in chapter 3) can help reduce 
disincentive by making benefit receipt for able bodied poor contingent on participation in small scale 
works programs. 
162. Benefits will be de-linked from savings and insurance. The practice of  deducting at source 
wil l be discontinued. Likewise, the Samurdhi social insurance scheme wil l  cease to be a mandatory 
scheme and will operate more like a voluntary, contributory scheme. However, Samurdhi beneficiaries, as 
well as other poor who require loans will continue to be able to obtain consumption loans from the system 
so long as they have participated in the group savings scheme and established their credit worthiness. I n  
this way, Samurdhi will become a strictly re-distributional transfer to the poor based on clear eligibility 
criteria. Such poor can participate in the ancillary programs o f  credit and insurance if they so wished, on a 
voluntary basis rather than a mandatory basis. However, some form o f  subsidy to the poorest for the very 
may well be required (see discussion in chapter 3). 
Targeting 
163. The reform introduces proxy means test to determine eligibility. Two critical changes are to 
be effected. First, t l ie introduction o f  a proxy means test formula (PMTF) as the selection criteria. This 
method sliould provide a more objective selection criteria than direct means testing under the 
circiinistances where subjective reports o f  personal income cannot be easily verified (Box 4.3). Second, 
the selection of  eligible individuals will be done by the Welfare Benefits Board, with decision-making 
delegated to the District Secretary, Divisional Secretary, or the Grama Niladkari (GN), Le., though 
decentralized administration. The PMTF has already been tested in a pilot targeting survey covering 
48,000 households in 114 GN divisions, backed up by a field survey o f  a sub sample o f  GN divisions 
(World Bank 20051). 
164. The targeting formula is  to be adapted to conflict areas. The pilot results did not uncover any 
evidence to suggest that tlie PMTF should not be applied in the conflict areas (World Bank 2005). 
However, a number o f  issues were raised by workshop participants on the need to change the way certain 
variables were defined and interpreted for the North and East, which would in turn imply a change in the 
instructions for the application form for the region. These included, for example, instructions about the 
definition o f  cultivable land, which i s  a variable in the PMTF. I n  the North and East, this definition will 
have to be reflect a possible impact o f  conflict-namely that land, cultivable in the past, cannot be 
cultivated next season because it may now have mines. 
63 
Box 4.3: Developing a proxy means test formula 
In principle, conducting a direct “means test” that correctly measures the earnings o f  a household i s  the best way to 
determine eligibility when the poor are the target group, as i s  the case with Samurdhi. In practice, however, such 
straightforward means tests suffer from several problems, the most important being that verifying incomes o f  
households i s  very difficult in developing countries where reliable income records do not exist. Thus the idea o f  
using a Proxy Means Test Formula (PMTF) that avoids the problems involved in relying on reported income i s  
appealing. This involves using information on household or individual characteristics correlated with welfare 
levels in a formal algorithm to proxy household income or welfare. These instruments are selected based on their 
ability to predict welfare as measured by, for example, consumption expenditure o f  households. The obvious 
advantage o f  proxy means testing is  that good predictors o f  welfare-like demographic data, characteristics of  
dwelling units and ownership o f  durable assets (as long as these cannot be changed or moved, respectively)-are 
likely to be easier to collect and verify than are direct measures like consumption or income. This has led to 
PMTFs being widely used around the world for targeting safety net programs, and the Steering Committee set up 
by the Government o f  Sri Lanka to guide the technical aspects of  the reform process has also decided to adopt a 
PMTF to identify the target group for Samurdhi benefits. 
Source: Sri Lanka Poverty and Social Impact Analysis, World Bank (20051). 
165. While not considered under this reform, community participation methods can be used to 
validate eligibility lists created by PMT formula targeting process. Such a validation would be 
particularly important, as Coady et al. (2004) fi nd that the method o f  targeting per se i s  virtually 
irrelevant for it effectiveness. For example, means tested programs scored among the best and among the 
worst among the 100 programs evaluated by the authors. They identify community participation as one o f  
the rare approaches which does make a difference. Community participation i s  not new to Sri Lanka, and 
was practiced quite successfully in selecting beneficiaries for the Janasaviya Program, the Samurdhi’s 
predecessor (World Bank 1995; see B o x  4.4). I t  i s  worth stressing that effective community participation 
i s  also one the promising methods to include in the program the hard core, hard-to-reach poor. The 
government’s welfare reforin as articulated in Sri Lanka New Development Strategy (Ministry o f  Finance 
and Planning 2005) also mentions the adoption o f  community screening methods as part o f  i t s  proposed 
welfare reform. Thus, combining community participation wi th  PMT may yield a stronger targeting 
approach. 
166. Strengthening administration of the Samurdhi program. Cash transfers are to be distributed 
through individual accounts created i n  post offices (instead o f  Samurdhi banking societies as i s  the 
current practice), preferably in the name o f  the female member o f  the household (particularly in areas 
where alcoholism i s  a problem). Timely distribution o f  benefit will also be important, given that some o f  
the benefits noted above are delayed, which cause undue hardship to eligible poor. Potential recipients are 
required to provide all information relating to the income and asset status o f  themselves and their 
families. To increase transparency, the names o f  eligible persons would be published in the media a time 
frame o f  I O  days given for receipt o f  objections, which would then be investigated. Any person or public 
officials found to be declaring false information would be subject to trial and if found guilty subject to a 
fine o f  5-10,000 and imprisonment o f  up to one year. Divisional Secretaries are responsible for ensuring 
the update o f  names including omissions and deletions to the l i s t  o f  eligible persons (Centre for Poverty 
Analysis 2004) While fines and threats may reduce false claims, the verification o f  eligibility and 
monitoring o f  claims wil l  s t i l l  need to be undertaken, particularly if governance remains an issue. This 
could be strengthened via random audits, and fair complaints procedures. Community groups might also 
be used to help target and monitor programs and ensure benefits are delivered to those identified by 
PMT/community-based targeting methods. 
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Box 4.4: Community participation in targeting welfare benefits-Sri Lanka's experience with 
Janasaviya 
Many non-poor received the income transfer in the first round o f  the Janasaviya Program. For example, the original 
income ceiling o f  Rs. 700 o f  Round 1 was found not to apply in practice, as a random survey o f  nearly 300 
beneficiary households found that nearly 30 percent had incomes above Rs. 1,500 per month before entering the 
program. But having first used income-based indicators to select beneficiaries, the Janasaviya Program 
subsequently replaced these with a set of  detailed, region-specific criteria identified with the assistance o f  the 
support team members and the Grama Niladhari under the supervision o f  the Divisional Secretary. These were 
framed on observable variables such as the ownership o f  land and consumer durables, and yielded valuable 
division-specific information on divisional economies, and the kind o f  income-generating opportunities that were 
available. 
Officials then resorted to community-based screening methods to improve targeting and village-level committees 
used the new criteria to identify eligible families, and l i s t s  o f  those eligible in descending order of  poverty were 
publicized. Anonymous complaints were then gathered and evaluated by the Divisional Secretary, and were 
thereafter inquired into by an investigative team comprising of  government officials, NGOs and others among the 
general public. These inquiries were usually made at a public gathering or "Janahamuwa", where the selected 
family and others were questioned in order to verify that they were indeed eligible for Janasavi benefits. Fine- 
tuning of  the screening process improved targeting efficiency considerably. 
Source: Gunatilaka (1997) 
(b) Options for Helping the Poor Escape Poverty 
167. Recent advances have moved social safety net programs from purely helping the poor to 
cope with poverty to helping them to escape from poverty, while Samurdhi reforms discussed above 
help transform the program to one which i s  purely redistributive. Examples o f  such innovations include 
making income transfers conditional on the access o f  the poor to health and education services, 
particularly for children, and boosting the income earning opportunities o f  the poor v ia access to micro- 
finance. Many programs, for example in Latin America and in Turkey, that started out on a pure cash 
transfer basis have been now transformed into programs that simultaneously enhance human capital by 
adding measures to help the poor escape poverty to cash transfer assistance. 
1 68. Hirntnn Cripitnl Developnzent. While the above describe Samurdhi reform does not address th i s  
issue, cash transfers could be used as incentives to reach the small share of children who are not enrolled 
in school and reduce dropouts, and also to help the poorest participate in nutrition based programs given 
malnutrition remains an important challenge for Sri Lanka. 
169. Improving school participation o f  poor children and reducing early drop-outs from 
schooling. Our analysis identified financial constraints as an important factor behind lack o f  enrollment 
and early drop-outs from schooling (see chapter 2). A conditional cash program-the program that makes 
income transfers conditional on continued school enrollment-may help to prevent such dropouts. Such a 
program would be targeted to five and six year olds, to prevent late entry to school, and to eleven to 
fourteen year olds (those attending lower secondary grades), to prevent them from dropping out, and 
would be available in selected poor, rural and urban, areas. Evaluations show that these programs can 
raise school enrollnient and attendance rates (and improve chi ld health and nutrition, if that i s  the 
program's objective)-see Box 4.5. Such programs need to be well targeted, so  that there i s  transparency 
aboiit \\ ho receives tlic transfers. The level o f  benefits and the number o f  beneficiaries i s  also easily 
aci.jiidecl and e~ tcnded  in times o f  crisis. I hese programs may also need to be coupled with 'flexible' 
timing in the provision o f  schooling/tio~i-fonnal education to meet the needs o f  working children, and 
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with progi‘aiiih that providc hearing and \. isual testdaids to disabled children to increase their enrollment 
and prctcnt dropouts. 
Box 4.5: Conditional cash transfers as a way to improve school attendance, health and nutrition of  the 
poor 
Conditional cash transfers provide money to poor households conditional on various desirable behaviors, such as 
sending children to school and visiting health centers for growth monitoring, immunizations, and nutrition 
interventions. These programs have been implemented in increasing number o f  countries, particularly in Latin 
America and Caribbean (Brazil, Honduras Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua), but also elsewhere (Turkey, for example). 
Mexican “Progresa” in 1999 reached 2.3 million families, and in Brazil (Bolsa Escola and PETI) and Jamaica 
(PATH) conditional cash transfers are widely used to promote health and education o f  children (World Bank 
2 0 04 b). 
Evaluations show that conditional cash transfers are an effective means for promoting human capital accumulation 
among the poor households, as well as for poverty reduction. There i s  clear evidence o f  success in increasing 
enrollment rates, improving preventive health care and raising household consumption (Rawlings and Rubio 2004), 
as well as enabling households to make previously unattainable investments in income generating activities 
(Gertler, Martinez and Rubio 2005). For example, the Mexican program (Progresa) increased primary school 
attendance by more than 2 percent and secondary enrolment by more than 8 percent, while it led to an increase in 
health visits by some 20 percent. The Brazilian Bolsa Escola reduced school drop out from 5.6 percent to 0.4 
percent (Rawlings and Rubio 2004). 
170. Combating child malnutrition. Currently, the government applies a four-prong approach to 
fight child malnutrition: (a) measures to address specific nutrition problems, (b) health interventions, (c) 
direct food consumption based measures to ensure adequate nutrition intake among households and 
individuals, and (d) poverty reduction programs (World Bank 2005a). However, there i s  l i t t le  evidence 
about the effectiveness o f  these public nutritional interventions. Given the lack o f  solid and robust 
research, these nieasiires may also fail to address some important aspects o f  malnutrition. Therefore, more 
work i s  needed to understand and tackle the causes o f  malnutrition and design interventions that w i l l  help 
address this problem. Assuming income w i l l  be a major constraint i n  program participation o f  the poorest 
children, to ensure their participation (and potentially that o f  their mothers), the Samurdhi program could 
be made conditional on participation o f  poor children i n  the appropriately designed nutrition programs. 
17 1.  Increasing Income of the Poor. There i s  growing evidence that linking the poor with programs 
that help them generate income, e.g., training and micro-finance, help these groups escape poverty. We 
have already discussed training o f  poorer informal sector workers in chapter 2, and focus here on the 
provision o f  micro-finance programs to the poor. Samurdlii, too, has developed such programmes. But  
forced participation has been damaging to overall objectives. Hence, delinking the microfinance programs 
from the income transfer program, giving the poor a choice about whether to participate, and ensuring the 
autonomy o f  the other programs may yield more positive outcomes. In addition, linking the poor to 
comni i~ni ty based self-help groups may also be useful in helping them escape poverty. 
172. Microfinance for the poor: strengthen the micro finance industry and pilot innovative 
financial services to the very poor. Given the wide outreach o f  microfinance institutions, enhancing 
their services to the very poor may provide new ways to the poor to escape poverty. T o  achieve this goal, 
efforts must be made in two directions (see Annex 4.1 for the description and analysis o f  key problems of 
the microfinance industry i n  Sri Lanka). First, improve conditions o f  the industry by strengthening the 
regulatory framework to ensure the security o f  deposits and probity o f  microfinance organizations. An 
independent regulatory body with representatives o f  major stakeholders on i t s  governing board needs to 
be established with sufficient safeguards to prevent its capture either by the government or by the 
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in icrofinance providers themselves. There i s  also a need for greater transparency about the extent o f  
subsidy received by the niicrofinance providers. And the Samurdhi Bank system needs strengthening o f  
its governance to gain the autonomy from the political establishment. Second, efforts should be redoubled 
to rigorously assess the impact o f  microfinance on poverty, especially o f  the very poor clientele. 
Moreover, while promising examples exist about how to weave in financial service to standard safety net 
programs, not enough knowledge exists about the methods and conditions that bring success in 
microfinance (see an example o f  an “opportunity ladder” provided by financial services in Box  4.6). 
Piloting various methods o f  providing financial services cum training and provision o f  selected business 
services to the very poor segments o f  population, and rigorously evaluate them (including analyzing the 
effects o f  poverty reduction by longitudinal surveys), i s  therefore needed. 
Box 4.6: Combining public works with financial services 
Under the Rural Maintenance Program o f  CARE, Bangladesh, poor women have been recruited for a four-year 
period to maintain earthen village roads as part o f  a public works program. They have to enroll in a compulsory 
savings plan, setting aside 22 percent o f  their earnings, and they have to participate in a comprehensive cycle o f  
life-skills training (including basic numeracy, health, nutrition, and income generating activities). The program i s  
active in approximately 90 percent o f  districts in rural Bangladesh, employing over 40,000 women with 10,000 
o f  them graduating every year. Seventy nine percent of  these women continue with self-employment activities, 
and 66 women graduates have been elected to local government office to date. 
The program has successfully met the twin challenges o f  targeting the poorest and ensuring program graduation. 
Equipping theni with necessary skills and helping them to generate substantial savings prepared women to start a 
microenterprise. 
Source: Hasheini (2005). 
(c) Helping the Poor Cope with Vulnerability 
173. Aside from addressing chronic poverty, safety net programs can help address other individual 
vulnerabilities and help individuals cope against large covariate shocks. Strengthening these programs 
may not be fiscally neutral and fiscal cost w i l l  require careful consideration prior to implementation. 
A (1 d res s i n g in d iv i d u a 1 vu In era b i I i t i es 
174. Disability/illness of main breadwinner, or  other household member, is  likely one of the 
largest health shocks affecting families. As noted above, addressing disability requires a comprehensive 
approach and also much more facilities and resources. Such an approach i s  embodied in Sri Lanka’s 
national strategy for disability, and it w i l l  have to be assessed against the overall budget envelope. The 
efforts in this area shoiild include: (i) improved information and awareness about the problems o f  the 
disabled.69 This requires providing more and better information about the incidence and type o f  disability, 
public awareness campaigns which would inform the public o f  the benefits o f  preventing disability, and 
help reducing the stigma about the disabled and including them in the society; (ii) improved prevention- 
developing measures to improve road safety, safety at the workplace, improving nutrition; (iii) facilitating 
participation o f  disabled ful ly in the socio-economic l i f e  o f  their community, including in education and 
health programs (through, for example, provision o f  hearing aides or glasses, or improved emergency 
treatment and care o f  mental illnesses, trauma and depression); and (iv) better coverage o f  disabled in 
safety net programs (and ex ante i n  disability insurance programs, see chapter 3). Perhaps most 
I t  was found, for example, that the lack o f  disability awareness negatively impacted the inclusion o f  people with 69 
disabilities at a l l  phases o f  the recent tsunami relief efforts. 
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importantly, ensuring the participation o f  the disabled in employment/training programs to help them 
access jobs w i l l  be critical for improving their wel l  being and helping them escape poverty. 
175. Social welfare and care services. Attending the needs o f  other vulnerable groups, such as 
alcohol and drug abuse, orphans, and street children, requires strengthening social welfare and care 
services, which i s  a very useful complement to cash transfer programs. These services provide or 
facilitate the provision o f  counseling for victims o f  trauma, alcoholism, divorce, loss o f  parents, and other 
social problems. While services can be outsourced to private providers/NGOs, the government agencies 
need to set standards o f  care, license providers, and regulate the provision o f  services. The scaling up o f  
these services will also require adequate financing, with the benefits o f  provision reflects against the long 
term consequences o f  inadequate care. Sri Lanka already implements programs in this area (including 
NGOs), but these programs would need to be adequately funded and strengthened to address these 
i in portant v ti I nerab i I it i es , 
Addressing Aggregate Vulnerabilities 
176. To address clisnster/(lrouglzt relief, the government could consider a package of 
interventions: cash/livelihood grants, workfare, and social welfare and care services, to be scaled up 
in case o f  disasters. One o f  the painful lessons o f  tsunami has been the lack o f  programs prepared in 
advance and readily available for re l ie f  and recovery response. A social protection component o f  such an 
intervention would systematically prepare and design programs to protect the affected population 
(appropriately defined), ready to be rolled out in terms o f  emergencies, and form an integral part o f  the 
country’s disaster prevention and coping strategy. Specifically, the safety net component would (i) meet 
immediate basic needs by ensuring food, shelter, and medical aid for immediate relief o f  disaster victims; 
(ii) distribute cash grants to provide for the minimum subsistence needs o f  affected households (and 
perhaps to restart livelihoods and rebuild housing); (iii) facilitate income earning opportunities for poor 
during the post-crisis through access to micro-credit and grants to start up businesses; (iv) offer workfare 
programs for those able bodied poor who are not able to f ind a j o b  or increase their income (see Box  4.7 
for key design elements o f  a successful workfare program); and (v) link affected individuals to social 
welfare and care services that could help provide, for example, needed counseling and family placement 
for individuals suffering the trauma o f  the loss o f  family members (e.g., orphans and widows), and help 
the disabled (with rehabilitation, orthotics, and psycho-social support). 
177. Providing relief for conflict-affected groups and areas. This effort could have several major 
thrusts. First, helping demobilized soldiers (and perhaps to other previous active participants in combat) 
to reintegrate into the c iv i l  society through programs that support their employment or creation o f  self- 
employiiietit. including labor market counseling and job  training. Such programs are common in countries 
which have undergone civ i l  conflicts in other regions countries which have undergone c iv i l  conflicts, e.g., 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (see Box 4.8). Second, addressing the special needs o f  children-ex-combatants 
and others, for example, to ensure that these children attend school and obtain needed health care. Third, 
measures also need to be taken to integrate disabled children and youths into society to ensure access to 
treatment including trauma counseling and other psycho-social assistance (see above section on 
disability). Finally, community rehabilitation-of schools, roads and essential infrastructure through 
public works or workfare-could also be provided (at the same time, offering temporary income support 
to the unemployed or demobilized soldiers). 
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Box 4.7: Key design elements o f  a successful workfare program 
In designing public works programs, several general principles should therefore be followed. First, forgone 
earnings should be minimized by attracting workers who have low alternative earnings opportunities. Second, 
displacement effects should be avoided, among others, by the careful selection o f  areas o f  activities. Third, while 
the program should in principle be open to anyone, wages should be set low enough so as to trigger a self-selection 
mechanism through which only those in need participate. Low wages also encourage participants to search for a 
regular job. And fourth, to maximize the their intended effect on income generation by the poor, projects that 
require heavy non-labor costs should be avoided, particularly during crises. I n  general, public works should be 
more labor intensive than required by pure profit maximization. 
Argentina’s Trabajar program i s  a very well know example o f  a successful workfare program, illustrates the above 
design elements. Trabajar allocates funds across provinces based on the distribution o f  the unemployed poor. 
Proposals to use the funds are made by municipalities and non-government organizations. These proposals are 
approved at the regional level, based on a system o f  points related to poverty in the area and the merits of  the 
proposed project. The government pays for the costs o f  unskilled labor and the sponsoring units pay for the 
equipment, materials, and the skilled labor. The wages for unskilled labor are set at two-thirds o f  the average wage 
for the poorest decile in the capital city. In principle there are no restrictions on the eligibility o f  beneficiaries to 
participate in the program, but in practice there i s  rationing. The financing of  the Trabajar program as a matching 
grant scheme not only induces local governments to commit to the project, but it also induces local governments to 
make use o f  more labor. The use o f  labor intensive approaches i s  thus enhanced through incentives to local 
governments rather than through instructions to contractors and engineers. 
Source: Vodopivec (2004) and de Ferranti et al (2000). 
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Box 4.8: Emergency labor redeployment project 
Following the Dayton Peace Agreement o f  November 1995, an estimated 425,000 soldiers were demobilized from 
the armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their reintegration into civilian life-supporting them to find employment or 
to create sustainable jobs and businesses-was facilitated by the two successive Emergency Demobilization and 
Reintegration Projects implemented by the World Bank. The projects provided labor market counseling services 
and promoted on the job training and s e l f  employment in small business activities and in agriculture. In one o f  the 
projects, 5,426 ex-soldiers participated, o f  which 1,520 took jobs under the on-the-job training component; 3,450 
started farming (the project supported, for example, the purchase o f  cattle and farming machinery), and the rest 
undertook vocational training. The table below summarizes some demobilization programs targeting ex combatants 
or aiming at reducing military in other countries: 
P roj ecti SI< i I Is  Assistance Average US$ per Duration of 
beneficiary Assistance COU!.!2 -_I_--- ___-_ --_I- 
Angola 2002 Low Cash and in-kind 300-900 6 months 
Bosnia 2000 Low In kind grants, job 2,900 One year 
Bosnia 2003 All-levels Cash 5,000 NA 
Bosnia All levels Training modules 500 3 months 
1996 
Cambodia 200 1 Low Cash and in kind 1,126 NA 
Chad 1996 1997 Low Cash 860-1,480 One year 
Djibouti 1995 Low Cash 1,000-2,000 6 months- 1 year 
Eritrea 1993 A l l  levels Cash 800-1,600 6months 
Namibia 1990 Low Cash and in kind 1,263 9months to 1 year 
Rwanda 1997 Low Cash 750- 1,600 10 months 
Rwanda 2002 Low Cash and in kind 110-1,100 6 months 
Uganda 1992 Low Cash and in kind 1, 114 6 months 
placement, training 
. ~ - ~ - - _ x l - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ . _ - ~ ~ ~ -  
Source: Naqvi (2005). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Equity is complementary with the pursuit of long-term prosperity, 
and institutions and policies that promote equal opportunities- 
where all members of societies have similar chances to become 
socially active, politically influential, and economically 
productive-contribute to sustainable growth and development. 
World Development Report 2006 
178. Previous chapters described the main risks and identified the poor and vulnerable in Sri Lanka, 
and studied the functioning o f  the main programs and formulated policy options in key social protection 
areas - labor market, social insurance, and social safety nets. Bui ld ing on the above analysis, this chapter 
sunimarizes key analytical findings and presents a unified policy framework to address social protection 
issues across i t s  diverse areas and programs. 
5.1 Summary of analytical findings 
179. The report identified the following key poor and vulnerable groups. Among children, those 
living in large families, who are disabled, out-of-school children, child workers, and malnourished 
children. Among working age adults, informal sector workers l iv ing in remote and infrastructure poor 
areas (particularly uneducated, casual and own-account workers), unemployed youth from low income 
families, displaced due to the c iv i l  conflict or natural disasters, and the disabled. Among the elderly, only 
the oldest face above-average poverty rates, but rapid aging o f  the population may lead to strains in the 
traditional and formal income support systems and contribute to future vulnerability among the elderly. 
180. The report found that Sr i  Lanka should be commended for putting in place an extensive 
social protection system. Sri Lanka’s social protection system i s  much more extensive than in other 
South Asian countries, wi th up to a third o f  the workforce covered in  case o f  employment protection and 
social security, and about 40 percent o f  households covered in  the case o f  the largest safety net (cash 
benefit) program (see Table 5.1, which i s  summarizing social protection programs, key issues, and 
proposed policies directions). I n  2004, social protection expenditures amounted to approximately 3 
percent o f  GDP (2 percent for  pensions and 1 percent for safety nets). The main safety net programs are 
the Sainiirdhi income transfer to the poor, income support for disabled soldiers and families o f  service 
personnel who died in the conflict, assistance for persons displaced by the conflict, and emergency 
assistance to people affected by natural disasters. Sri Lanka i s  also to be commended for ratifying eight 
1LO conventions on core labor standards and for establishing tripartite mechanisms for social dialogue. 
18 I. But the country’s social protection system could be strengthened in all three core areas - 
labor markets, social insurance, and social safety nets. By forcing many individuals to cope with 
rather than avoid poverty and vulnerability, Sri Lanka’s segmented labor market benefits the non-poor 
and excludes the poor, thus importantly contributing to both inequality and inefficient utilization o f  
resources. Moreover, despite the fact that a substantial share o f  labor force i s  covered by formal old age 
income support, there i s  s t i l l  a large coverage gap, benefits are inadequate and fiscal sustainability o f  
several schemes questionable. And the main safety net program, Samurdhi, i s  poorly targeted, provides a 
low level o f  benefits, and i s  not appropriately linked to human capital development or income generation 
o f  the poor. 
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182. (a) Key issues in the labor market: While devoting significant attention to  worker protection 
and promotion, Sri Lanka has yet to achieve the right balance o f  policies and programs. In line wi th i ts  
focus on social policies, Sri Lanka’s legislation covers various aspects o f  working conditions and protects 
core labor standards. On the other hand, Sri Lanka’s employment protection institutions (such as the 
employment protection legislation and wage setting mechanisms) ensure overly generous benefits and 
wages to formal sector workers, and by doing so, reduce access to ‘good’ formal sector jobs (and 
associated insurance schemes) for two thirds o f  the labor force working in the informal sector, as well as 
to some particular groups such as unemployed youth and women. Sri Lanka’s depressed j o b  flows a likely 
consequence o f  the restrictive TEWA system-have potentially adverse implications for productivity 
growth and access to formal jobs by marginal groups. The limited education o f  informal sector workers 
and their location in poorer rural areas also reduce their access to better paying formal sector jobs. And 
restricted formal sector j o b  opportunities appear to lower expected returns from schooling for the poor. I n  
turn, this reduces schooling participation o f  the poor and creates a cadre o f  less educated workers with 
lower formal j ob  prospects, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle o f  poverty. 
183. (b) Key issues in the social insurance. Sri Lanka’s social insurance schemes provide some 
measure o f  protection, but they offer limited coverage, provide inadequate benefits, have weak 
administration and regulation, and their financial sustainability i s  in question. The diverse schemes are 
also not coordinated in terms o f  benefit levels while the l imited portability o f  benefits also constrains 
labor mobility. Individuals are protected against health shocks through coverage o f  medical fees, but loss 
o f  income from sickness-which often constitutes the larger income loss f rom sickness-is not 
compensated, and can lead to poverty. I n  i t s  effort to promote labor market reforms, Sri Lanka i s  
considering the introduction o f  a formal unemployment insurance system, but i t s  design has to be 
adjusted to f i t  the country weak administrative capacity and large informal sector providing abundant 
opportunities for undeclared paid work. To  provide income support for the workers in the informal sector, 
workfare schemes exist on an ad-hoc basis, but Sri Lanka does not have a permanent workfare scheme. 
184. (c) Key issues in the social safety nets. The key income transfer program, Samurdhi, provides 
limited benefits and has large inclusion and exclusion errors. Similarly, income support to disabled i s  
focused on soldiers injured by the conflict, leaving other poor disabled groups under-covered, and a more 
comprehensive approach to disability i s  needed, focusing on prevention and enabling the disabled to 
integrate better into society. And while disaster re l ie f  seems to work relatively effectively and acts as an 
important source o f  income for the affected persons, the relief for the displaced (in the form o f  food 
assistance) is insufficient to meet basic nutrition needs, and rehabilitation assistance for permanent 
settlement faces strong fiscal constraints that limit the coverage. T o  support families and individuals 
affected by the devastating tsunami o f  December 2004, the government, aided by multilateral agencies, 
introduced cash transfers and helped to provide loans and grants for small, medium and micro enterprises. 
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5.2 Gaps in knowledge 
1 8 5 .  The report identified a host o f  important knowledge gaps in al l  key areas o f  social protection to 
be covered by future analysis. Being conceived as a desk-top analysis, the report covered only areas 
which have already been examined by existing s t~d ies . ’~  In doing such analysis, the report identified 
several areas exhibiting important gaps in knowledge. In terms o f  diagnostics, one such area i s  
vulnerability, which, in the absence o f  panel data on household expenditures, has not yet been studied 
adequately (that is, the main risks causing vulnerability, the characteristics o f  groups such suffering a 
decline iii wellbeing, and the magnitude o f  the decline, are yet to be analyzed). Important knowledge gaps 
exist also in a l l  three functional areas o f  social protection: 
I n  labor markets, further work i s  needed to learn about successful strategies and institutions 
promoting labor market outcomes for the youth, and about the effects o f  labor market and other 
institutions on productivity, labor demand, and job  creation.” Cost effective active labor market 
programs also need to be determined, as many findings from industrialized countries about the 
impacts o f  active labor market programs may not apply i n  the developing country setting, given 
much larger informal labor markets and weaker implementation capacity. 
I n  social insurance, further analysis i s  needed to determine the modalities o f  extending coverage 
o f  social protection, i n  particular, to arrive at proposals on how to reduce transaction costs and 
administrative barriers for those that should be covered by the existing programs (like EPF), and 
to propose a voluntary and subsidized approach to expanding coverage in sequential fashion. 
Introduction o f  the unemployment insurance in Sri Lanka wil l  also call for  a further analysis o f  
the design o f  the institutional features o f  the program. 
And in social safety nets, important knowledge gaps relate to the analysis o f  exit conditions 
from income transfer programs. For example, under what conditions can microfinancial services 
(coupled by entrepreneurship training, as well as marketing and accounting services) be 
successfully linked wi th  standard safety net programs, and how to successfully weave in the 
workfare requirements into income transfer programs? Moreover, there i s  l i t t le  evidence about 
the effectiveness o f  current interventions to combat child malnutrition, and analysis leading to 
the preparation o f  a holistic plan to address macroiaggregate vulnerabilities i s  also lacking. 
5.3 Policy directions 
186. Social protection programs are vital to promote growth while ensuring that the dividends o f  
growth are shared more equally among population, and promoting such programs i s  one o f  key 
challenges for Sri Lankan policy makers. A key message o f  the World Development Report 2006 i s  
that the dichotomy between policies for growth and policies specifically aimed at equity i s  false, and that 
important “double dividend” policies exist in all key areas o f  social protection (World Bank 2005e). The 
present report applies that general message and identifies key such policies i n  the Sri Lankan context (see 
summary in Table 5.1): 
I n  labor markets, employment prospects o f  the poor and vulnerable should be increased. That 
goal encompasses both expanding j ob  opportunities (among others, by changing the paradigm 
from protecting jobs to protecting workers) and enhancing equal access to formal sector jobs, as 
h e l l  as improving s k i l l s  o f  the current and future workers, thus boosting their employability. 
This wi  I1 not only promote the access o f  informal sector workers and other marginalized groups 
to “good” jobs, fostering equity, but also enhance productivity. 
Note, however, that the report undertook original analysis in two areas: the impact o f  employment protection 
As mentioned above, the joint WB-ILO initiative under the UN-sponsored “Youth Employment Network” wil l  go 
70 
legislation on job flows and size o f  firins, and the determinants of  informal sector employment. 
long way toward addressing these issues (the work started in 2004 and wi l l  be completed in 2006). 
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I n  social insurance, adequacy and financial sustainability o f  insurance schemes for old age, 
disability and survivors, both formal and informal, wi l l  need to be improved, and the 
possibilities to expand coverage to the informal sector explored-the tasks that wi l l  contribute 
to greater equity, but also to more sustainable growth. 
And social safety nets should be strengthened, not only by ensuring that programs target the 
poor, but also by linking assistance to human capital investments and the expansion o f  income 
earning opportunities o f  the poorest groups, thus helping the poor and making the economy 
in o re prod 11 ct i v e. 
9 
187. The proposed directions effectively link various areas o f  social protection under a unified 
social risk management framework. Boosting employment prospects i s  an obvious priority, as it not 
only increases earnings but also brings more people under the coverage o f  social insurance and ultimately 
reduces the need for safety net interventions. Improved and innovative insurance programs can help the 
poor to better utilize their productive resources, for example, by investing in high risk and return 
activities. And the provision o f  safety net programs can be productively linked to activities related to 
labor market. For many o f  the poor, breaking the dependence on Samurdhi assistance may require 
enhancing their access to training and upgrading their skills, and/or relaxing restrictive labor and wage 
regulations. Similarly, the provision o f  cash transfers that are contingent on participation in schooling and 
health care improves employment prospects o f  the next generation and thus helps the poor to escape the 
vicious circle o f  poverty. By weaving social protection instruments into informal and market-based 
mechanisms in the most productive fashion, the proposed approach thus combines policies aimed at 
coping with shocks with policies reducing the frequency and magnitude o f  shocks. 
(a) Enhancing Employment Prospects for the Poor and Vulnerable 
188. An important short-term task to increase employment chances of  the poor and vulnerable i s  
to improve their ski l ls .  This includes introducing cost effective active labor programs, such as j o b  
counseling and labor market information, and demand driven training programs for vulnerable, 
disadvantaged workers, particularly in rural or remote areas. Piloting o f  new programs i s  warranted to 
design appropriate national strategy (paying special attention to youth, women and disabled). Similarly, 
helping the poor children and youth to improve their education outcomes will also improve their labor 
market chances. To increase participation o f  children in school and reduce dropouts, one option i s  to 
defray the costs o f  education o f  the poorest children by providing safety nets contingent on school 
participation. Innovative approaches to tailor schooling and training around the needs o f  the working 
children, or children who have dropped out o f  school, may also be needed. 
189. To expand and enhance equal access to formal sector jobs, an important, long-term task i s  
to shift the paradigm from job protection to worker protection. Under such a reform (which would 
undoubtedly be a protracted and gradual one), costly protection o f  formal sector jobs via stringent 
employineiit legislation would be reduced (and essential protection o f  basic rights enforced), and the 
protection o f  workers assured via unemployment insurance and other social protection programs. This 
shift would not only promote the access o f  informal sector workers and other marginalized groups to 
"good" jobs, fostering equity, but also enhance productivity growth. Moreover, such a reform would also 
improve competition for jobs and reduce wage premium o f  protected workers. In turn, this w i l l  help 
reduce labor costs and increase both demand for labor as wel l  as international competitiveness o f  Sri 
Lankan firms. And such a reform would help spur productivity growth, because firms would be more 
inclined to introduce new technology and because Sri Lanka would become more attractive for foreign 
investors. 12 
Note also that reducing informality wi l l  require reforms in other, complementary areas. For example, a recent 
investment c l imate  assessment in Sri Lanka shows that while regulatory requirements to entry are low, both rural 
l? 
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(b) Reducing Vulnerability through Social Insurance 
190. The adequacy, administration, and regulation and financial sustainability o f  formal sector 
insurance schemes need to be improved, and the possibilities to expand coverage explored. I n  the 
long run, to improve the f iscal sustainability and coverage o f  informal sector insurance programs, more 
radical measures may be needed, such as the creation of a unified insurance program covering formal and 
selected informal sector workers (with the system being implemented gradually, and after the labor 
market i s  further formalized and improvements in regulation and administration o f  current programs are 
achieved). Thus reforms should both increase coverage (thus contributing to equity), as well as lower 
fiscal expenditures spent on social safety nets (thus reducing constraints to growth). 
191. I n  the short run, important gradual reforms of  social insurance institutions involve 
improvement o f  their services, expanding their coverage and scope, and ensuring financial 
solvency. For the civil service scheme, these measures include gradually reducing target replacement 
rates and introducing employees’ contributions, and for Employees’ Provident Fund and approved 
retirement schemes, increasing retirement ages and improving the linkage o f  benefits to contributions (or 
introducing fully contributory schemes) rather than specifying nominal benefits and contributions in 
schemes covering informal sector workers. Moreover, with regard to death and disability insurance, 
public policy objectives should be clarified with a view to reducing arbitrary differences and inequities 
between workers-paying due attention on political economy considerations. For all schemes, 
information systems need to be upgraded and supervision improved. Moreover, to pave the way to greater 
labor market flexibility and ease the political costs o f  reducing job protection, Sri Lanka should consider 
the introduction o f  unemployment insurance program, but a standard OECD model needs to be adapted to 
the Sri Lankan context (for example, the elimination o f  personalized monitoring o f  continuing eligibility 
conditions and a much simplified benefit and administration structure would render the OECD model 
more appropriate for a low income country). For informal sector workers, particularly the poor, a 
workfare program may be considered. 
192. A longer-term strategy i s  to create a seamless, unified framework for formal and informal 
sector workers, covering old age, disability, survivor and unemployment risks. Social security (old 
age, death, disability) should be based on a defined contribution scheme (or with contributions strongly 
linked to benefits) with parameters set so as to produce a target replacement rate. This would allow for 
complete portability of  benefits (individuals would not lose accumulated benefit when they move jobs, 
easing labor mobility) and increase economies o f  scale in administration (e.g., record keeping) and avoid 
the creation o f  new liabilities. Death and disability insurance, fairly priced based on actuarial results, 
could be purchased for members of  this scheme. Annuitization of  benefit (the conversion of  a lump-sum 
benefit into a stream o f  benefits paid in regular intervals) after retirement could also be made possible. 
Sin1 ilarly, a funded severance portion of  the system could be added and integrated into the unemployment 
insurance (UI) program, with UI benefits being funded by withdrawals from both individual saving 
accounts as well as from the solidarity fund, the latter being financed by pooled contributions of  workers 
and their employers. This approach offers advantages not only in terms extension o f  coverage, but also 
greater labor mobility and financial solvency. A unified system would need to be designed carefully, and 
would only be implemented gradually once improvements in regulation and administration of  current 
programs are achieved. Increased formalization o f  the economy would complement expansion in 
coverage. 
and urban firins suffer from poor quality o f  infrastructure (especially energy and transport) and costly and limited 
access to finance, the factors which pose formidable barriers both to new startups and to investment and increased 
productivity by existing firms (Asian Development Bank and World Bank 2005). 
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(c) Reforming Social Safety Nets 
193. Samurdhi income transfer program needs to be better targeted and the incentives of 
recipients to escape poverty improved. The ongoing reform-aiming to increase the amount o f  support 
within existing budget through targeting based on a proxy means testing formula -is a an important 
initiative and w i l l  improve objectivity and transparency. Eligibil i ty could also be validated via community 
participation. Because inflation has strongly eroded the real value o f  benefits, current benefits should at 
least be maintained in real terms and continually adjusted for inflation. But higher benefits may create 
work disincentives (poverty traps), so suitable exithncentive clauses f rom the program need to be 
designed (e.g. workfare to improve community infrastructure, which can act as a work test for able bodied 
poor), and continual eligibil i ty frequently monitored. Once disability i s  included as a criterion for 
receiving Sainurdhi benefits, it would be possible to consider the option o f  folding disability transfers into 
Samurdhi, or at least ensure consistency across the two main cash transfer programs as a first step. 
194. The safety net programs could be strengthened by helping the poor to participate in human 
development and income earning programs, and to improve their access to skill development. The 
Saniurdlii reform could be Strengthened by using cash transfers providing incentives to improve school 
eiirollnient and reduce dropouts, and also to help the poorest participate in nutrition based programs, thus 
confronting child malnutrition. Helping the poor access micro-finance and training will also assist poor 
people to exit the safety net. 
195. Programs addressing individual and community wide vulnerabilities need to be upgraded. 
Existing social welfare and care services for vulnerable groups need to be improved. While these services 
can be outsourced to private providers/NGOs, the government agencies need to shape policy, set 
standards o f  care, license providers, and regulate the provision o f  services. Strengthening programs for 
disabled i s  also important, and as part o f  the implementation o f  the national disability action plan, efforts 
across a number o f  agencies, both public and private, will need to  be coordinated to raise 
awareness/reduce stigma o f  disability, strengthen prevention o f  disability, and promote tlie inclusion o f  
disabled in socio-economic activities. Among community wide programs, a package o f  disasterldrought 
r e l i e f  interventions could developed, to be scaled up in case o f  disasters (cashAivelihood grants, workfare, 
and social welfare and care services), and the re l ie f  for conflict affected groups and areas could be 
strengthened by helping demobilized soldiers to reintegrate into c iv i l  society, by attending the special 
needs o f  children and youths affected by the conflict, and by rehabilitating schools, roads and essential 
infrastructure through public works. 
196. Towards a more integrated social protection system. The above policy options also help to 
steer various social protection instruments in the direction o f  an integrated system. As a first step, a 
coordination mechanism could be introduced (an inter-agency committee, for  example) to reduce 
coverage gaps and overlaps between programs, align benefits and eligibil i ty conditions, strengthen 
capacity to forecast and evaluate program costs and impact, and pilot and evaluate new approaches. Over 
time, i t  would be important to move beyond coordination o f  programs towards developing a more 
integrated, financially viable social protection system, the system that would provide adequate work 
incentives, that would addresses both chronic poverty and risks, and that would extend coverage to tlie 
very poor. Such a system would be based on reduced employment protection (while protecting basic 
workers rights and core labor standards) and t l ie  provision o f  explicit income protection (e.g., workfare or 
unemployment insurance) and safety nets, including social assistancekash transfer programs as well as 
social welfare and care services, financially viable and wel l  administered formal and informal social 
security schemes. Such a system could potentially evolve, under particular pre-conditions noted above, 
into a unified social security system. 
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(d) Cross Cutting Issues 
197. Ensuring adequate and fiscally sustainable funding for the social protection programs. 
Social protection spending in Sri Lanka i s  skewed towards higher income groups both in the case o f  
safety net programs (e.g., Samurdhi) and in social insurance (e.g., pensions). The proposed Samurhdi 
reforms, as well as social insurance proposals o f  this report, would not only help to correct these 
imbalances, but they would also help keeping public expenditures on these programs in check. In 
particular, improved targeting under the proposed Samurdhi reform wil l  create ample room for increasing 
benefit per recipient - the level o f  which has been strongly eroded because the amount per beneficiary 
has been nominally fixed - without necessarily increasing the overall spending level. Over the long 
term, to ensure fiscal sustainability the country wi l l  need to reduce spending on pension schemes for c iv i l  
servants (and the scheme’s large implicit debt burden) and link pension benefits strongly to contributions. 
Moreover, public expenditures may also be re-directed towards (potentially subsidized) insurance 
coverage o f  the poor and towards adequately funded and efficiently targeted safety net programs. Overall 
spending for safety nets in developed countries peaks at about 2 percent o f  GDP (World Bank 2005e) and 
could serve as upper bound target expenditure for safety net programs for Sri Lanka, including cash 
transfers and social welfare services. Some flexibil i ty and set aside in safety net spending may be needed 
to respond to social protection needs stemming from emergencies, such as natural disasters. 
198. Strengthening capacity to administer programs i s  critical for program implementation. 
Although social protection reforms may bring strong efficiency gains and may promise to improve 
welfare o f  the poor, such reforms are technically demanding and, therefore, the capacity o f  the country to 
design and implement such reforms need to be developed. Social protection reforms are diff icult to design 
because they require meticulous attention to adequacy, incentives, fiscal costs, and monitoring and 
evaluation, and because they often have to be coordinated across different areas (ranging from social 
protection to financial markets, fiscal management, education, and health), and because local 
circumstances need to be carefully accounted for. 
199. Appropriately accounting for political economy considerations is  vital for ensuring 
successful adoption o f  proposed changes. Social protection reforms are politically diff icult because 
many groups prefer the status quo. For example, current beneficiaries o f  strong employment protection- 
incumbent workers and their unions-may oppose any reduction o f  j o b  protection as they consider 
alternatives, such as unemployment insurance, inappropriate; existing beneficiaries o f  Samurdhi may 
oppose reforms because they do not wish to lose eligibility if a more transparent method o f  selection i s  
adopted. And because potential beneficiaries are often without adequate political representation (informal 
sector workers, or the poor who are excluded from safety net programs, for example), and because the 
benefits o f  reforms often accrue only in the long run (such as in reforms o f  old age income support), 
social protection reforms need to be coupled with adequate attention to political economy o f  reform. 
200. Introducing strong monitoring and evaluation of social protection programs to evaluate 
policy impact and inform program design. Sri Lanka already has an effective m i x  o f  surveys and 
administrative data collection that can be strengthened and used on a regular basis to inform policy design 
and impact. Monitoring and evaluation activities involve using sound administrative data, t imely 
household surveys to evaluate program coverage, incidence and adequacy; impact evaluations based on 
timely survey baselines which address a broader range o f  impacts than the input/output focus o f  most 
concurrent evaluations; periodic use o f  process evaluation tools such as public expenditure tracking 
surveys for programs where leakage i s  more pronounced; effective implementation o f  social audits which 
are allowed for in some schemes but rarely used in practice. The capacity to assess actuarial soundness o f  
social security schemes and make actuarial projections o f  the financing impact o f  project design are also 
important tools for policy evaluation and design, and needs to be strengthened. 
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ANNEX 2.1: POVERTY PROFILE 
--- Table A2.1: Poverty profile for Sri Lanka, 2002 (in percent) 
Total 
By province 
Western 
Central 
Southern 
North- Western 
North-Central 
Uva 
Sabaragaiiiu\~ a 
HOUSEHOLD 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Size of the family 
I - 3 members 
4 - 6 members 
More than 6 members 
Children present 
Presence o f  I child 
Presence o f  2 children 
Presence o f 3  children 
Presence o f 4  or more 
chi Id ren 
Presence o f  elderly in househ. 
Elderly 60-69 
Elderly 70-79 
Elderly 80 and over 
Presence o f  children in househ. 
Widows 
Widowers 
Labor market attaclinieiit 
I-Iouschold with at least one 
formal sector \vorlter* 
Household with at least one 
informal sector worker* 
Number o f  employed in the 
household 
None 
One 
Two or more 
Nuniber o f  unemployed in the 
household 
Kone 
One 
Two or more 
I-I oil seho I d s rece i Y I 11 g d i sa b i I i ty 
Poverty 
rate 
22.7 
10.8 
25.1 
27.8 
27.4 
21.5 
37.3 
33.6 
11.0 
19.9 
33.4 
27.0 
18.1 
27.0 
38.3 
51.7 
19.9 
22.2 
25.0 
21.8 
19.0 
8.7 
3 1 . 1  
15.8 
23.8 
22.6 
21.1 
23.5 
33.7 
34.4 
Poverty 
gap 
5. I 
2.3 
5.3 
6.5 
6.1 
4.4 
9.0 
7.6 
2.2 
4.1 
8.1 
6.1 
3.6 
5.8 
9.5 
14.7 
4.4 
5.0 
6.3 
4.8 
3.9 
1.9 
7.1 
3.9 
5.4 
4.9 
4.7 
5.0 
7.7 
10.8 
Poverty Share o f  Share o f  
severity 
1.7 
0.7 
1.7 
2.2 
2.0 
1.3 
3.2 
2.5 
0.7 
1.3 
2.8 
2.0 
1.1 
1.8 
3.2 
5.6 
1.5 
1.6 
2.2 
1.6 
1.3 
0.5 
2.3 
1.4 
1.8 
1.6 
1.5 
1.6 
2.6 
4.0 
the poor 
100 
15.5 
16.4 
17.4 
16.0 
6.4 
11.9 
16.4 
8.9 
42.8 
48.3 
82.2 
26.9 
35.7 
24.6 
12.8 
18.5 
12.7 
5.5 
5.2 
1.1 
10.2 
70.2 
3.7 
46.3 
50.0 
67.5 
18.4 
14.1 
3.8 
total pop. 
100 
32.3 
15.1 
14.3 
13.3 
6.7 
7.3 
11.1 
18.4 
48.8 
32.8 
69.2 
40.3 
35.7 
17.3 
6.7 
21.1 
12.9 
5.0 
5.4 
1.2 
26.8 
51.3 
5.4 
44.3 
50.4 
72.7 
17.8 
9.5 
2.2 
rate 
7.9 
6.0 
11.3 
17.1 
13.8 
4.1 
14.6 
8.8 
1.1 
7.3 
11.2 
9.9 
6.1 
8.0 
12.9 
27.9 
7.4 
5.1 
7.0 
4.9 
2.8 
2.9 
12.6 
7.3 
9.9 
6.2 
6.9 
7.8 
14.6 
29.7 
Rural 
poverty 
rate 
24.7 
12.7 
27.0 
28.6 
27.9 
22.2 
37.2 
34.6 
12.2 
21.8 
36.9 
29.2 
20.0 
29.4 
40.9 
57.1 
21.2 
24.0 
27.5 
24.2 
21.8 
9.6 
33.9 
17.9 
25.8 
24.3 
22.8 
25.7 
37.5 
41.4 
Estate 
rate 
30 0 
25.9 
24.5 
35.7 
34.8 
14.4 
42.7 
33.3 
poverty 
13.9 
20.3 
47.5 
34.9 
17.8 
35.4 
49.5 
56.8 
37.3 
47.9 
40.2 
30.0 
17.6 
25.9 
31 1 
10.5 
30.8 
30.3 
28.8 
31.3 
35.4 
32.6 
Table A2.1: Poverty profile for Sri Lanka, 2002 (in percent) (cont.) 
.,---,-~-----~--- 
Total Urban Rural Estate 
Share of poverty poverty poverty 
Poverty Poverty Poverty Share o f  total rate rate rate 
rate gap severity the poor pop. ,... ...... " ..... " ............... " ....................... .......... ~ 
INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 
Below 5 
5-14 
1 5 - 2 4  
2 5  - 44 
45  - 54 
5 5  - 64 
65-14 
85 and above 
5 grade or less 
6-9 grader 
OIL above but not AIL 
Ail, & above 
I,abor n1arltei s ta lus  
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Formaliinforinal 
75-84 
Education 
En1 p I o y ed 
Formal sector workers* 
Informal sector workers* 
Occupational category o f  
employment 
Senior Managers and 
o f l ic i  al s 
I'ro fcss i (1 i i  n I s 
Technicians and ass. 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service and market workers 
Skilled agr. and fishery 
workers 
Craft and related trades 
Plant and machine operators 
Elementary (unskilled) 
occupations - 
24.9 
30.8 
23.5 
20.8 
18.2 
16.5 
17.9 
21.7 
21.1 
3 1 . 1  
22.7 
10.9 
4.8 
19.6 
26.5 
23.0 
5.8 
27.6 
3.3 
2.2 
3.2 
4.4 
12.6 
27.2 
21.1 
13.4 
31.9 
5.6 
7.3 
5.1 
4.5 
3.9 
3.3 
4.0 
5.1 
5.6 
7.3 
4.8 
2.1 
0.9 
4.2 
5.8 
5.2 
1.1 
6.1 
0.6 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
2.8 
5.6 
4.2 
2.8 
7.2 
1.8 
2.5 
1.7 
1.5 
1.2 
1 .o 
1.4 
1.7 
2.3 
2.5 
1.5 
0.6 
0.3 
1.3 
1.9 
1.7 
0.3 
2.0 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
1 .o 
1.7 
1.2 
0.9 
2.4 
8.4 
24.5 
19.7 
26.9 
9.8 
5.1 
3.5 
1.8 
0.5 
52.0 
39.2 
6.9 
2.0 
38.9 
11.6 
49.5 
32.0 
68.0 
0.6 
0.8 
1 .o 
1.4 
3.3 
1.3 
17.0 
5.2 
69.4 
7.6 
18.1 
19.1 
29.3 
12.2 
7.0 
4.4 
1.9 
0.5 
37.6 
38.9 
14.2 
9.2 
43.4 
9.6 
47.0 
8.9 
91.1 
3.5 
7.7 
6.4 
6.4 
5 . 5  
1.0 
16.7 
8.1 
44.9 
10.8 
11.8 
8.5 
7.0 
6.4 
5.3 
3.2 
4.5 
8.6 
14.4 
8.1 
2.2 
1 .o 
5.7 
11.5 
7.8 
10.8 
1.6 
0.0 
0.7 
0.9 
0.6 
3.7 
16.7 
9.5 
5.9 
13.3 
26.0 
33.2 
25.8 
22.6 
20.1 
17.8 
19.6 
23.9 
22.1 
33.3 
24.7 
12.5 
6.0 
21.1 
28.9 
25.3 
30.0 
6.6 
4.6 
2.6 
3 .1  
5.0 
14.2 
28.5 
22.4 
14.9 
35.5 
39.0 
36.0 
27.0 
30.7 
19.4 
25.7 
39.4 
26.9 
43.2 
31.5 
26.2 
20.9 
10.7 
25.5 
29.6 
31.9 
26.5 
15.0 
0.0 
3.0 
24.0 
21.1 
21.4 
22.6 
26.7 
13.6 
26.7 
Source: Own computations, based on HIES 2002. 
h'ote: formal sector workers are defined as persons engaged in paid employment and having one of  the following 
principal occupations: legislators, senior managers, and officials; professionals; technicians and associate 
professionals; clerks; and plant and machine operators and assemblers. 
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ANNEX 3.1: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN 
SRI LANKA 
3 1 .  The Termination of Employment o f  Workman Act (TEWA) o f  1971 imposes severe layoff 
restrictions. I t  requires employers wi th  more than 14 workers to inform the Commissioner o f  Labor 
about their intended layoffs - and obtain his/her authorization for  doing so (for each individual case, not 
only for mass layoffs). The act requires that the request i s  examined and response provided in three 
months, but until 2003, it did not prescribe the compensation to be provided for the laid o f f  workers. 
32. I n  recent years, the government has tried to expedite the process and to introduce more 
transparency in determination of the benefits. To speed up the legal process, a special act was 
introduced in March 2003 (Special provisions act, No. 13 o f  2003). The act requires that the Labor 
Commissioner responds to applications seeking the layoffs permission, and to complaints about the 
termination o f  employment in breach o f  the act, wi th in 2 months o f  the receipt o f  the application or 
complaint; that the arbitrator makes a decision about disputes between employer and employees within 3 
months; and that the labor tribunal makes a decision about applications against the termination of 
employment within 4 months. To improve transparency, compensation formula was introduced in 2003 
and amended in 2005. Below we describe past experience with the act and present simulations to illustrate 
the generosity o f  the current formula. 
Past experience 
3 3 .  Even before 2005 formula, TEWA compensation of  laid off  has been very generous. During 
2000-03, the generosity index approved by the Commissioner (the multiple o f  the monthly salary per year 
o f  service) w a s  up to a maximuin o f  6 monthly wages per year o f  service, and on average it was between 
1.6 and 3 . 1  monthly wages per year o f  service. I n  2002-03, the generosity index in over 60 percent of 
cases was between 1 and 3, and i t  exceeded 3 in about 15-20 percent o f  cases (Figure A3.1). I n  2002, the 
compensation index (the multiple o f  the monthly salary awarded to workers) averaged at 16.2, and 
amounted to 20 or more in just over one fifth o f  the cases (Figure A3.1). 
Figure A3.1: Generosity o f  TEWA orders and compensation index, 2002-03 
0 
0 
~ -~ 
Number of TEWA cases by index of 
generosity 
0 0 N
; 
0 2 0 0 2  : 
El2003 ' E 
0 
r 
0 
0 2-3 40 
1 month 1-2 2-3 More than 
or less 3 Cmpnsabmlrdax 
. . - 
Source: Own computations based on the information provided by the Commissioner. 
Notes: The index of  generosity is  the multiple o f  the monthly salary per year o f  work service, above computed from 
the TEWA orders for firms; compensation index i s  the multiple ofthe monthly salary awarded to workers, above 
computed from compensation awarded to workers in 2002. 
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34. The corresponding layoff costs to employers were commensurately large. The total sums paid 
out to laid off workers have been large, with the average payment in 2002 being Rs.161,000 and the with 
payments of over Rs.1 million in five percent cases (see Figure A3.2). Additional costs were produced by 
the unpredictability and lengthiness of  the TEWA procedure. In 2003, the average processing time of  
cases concluded by the Commissioner’s order was 9.8 months, and in many cases it can take much more 
(see Figure A3.2 for the distribution of  cases by processing time). What i s  more, the procedure typically 
involves hearings, where employers explain their financial performance and business plans to government 
bureaucrats to justify layoffs. 
Figure A3.2: Application processing time (2003) and compensation amounts awarded to workers 
under TEWA orders (2002) 
_ _  
Number of TEWA cases b y  durationof application 
processing time 2003 (inmonths) 
’4 I 
3-6 7-12 
3 5 .  Older workers were awarded less generous rate o f  compensation. While the generosity index 
was awarded on the case-by-case basis for each individual application (taking into account, above all, the 
financial standing o f  the employer and its capacity to pay compensation to the laid-off workers), our 
regression results show that apart from financial and other conditions of  the firm, workers’ length of  
service significantly influenced the generosity index, with additional 10 years o f  service reducing the 
generosity index by 0.3.73 I t  therefore seems that implicitly, the labor commissioner based the order also 
on the “denied future service.” That is, the commissioner’s decisions took into account the fact that more 
experienced workers - other things equal - were to lose less from the layoff, because they faced smaller 
forgone earnings due to shorter duration of  service forgone with the employer. 
36.  
from 7 1 to 105 per year in 2000-03 (Table A3.1). I n  that period, less than half o f  cases were concluded by 
the order o f  the commissioner - others were withdrawn, dismissed or settled outside TEWA via voluntary 
retirement schemes. In  2002-03, about 30 orders were issued, involving 900 to 1100 workers. (Note that 
because of extremely high costs and cumbersome procedure, the majority o f  layoff cases are quite likely 
handled via voluntary retirement schemes and are thus not recorded as layoffs). 
The number of applications by employers under the TEWA has been quite modest, ranging 
7 3  In the regression, the dependent variable was index o f  generosity and explanatory variables were, apart from 
duininy variable for each firm, wage o f  the worker (proved to be insignificant) and hisiher years o f  service. 
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Table A3.1: TEWA cases -applications by employers and orders made, 2000-03 
2000 2001 2002 2003* 
Application on termination made 
by employers 
Applications received 71 
Applications disposed 23 
Cases pending 5 5  
105 96 71 
60 110 94 
100 86 63 
Orders made by the commissioner 
Number o f  orders 28 3 1  
Number of  workers involved 11000 897 
Average generosity index (number 
o f  monthly wages per year o f  1.6 3 .1  2.1 1.9 
se rv ice) 
Average duration o f  years o f  service 
Average amount o f  compensation 
(Rs.) 160,006 
Soztrces: For applications, Gazette o f  Ministry of  Labor, 2004: for orders made, own calculations based on 
documentation on TEWA cases o f  the Ministry of  Labor and Foreign employment; and ILO (2003) for Average 
generosity index in 2000-0 1 . 
Notes: 2003 refers to January - September. 
o f  workers involved (years) 7.4 
Introduction o f  formula-based amendments of TEWA 
37.  By ex-ante determining the amount o f  severance pay, the recently introduced formulas 
reduced arbitrariness, but the separation process st i l l  requires prior approval. The government has 
made several attempts to impose a compensation formula. I n  2001, a recommended formula was 
introduced, calling for “two to three months salary for each year o f  actual service or full salary for the 
remaining period (denied service) up to retirement, whichever i s  less, subject to a maximum o f  50 months 
salary” (Sri Lan Ia  Labor Gazette, Vol .  52, No.1). I n  December 2003, a mandatory formula was adopted 
by a special act amending the TEWA, calling for generous benefits and adopting a rather complex 
structure (The Gazette o f  Democratic Socialist Republic o f  Sri Lanka, No. 132171 7, December 3 1, 2003). 
Biit the new government, which assumed office in Apr i l  2004, suspended that formula and introduced a 
new formula in March 2005. While the recently introduced compensation formulas link the amount o f  
severance pay to worker’s length o f  service (as common in other countries) and thus reduce non- 
transparency and arbitrariness in the f i r ing process, the process s t i l l  involves ‘prior approval’ by the Labor 
Commissioner and i s  thus not free o f  non-transparency and arbitrariness. 
38.  The separation benefits under the March 2005 compensation formula are well above 
international standards. The March 2005 formula starts with a factor o f  2.5 o f  monthly wages per year 
o f  service for workers wi th 1-4 years o f  service. I t  calls for the increase o f  total benefits with the years o f  
service, but at a decreasing rate, and stipulates the maximum o f  48 monthly wages for service o f  34 years 
and above (see Figure A3.3). For workers with short service, 3 to 4 years, as wel l  as for those with 20 
years o f  service, the generosity o f  the severance pay according to the new formula exceeds the average 
generosity in all regions i n  the wor ld by a multifold factor (Figure A3.4). Even for workers with lengthy 
service, the severance payment i s  very generous. For example, under the new formula a Sri Lankan 
worker with 20 years o f  experience i s  awarded by a severance pay o f  39 monthly wages, in contrast to 
93 
average severance pay o f  16.3 monthly wages in 
other Asian countries, 1 1.9 in Latin American, 7.1 
in African, 6.4 in OECD, and 4.4 in transition 
--------__-____ 
Figure A3.3: Level of severance pay 
compensation, March 2005 formula 
co 11 n t r i es-a staggering d i fference ! 
39.  The generosity o f  the March 2005 
TEWA formula strongly increases the overall 
generosity o f  payments. This can be shown in 
two ways, by comparing the present and previous 
for in u 1 as, and by s i in u I at i on s : 
Under the new formula, the highest benefit per 
year o f  service i s  2.5 monthly wages for a year 
o f  service, dropping to 2 monthly wages for 19 
years o f  service, and to 1.4 for 40 years o f  
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Years of service i 
service. This exceeds the generosity under the 
December 2003 formula for all categories o f  workers, particularly for those with more work 
experience. 
To take into account the likely 
composition o f  layoff workers, we also 
evaluated the generositv o f  the 2005 I 45 7 
Figure A3.4: International comparison of the 
generosity of severance pay I 
formula based on -the following 
simulations. For all 1100 individuals who 
were awarded TEWA compensation by 
orders o f  the Commissioner o f  Labor in 
2002, we computed the values for their 
severance payments assuming that the 
2005 formula applied (knowing the years 
o f  service o f  each worker and using the 
formiila rules). As shown in Figure A3.5, 
the 2005 formula awards a higher 
generosity index to workers whose 
assigned generosity index in 2002 was 
below 2, and reduces somewhat the 
generosity indices for workers who were 
previously assigned exceptionally high 
40 
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30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
E! 3 - 4 years 
20 years 
Source: Own computation, for Sri Lanka; Holzmann, 
Iyer and Vodopivec (2005), for other countries. 
values. As the result, the simulated compensation amount o f  most workers increased, particularly o f  
workers with few years o f  experience. 
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Figure A3.5: Simulation of the generosity of the 2005 TEWA compensation formula 
Generosity Index 
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Compensation Amount 
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1- 2002 0 2005 I 
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ANNEX 5.1: REVIEW OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN 
SRI LANKA 
Microfinalice denotes financial services for people who cannot access credit f rom the formal banking 
system and includes credit for investment and consumption. Traditionally targeted at self-employed to 
boost their ability to take advantage o f  market opportunities, microfinance also caters to the very poor and 
vulnerable, ensuring that they do not suffer f rom drastic erosion o f  incomes and well-being due to sudden 
shocks (Hashemi, 2005). Below we describe coverage and the main providers, review their financial 
performance, and discuss the regulatory framework o f  the industry. We argue that while the 
microfinance coverage in Sri Lanka i s  broad, the providers are highly subsidized and the 
regulatory framework is  weak. 
Having a long history, microfinance in Sr i  Lanka has a widespread coverage and provides a mix of 
services. Together with Bangladesh and Indonesia, tlie coverage exceeds 8 percent o f  population, in 
contrast to most countries, where microfinance institutions reach less than 2 percent o f  population 
(Honohan 2004). Gant et al (2002) found adequate coverage throughout the country except in the Nor th 
and East. There are high levels o f  savings mobilization, even among the poorest. Most  providers offer a 
m ix  o f  consumption and small micro enterprise loans, wi th in a graduated system o f  loans. The providers 
often involve savings groups and societies and use revolving fund ‘seed’ funding. Credit-plus services 
include non-financial inputs such as business development services, management training, financial and 
accounting training, and access to information, markets, product design and packaging. These are costly 
and require substantial subsidy from donors or collaboration with government. 
Both government ancl non-governmental organizations participate (Table A5. 1). I n  2000, the largest 
providers were the Samurdhi Bank Societies (1.2 mi l l ion shareholders), SANASA TCCSs (1 mi l l ion - 
but the extent o f  tlie participation o f  the poor i s  unclear), SEEDS (200,000), and Hambantota Janashakti 
Banku Sangani (25,000). Individuals may be members o f  more than one organization, so membership i s  
hard to estimate, but t l ie  total outreach i s  unlikely to exceed 3 mi l l ion.  The Samurdhi Bank Societies 
appear to be reaching large numbers o f  the poor excluded by other programs (Gant et al. 2002) 
Microfinance providers have relied on high levels o f  subsidy, thus jeopardizing their sustainability. 
The survey o f  providers by Gant et al. (2002) found that the entire microfinance sector except the 
cooperative rural banks and tlie regional development banks i s  subsidized by donors or the government, 
’ iiiaking m icrofinance unsustainable, let alone commercially viable.’ For example, even assuming that 
total staff costs o f  a Samurdhi Banking Society i s  borne by the government, in 2001 more than 50 per 
cent of these banks were not breaking even (Gant et al. note that the Samurdhi Banks are not donor 
dependent and are entirely based on members’ savings for capital). Whi le the literature recognizes that 
microfinance programs are highly cost-sensitive and most rely on subsidies (Morduch 1999), there needs 
to be greater transparency about the extent o f  subsidy required. 
Weak regulatory framework poses a threat to sustainability. The current regulatory environment i s  not 
conducive to tlie security o f  people’s funds or the probity o f  microfinance institutions. Contrary to the 
Banking Act  (Section 76 A (l), amended by Act  No. 33 o f  1995), almost al l  microfinance organizations 
mobilize savings and on lend to their members without the written approval o f  the Monetary Board. 
Moreover, since t l ie requirements for financial disclosure under the Ordinances under which they need to 
register are relatively simple, microfinance providers do not have to demonstrate either their financial 
accountability or probity. 
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There i s  also no legal structure governing the operation o f  international NGOs in microfinance. These 
organizations are thus permitted to receive funds from foreign donors without any restrictions, control or 
s 11 pe rv is i o n by the govern ni  en t . 
Table A5.1: Microfinance Providers in Sr i  Lanka 
Sector Government Non-Governmenth'rivate Multilaterals/ 
Bi-laterals 
and INGOs 
Formal Sector Financial Central Bank Hatton National Bank (HNB) UNDP 
Ins t i t LI t i o t i  s associated National Development Bank UNHCR 
with in1 i c ro finance State-owned banks (NDB) (Conflict 
programs (People's Bank Development Finance Areas) 
( RRDB s )  
Bank o f  Ceylon 
National Savings Ceylinco Development Bank 
Bank) 
Corporation o f  Ceylon (DFCC) 
Microfinance Institutions MFIs set up by SarvodayalSEEDS CARE 
( MFIs) Central Bank SANASA Bank and PTCCS SAP 
Hambantota (WDF) SCF 
Agromart Foundation Ltd. Oxfam 
NFPO and others 
Sewalanka 
Co-operative Rural Banks 
and others 
Traditional village-based MerchantsiMoneylenders 
financial services Community Based Organizations 
Samurdhi Banks Janashakti Banku Sangam - FORUT 
(CBOs) such as Death Benevolent 
Societies 
Source: Nayar and Gunatilaka (2000). 
Microfinance for the poorest segments i s  dominated by the government. Gant et al. (2002) note that 
Samurdhi Banks have reached large numbers o f  the ultra poor who have been l e f t  out by NGO, 
commercial banks, and other microfinance programs. Gunatilaka and Salih (1999) reported that even the 
poor who were excluded from the Samurdhi transfer program were encouraged to form savings groups 
and purchase shares. Where Samurdhi Banks were established and the poor managed to purchase their 
shares, the system became an important source o f  emergency credit for small loans o f  about Rs. 300. 
According to Gunatilaka and Salih, roughly a third o f  bank shareholders regarded the Samurdhi Bank as 
the principal source o f  emergency credit for small loans, relative to 40 percent o f  shareholders that relied 
on friends and relatives, and to 7 percent that continued to rely on shopkeepers and moneylenders. 
Similarly, World Bank (2002) revealed that roughly 10 per cent o f  a l l  loans o f  households i n  the lowest 
two quintiles were from Samurdhi, compared with 7 per cent f rom money lenders and 9 per cent from 
friends. There also appears to be a high degree o f  beneficiary participation and ownership o f  the 
Samiirdhi Banks. In the North and the East, microfinance for social protection i s  provided by the 
expanded relief activities o f  international and national non-governmental organizations (see Box  A5.1), 
although the Samurdlii Bank societies are also being set up in these areas. 
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Box A5.1: Microfinance for Social Protection in the North and East 
Microfinance services to the poorest o f  the region have been provided international agencies and 
organizations such as CARE and FORUT, along with national organizations such as the Cooperatives, 
Sarvodaya, Sewalanka and other NGOs. Demand for credit has been high and credit operations o f  
organized savings and credit groups have been oversubscribed. 
The survey o f  the microfinance sector in the North and East identified two groups of  extremely 
vulnerable poor in the region who needed consumption, distress and livelihood loans (typically o f  up to 
Rs. 7500). One was the extremely vulnerable individuals, consisting o f  IDPs in welfare centers, and 
individuals belonging to short-term resettled and relocated communities. The other group were those 
belonging to the medium-term resettled and relocated communities. Other than for the IDPs in welfare 
centers, access to consumption and distress loans for the extremely vulnerable was found to be fairly 
easy, interest rates were subsidized, procedures were simple, and transaction costs low (because o f  high 
social collateral). For the medium-term resettled and relocated, too, access to microfinance for social 
protection was found to be easy, with a mix o f  below market and market related interest rates, simple 
procedures and interest payments on savings. 
Source: Gant et a l  (2002). 
There i s  little rigorous analysis of  access to microfinance by poor o r  its impact on employment 
creation. Information about impact o f  microfinance i s  limited to evaluations o f  specific programs, both 
independent and in-house, usually initiated by donors. Such evaluations are rarely representative, are usually 
qiialitative and few have baseline data against which to measure progress. Establishing causality i s  also a 
problem. Many factors besides access to finance impinge on the success o f  micro enterprise initiatives. In 
the absence o f  panel-type data, it is virtiially impossible to quantify the contribution o f  microfinance to self- 
eniploynient siiccess. Anecdotal evidence suggests that microfinance services aimed at assisting the poor at 
best succeed in protecting them, but they do not help them move to higher income growth paths (Gunatilaka 
and Salih 1999). But there i s  broad consensus that microfinance organizations have helped empower the 
poor, particularly women, and have raised their confidence levels, and have thus also enhanced 
employability (see Box  A5.2). 
Box A5.2: Women’s Development Federation, Hambantota 
The Women’s Development Federation (WDF) of  Hambantota, or the Janashakti Banku Sangam, began in the late 
1980s and currently has over 33,000 members in five divisions in Hambantota District. I t  i s  owned and managed 
solely by females and i t s  modus operandi is  founded on social mobilization efforts and participation o f  women in 
social and economic activities. Its community driven activities benefit a large number o f  women-headed 
households and their micro businesses. Examples o f  such community improvement activities are harvesting 
rainwater for cultivation and consumption, and access to safe water from both micro and minor irrigation system. 
Recently, the WDF has used World Bank assistance to expand its outreach, undertake more intensive training and 
capacity-building among poor women, and assist Tsunami affected beneficiaries to set up income generating 
activities. infrastructure. 
Source: internal material o f  Women’s Development Federation project (World Bank). 
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